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Abstract 
This dissertation explores financial behavior outcomes based on economic, relational, and 
behavioral characteristics within marriages and individually. Data for the three essays is obtained 
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 cohort (NLSY79) and the NLSY79 Child 
and Young Adult (1986-2008) survey.  
 Essay one examined the determinants of money arguments within marriage utilizing 
Lundberg and Pollak’s (1994) theory of non-cooperative game theory. Respondents’ negative 
financial behaviors, higher income, and birth order (being laterborn) were found to influence a 
greater frequency of money arguments. 
 Essay two examined the predictors of individuals’ financial behaviors, specifically 
socialization characteristics and gender role attitudes (traditional versus non-traditional). Using a 
theoretical framework of gender role theory (Eagly, 1987), younger age, not being married, 
being non-Black, non-Hispanic, being males, and having higher income were all found to be 
predictive of at least of one of the three financial behaviors used in this study. 
 Finally, using a theoretical framework of Becker’s (1993) theory of human capital, essay 
three explored the intergenerational transfer of attitudes and human capital across two 
generations and their possible link to the respondents’ financial behaviors. Results showed that 
mothers’ enhanced human capital, endowed and attained, and nontraditional gender role attitudes 
have a significant positive impact on the children’s financial behaviors. Respondents’ income 
was also found to be significant. 
 Combined results of the dissertation reveal that a link exists between the three issues 
discussed in the individual papers. Essay one examined what factors, including financial 
  
behaviors, might influence spousal money arguments. In response, essays two and three explored 
the predictors of financial behaviors within one generation and across two generations. These 
studies may be beneficial to financial planners, counselors, and therapists by exposing specific 
determinants of positive versus negative financial behaviors. These findings also provide useful 
information for policymakers in creating programs that best serve the needs of individuals 
related to their personal financial issues. Overall, by exploring not only monetary, but attitudinal 
and socialization effects of financial behaviors, this study adds to the body of knowledge related 
to the encompassing field of personal financial planning.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 Introduction 
Individuals and families have recently been subjected to many financial stressors due to 
the downturn of the economy. The United States has seen a recession, rising fuel and food prices, 
a mortgage and credit crisis, increased bankruptcies, and reduced savings (McCormick, 2009). A 
survey conducted by the American Psychological Association (2004) reported that 73% of the 
respondents listed money as the main cause of stress in their lives. Financial strain leads to other 
personal issues such as depression, anxiety, insomnia, and headaches (O’Neill, Sorhaindo, Xiao, 
& Garman, 2005). These situations make it imperative that individuals and families consider 
incorporating the services of a financial professional in order to create and sustain positive 
financial health. 
 “Financial planning is the long term process of wisely managing your finances so you 
can achieve your goals and dreams, while at the same time negotiating the financial barriers that 
inevitably arise in every stage of life” (Financial Planning Association, 2011, p.1). Traditionally, 
the financial planning process has consisted of aiding individuals with financial issues such as 
cash flow management, investment planning, tax planning, retirement planning, estate planning, 
and risk management, etc. According to Grable, Archuleta, and Nazarinia (2011, Chapter 3), 
financial planning is a proactive process, where planning starts with determining an individual’s 
or family’s financial goals and then providing services or products to obtain those goals. On the 
other hand, financial counseling is a reactive process whereby the planner assesses the clients’ 
financial problems or concerns, such as overindebtedness, and assists them in changing their 
negative behaviors or situations. However, both disciplines have evolved into a much more 
complex practice of not only “crunching numbers,” but engaging individuals in awareness of the 
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root of their money issues. In other words, why do consumers exhibit certain financial 
behaviors? In order to face the challenges associated with behavioral change, traditional financial 
planners/counselors have engaged in collaboration with those trained in financial therapy, who 
are trained to guide clients in behavioral change that can make their financial plan successful 
(Maton, Maton, & Martin, 2008). Planners/counselors/therapists who are dedicated to 
collaborating to work with clients in a “holistic way by addressing both financial issues and 
emotional, relational, and behavioral issues that compound the problem have an opportunity to 
change the financial planning and counseling professions” (Archuleta & Grable, 2011 p. 56). 
Such a collaboration will allow financial professionals to help clients achieve long-lasting 
behavioral change and lead to higher levels of emotional, relational, and financial well-being 
(Archuleta & Grable). The overlying discipline of personal financial planning/counseling/therapy 
seeks to assist individuals in dealing with financial issues more effectively, and to generate 
research to assist policymakers in better formulating programs that will address what public 
policy has deemed significant issues.  
Unlike the traditional economist who tends to work with aggregate data to calculate a 
general equilibrium at the firm, industry, or market level, the personal financial 
planner/counselor/therapist explores individuals more deeply and attempts to observe and 
understand individual behavior and its determinants. Rather than attempting to discover the 
aggregate utility function (i.e., total satisfaction) for consumers in a market, the personal 
financial planner/counselor/therapist considers the individual’s utility function. Although 
economic issues influence people’s response to financial concerns, individuals’ behaviors may 
be influenced by other factors. In addition, such financial behaviors may impact personal 
relationships.  
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In response, this dissertation examines financial outcomes based on economic, relational, 
and behavioral characteristics. These studies provide useful information for the overall financial 
planning, counseling, and therapy professions by exposing certain characteristics of individuals 
that may influence their financial behaviors and their relationships where money is involved. For 
instance, in the first essay results showed that as respondent’s income increased, couples engage 
in more frequent money arguments. This finding is contrary to popular press reports which 
suggest that more money can solve problems. In addition, essay two found that one’s attitudes 
related to traditional versus nontraditional gender roles is not significant in predicting one’s 
financial behavioral outcomes, but that gender itself is predictive. Also interesting, essay three 
discovered that gender role attitudes are predictive of financial behavioral outcomes across 
generations; specifically, mothers’ gender role attitudes influence their children’s financial 
behaviors. This paper also found that mothers’ human capital has an impact on their children’s 
financial behavioral outcomes. Apparently, findings from these studies show that not only money 
itself, but other issues may influence one’s financial behaviors and resulting outcomes. By 
exploring not only the monetary facets of behavior, but also the attitudinal and socialization 
effects of financial behaviors, this dissertation seeks to provide useful information to the 
encompassing field of personal financial planning. This research can be used to assist 
practitioners in the area of financial planning, financial counseling, and/or financial therapy, as 
well as add to the body of knowledge that policymakers can access when designing programs 
associated with personal financial issues.  
In the first essay, the issue of spousal money arguments was observed. Research has 
shown that money tends to cause more tension than almost any other issue in marital 
relationships (Britt & Huston, 2012; Regnier & Gengler, 2006). Obviously, relieving marital 
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stress caused by money arguments would be a first step for practitioners working with 
individuals in either counseling them about money issues or helping them plan their financial 
future. A clearer understanding of what causes marital stress in regards to monetary arguments 
would also be useful to policymakers in establishing programs to enable families to make better 
financial decisions.  
The second in this series of essays addresses the issue of gender role attitudes and 
socialization characteristics on financial behavioral outcomes. A fuller awareness of the 
influence of these variables can be useful to both policymakers and practitioners. If a policy or 
planning goal is to modify financial behaviors towards a particular outcome, understanding what 
attitudes and/or characteristics will lead to the presence or absence of that behavior will aid in 
helping individuals address their issues. In addition, this determination will assist policymakers 
in designing programs that will result in the desired outcome. 
The third and final essay deals with the issue of the intergenerational transfer of financial 
behaviors. Understanding what type of household would tend to produce children who either 
exhibit or lack a particular financial behavior would be useful in more effectively targeting 
resources dedicated to improving financial behaviors. For those practitioners working with 
individuals, insight into the intergenerational transfer of attitudes and/or characteristics and its 
influence on their children’s financial behaviors can be beneficial in more fully understanding a 
client, and perhaps enlightening clients about the potential consequences for their children’s 
financial well-being. Information from this study also will provide assistance for policymakers in 
providing successful programs for individuals related to their financial behaviors and resulting 
outcomes. 
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 Regardless of whether practitioners work independently as a planner, counselor, or 
therapist or in collaboration with one another, they must face the reality that they need to work 
with the whole person in order to have a better understanding of their relationship with money 
(Maton et al., 2002). These three papers attempt to capture more of the “whole person” by 
discovering attributes of an individual’s background that will make them more or less prone to 
engage in particular financial behaviors.  
 Description of Studies 
This dissertation examines the topic of individuals’ financial behavioral outcomes. 
Similar to Perry and Morris’ (2005) inquiry, the current study uses a self-reported measurement 
of financial behavior outcomes. All three studies within this dissertation refer to these outcomes 
as simply financial behaviors. First, the study looks at the frequency of money arguments within 
relationships and what factors, including partner’s financial behaviors, might influence these 
arguments. Following this direction, predictors of financial behaviors within one generation and 
across two generations are explored to determine what may actually impact financial behaviors 
which may lead to relationship discourse. Data were obtained from the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) and the NLSY79 Child and Young Adult (1986-2008). The 
NLSY79 has been administered annually beginning in 1979, and biennially since 1994. The 
NLSY79 (1986-2008) is a separate survey in which data has been collected biennially since 1986 
of all children born to NLSY79 female respondents. 
 Chapter Two explores the predictors of money arguments. It is well known that money is 
a reality that couples must deal with in their relationships, and that it may cause “anxiety because 
it is so tied to feelings of success, competence, safety, security, and acceptance in society” 
(Shapiro, 2007, p. 279). As a result, financial disagreements and pursuing arguments rank as one 
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of the most common areas of conflict for couples (Goodman, 1986; Regnier & Gengler, 2006;). 
However, the research related to the causes of money arguments is limited (Britt, Huston, & 
Durband, 2010). Therefore, this essay provides a context for understanding money arguments by 
conceptualizing the frequency of money arguments as being an output of financial behavior 
characteristics, human capital, and demographics, such as age and birth order. Economic game 
theory related to non-cooperative bargaining (Lundberg & Pollak, 1994) is used to provide a 
theoretical framework for the study. It is assumed that when couples argue about money, they are 
not operating from a joint utility function creating a non-cooperative bargaining marital situation. 
This study provides useful information to the financial planning and counseling fields for 
assisting couples in managing their financial relationships. An appropriate journal for submission 
of this paper is the Journal of Financial Therapy.  
 Once establishing the possible importance of individuals’ financial behaviors on the 
frequency of money arguments, Chapter Three determines what factors may influence financial 
behaviors. Guided by gender role theory (Eagly, 1987), the second study conceptualizes that 
one’s gender role attitudes and socialization characteristics are predictive of financial behaviors. 
Gender roles refer to the socially accepted set of social and behavioral norms for individuals 
based on their specific sex and culture (World Health Organization, 2009). “The attitudes that 
men and women hold toward appropriate gender roles have a significant influence on many 
aspects of marital and family dynamics” (Blee & Tickamyer, 1995, p. 21). Understanding the 
impact of one’s gender roles may provide practitioners, especially within the financial therapy 
realm, important tools for counseling individuals and couples. The intended journal for 
publication of this paper is the Journal of Financial Counseling and Planning. 
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In Chapter Four, the intergenerational transmission of a mother’s gender role attitudes 
and human capital to her children and their effect on her children’s financial behaviors is 
examined. This study seeks to determine how these variables might be transferred across two 
generations and the resulting behaviors. Past research has shown that parents influence their 
children’s attitudes about money (Jorgensen & Savia, 2010), and furthermore, that mothers’ 
behaviors and attitudes are more influential (Clarke, Heaton, Israelson, & Eggett, 2005). An 
expanded theoretical framework of Becker’s (1993) theory of human capital was utilized to 
explore this relationship. Establishing a relationship between mothers and their impact on their 
children’s financial behaviors may provide prescriptions to policymakers to further the 
advancement of financial education for not only children, but parents also. The Journal of 
Behavior Finance is an appropriate journal for publication of this paper. Chapter Five concludes 
this dissertation with a summary of results from all three essays. Implications for this research 
are provided in the chapter. 
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Chapter 2 - Spousal Money Arguments 
 Introduction 
Many couples have problems expressing their emotions, and they find that arguing about 
money is easier than dealing with other interpersonal issues (Shapiro, 2007). Previous research 
has shown that financial issues are one of the main topics that couples argue about (Regnier & 
Gengler, 2006; Papp, Cummings, & Goeke-Morey, 2009). Money ranks above sex and in-laws 
as the most likely subject to incur arguments (Regnier & Gengler). In their study of 1,000 
spouses, Regnier and Gengler found that approximately 70% of their survey respondents 
admitted to arguing about money. Papp et al. did not find money as the most frequent topic of 
marital conflict, but they did find that “compared to nonmoney issues, marital conflicts about 
money were more pervasive, problematic, and recurrent, and remained unresolved despite 
including more attempts at problem solving” (p. 91). Papp and associates indicated that financial 
decisions are likely to have been previously discussed by couples, but should be reviewed as the 
relationship matures, especially if couples begin to interact more negatively when discussing 
money than with other topics.  
Several other researchers have documented the negative effects of money arguments 
within marriage. For instance, Dew (2009) noted that money arguments were the strongest 
determinant of divorce when compared to other types of arguments. The majority of couples 
(84%) reported that money created tension in their marriages, while 15% fought about money 
several times or more than once a month. Despite the negative effects of money arguments on 
the likelihood of divorce, money arguments appear to be even more predictive of relationship 
satisfaction than divorce (Britt & Huston, 2012), possibly indicating high occurrences of 
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unhappy relationships due to spousal arguments about money. Money is also a contentious topic 
among cohabiting couples. Relationship problems associated with financial issues contribute to 
the dissolution of cohabiting unions (Dew, 2011).  
This study expands the literature base related to a prediction of money arguments by 
examining the relationships between the frequency of money arguments and one’s financial 
behaviors, human capital, and various demographic variables, including birth order. Although 
several intra-household bargaining approaches have been used to explore spousal money 
arguments, the current study focuses on a non-cooperative bargaining approach. From a non-
cooperative bargaining perspective (Lundberg & Pollak, 1994), spouses attempt to maximize 
their individual utilities without regards to the overall household utility. In other words, 
individuals are assumed to be concerned with the satisfaction that they personally derive from 
consuming a good or service. As discussed in the sections that follow, there is evidence to 
suggest that firstborns, those with certain financial behavioral characteristics, and those with 
higher human capital may have a preference toward maximizing individual utility and may 
therefore have a higher frequency of money arguments. This study attempts to answer the later 
part of the previous sentence by exploring if spouses who have a known preference for 
individual utility do indeed argue more about money.  
 Theoretical Framework and Related Literature 
Economists have long struggled with the issue of how to apply unitary/single utility 
functions to household expenditures (Browning & Chiappori, 1998). The first major contribution 
in applying the unitary utility function to joint decision making was Samuelson’s concept of a 
household welfare function (Samuelson, 1956). While useful, this utility function still relied on 
transferable preferences and the weighting of each member’s utility. From both a theoretical and 
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empirical perspective, these assumptions can be problematic. The next breakthrough was made 
by Becker (1991) relying heavily on Gronou’s (1973) work on the allocation of time within a 
family. At its heart, Becker’s work borrows from the framework of a production function in 
which the family is cooperating to manufacture the greatest quantity of market and household 
goods to provide utility to the household (Becker, 1991). This work, while solving many 
mathematical issues associated with modeling a family’s allocation of resources also relied on 
almost complete cooperation, low to no transaction costs, and universally positively 
intercorrelated utility functions among family members (Konrad & Lommourd, 2000). While 
undeniably mathematically elegant, Becker’s solution may rely on assumptions too rigorous to 
accurately reflect many marital relationships. However, building on the work of Becker and 
Samuelson, game theorists have developed cooperative and non-cooperative bargaining models 
that can still stand the rigor of being proved mathematically and yet still more accurately capture 
the reality of many marriages. 
 Becker’s (1991) analysis of marriage begins by examining the marriage market. Like any 
other market, if negotiations could occur without significant transaction costs and enforceable 
agreements could be negotiated, not only would the initial allocation of resources be determined 
by who marries whom, but also the distribution of resources throughout the life of the marriage 
could be efficiently determined at the outset of the marriage (Lundberg & Pollak, 1994). 
However, finding a mate is obviously a process with significant transaction costs and search 
costs, and marriage contracts are notoriously difficult to enforce. When the above conditions 
cannot be met, non-cooperative game theory can effectively capture the reality of the situation. 
Unlike cooperative game theory, non-cooperative game theory makes no assumptions 
that a husband and wife can enter costless, binding, and enforceable agreements. This approach 
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focuses on self-enforcing agreements in which the solution is the Nash equilibrium (both parties 
get what resources they want). Such models do not assume or imply that all equilibria are Pareto 
optimal (i.e., when it is impossible to put one person in a better position by giving them more 
resources without putting someone else in a worse position) as does cooperative game theory 
(Lundberg & Pollak, 1994). The assumptions of traditional non-cooperative game theory do open 
the door to examining negotiations within marriage. Thus, the approach suggested by Lundberg 
and Pollak that manages to combine elements of cooperative with non-cooperative game theory 
may more accurately capture marriage. Lundberg and Pollak noted that in many marriage 
negotiations, both cooperative and non-cooperative, Nash equilibria can be supported. Pareto 
optimal outcomes can occur even without binding agreements as solutions to repeated games. 
They noted that because of the repetitive nature of interactions within any marriage there may 
well be a tendency towards cooperation. This tendency to be able to maintain a cooperative 
equilibria within a repeated interaction is strongly supported by both empirical and experimental 
work dealing with iterated prisoners’ dilemma games: “if the prisoner’s dilemma is repeated as a 
stage game forever, then it is well known that the cooperative outcome (“don’t confess”) is an 
equilibrium despite the inability of the players to make binding agreements” (Lundberg & 
Pollak, p. 134). Browning and Chiappori (1998) also demonstrated empirically that within 
marriage, cooperative outcomes can be sustained. However, in order for these outcomes to be 
sustained, each party must have a credible threat or a way to punish the partner that deviates 
from the cooperative outcome.  
 This study posits that disagreements about money that turn into arguments about money 
are an example of the parties disciplining one another for deviating from the cooperative 
equilibrium distribution of resources within a marriage. Therefore, it would be expected that 
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couples with more positive financial behaviors have more clearly delineated the cooperative 
equilibria resource distribution and thus recourse to the disciplining mechanism of verbal 
confrontation will be used less. Guided by the work of Lundberg and Pollak (1994) described 
above, and using control variables described below, the following model will be tested: 
Frequency of money arguments = f (financial behaviors, human capital, birth order, age)     
 Financial Behavior Characteristics 
Despite women’s advances in the work force, husbands and wives still conduct financial 
tasks along traditional lines where women manage the daily household finances and men handle 
the long-term planning (Regnier & Gengler, 2006). Subsequently, it is possible that money 
arguments will increase in frequency if men and women deviate from their traditional roles.  
 Despite women’s independent access to money through employment, the decline of 
men’s traditional role of the breadwinner, and the increase in cohabiting couples, inequalities in 
control over finances still exist (Vogler, Lyonette, & Wiggins, 2008). One source of financial 
conflict for couples is related to purchasing large expenditures. Women have typically been 
assigned to make domestic purchases and men to make purchasing decisions of technical items. 
Deviations from these traditional purchases can lead to conflict (Kirchler, 2011). Other financial 
behaviors, such as the overexpenditure of money and the blaming and hostility of these 
behaviors between family members, may also lead to conflict (Papp et al., 2009). Perceptions of 
spousal financial behaviors are oftentimes more important than actual behaviors. Respondents 
who perceived their partner’s spending behaviors negatively were more likely to report lower 
satisfaction with their relationship (Britt, Grable, Nelson, & White, 2008). 
 According to their study of 133 married adults, Lawrence, Thomasson, Wozniak, and 
Prawitz (1993) found several financial behaviors positively related to the frequency of arguing 
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about money. Delaying tactics, apparel cost-cutting strategies, and do-it-yourself techniques 
were related to more frequent arguments. Among other behaviors, those respondents that put off 
purchasing needed services or who contacted creditors about late bills were more likely to argue. 
Several of these practices are similar to the financial behaviors used in the current study in order 
to conceptualize overall positive or negative financial behaviors. Referring back to the 
conceptual model, in addition to financial behaviors, human capital is also considered to 
influence the frequency of money arguments. 
  Human Capital 
Attained human capital is comprised of those attributes in which individuals seek to 
optimize their utility through the attainment of higher levels of education and income (Becker, 
1993). Higher incomes are associated with less frequent money arguments (Britt & Huston, 
2012; Goodman, 1986).  Well-educated individuals generally possess more effective 
communication skills which help reduce relationship stress (Amato & Previti, 2003), whereas 
lower levels of education and income may represent economic pressure and be used to predict 
marital conflicts (Dew & Yorgason, 2010). In contrast, in a sample of retirement age couples, 
Lawrence et al. (1993) found that disagreements about money exist regardless of income or 
education. Konrad and Lommerud (2000) suggested that spouses have an incentive to overinvest 
in their education, which may increase their income, and improve their bargaining power within 
their relationship. Spouses with greater bargaining power may be able to allocate additional 
resources to maximize individual utility. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that working 
age couples with higher income and higher levels of education (i.e., those with higher attained 
human capital) may choose to allocate resources for individual purposes to further their utility in 
the threat point (i.e., money arguments). 
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In regards to endowed human capital, I.Q. has been shown to be an accurate proxy for 
endowed human capital, and a strong relationship between I.Q. and financial decision making 
exists (Finke, 2009). People with higher levels of endowed human capital are expected to 
maximize their individual utility functions and engage more frequently in money arguments. 
Based on non-cooperative game theory (Lundberg & Pollack, 1994), people with higher 
endowed human capital maintain more bargaining power and ability to influence the threat point. 
Consequently, according to a non-cooperative theoretical framework, individuals with higher 
endowed human capital argue more about money with their spouse in an attempt to allocate more 
resources to individual utility. 
 Birth Order and Age 
Finally, birth order and age are thought to influence money arguments. A number of birth 
order studies have been conducted in economic, social, and psychological research with various 
results. Economic studies have found strong evidence that birth order has effects on income, 
educational attainment, and I.Q. Firstborns or earlier born children have higher educational 
attainment, higher earnings, and higher I.Q.’s than laterborn children (Black, Deveraux, & 
Salvanes, 2005; 2011). Black et al. (2005) observed a steady decline in children’s education by 
birth order; a higher birth order had a significant and large negative effect on educational 
attainment. Furthermore, results showed that both laterborn women and men have lower full-
time earnings. 
  Sulloway (1996) developed the “niche model of personality development” which 
suggests that firstborn children have the first choice of niche and strive to impress their parents in 
traditional ways by assuming responsibility and other achievements. His model proposed five 
factors of personality dimensions: Surgency, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional 
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Stability, and Openness. Sulloway found that firstborn status was positively correlated with 
Surgency and Conscientiousness and negatively correlated with Agreeableness, Emotional 
Stability, and Openness while controlling for sex, age, number of siblings, and socioeconomic 
status. Michalski and Shackelford (2002) replicated Sulloway’s study with contradicting results, 
with the exception of Agreeableness (i.e., firstborn children are less agreeable) which was also 
found to have a negative relationship with firstborn status. Adler (1931) proposed the 
dethronement theory in which firstborns are afraid of being dethroned by their younger siblings 
and will fight to maintain their authoritative position in the family. The firstborns may want to 
control their siblings through the use of effective argument (Rodgers, 2003). In fact, Rodgers 
hypothesized that firstborns and only children would report more argumentativeness than 
laterborns. Results indicated that firstborns reported significantly greater argumentativeness than 
did the youngest children. These results suggest that firstborn children will report more spousal 
money arguments than laterborn children. 
Age has been determined to be an important indicator of money arguments (Goodman, 
1986; Lawrence et al., 1993). In his study of 2,555 randomly sampled adults who have the role 
of the families’ chief financial decision makers, Goodman found that as age increased, 
respondents argued more about nonmonetary issues than financial ones. Utilizing a smaller 
sample of 133 older married adults, Lawrence et al. (1993) determined that the frequency of 
arguing about money decreased significantly as age increased. 
Based on the research literature and proposed theoretical framework, the following 
hypotheses will be tested: 
H1: Spouses with more negative financial behaviors argue more frequently about money. 
H2: Spouses with higher attained and endowed human capital argue more frequently about 
money.   
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H3: Firstborns argue more frequently about money. 
H4: Younger spouses argue more frequently about money.   
 Methods 
Respondent data was retrieved from the National Longitudinal Survey of Child/Young 
Adult (1986-2008) administration which profiles the development of all children born to the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) cohort female respondents. This child 
survey, conducted biennially, includes comprehensive respondent data, coupled with longitudinal 
information on the family background, education, employment histories, and economic well-
being of their NLSY79 mothers. This data set provides variables to measure money arguments, 
financial behaviors, human capital, and various demographic characteristics, making it an 
appropriate data set for this study.  
 Dependent Variable 
 This study hypothesized that the actual causes and frequencies of arguments about money 
are, in fact, an unobservable latent variable indicating many facets and issues in the underlying 
relationship. When dealing with a latent variable, a researcher must use data that is observable to 
draw conclusions about the underlying latent variable. As Long (1997) argued in his seminal 
work on limited and dichotomous dependent variables, logit is often appropriate when a 
researcher suspects they are dealing with a latent variable. Long argued that if logistic regression 
is appropriate for a particular research question, that is evidence that one is dealing with a latent 
variable. 
 In specifying this model, this study recognized the observed limited dependent variable, 
frequency of money arguments. This variable was reported on a Likert scale ranging from 1 
(often argues about money) to 4 (never argues about money). However, from an econometric 
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standpoint, this is arguably not a ratio level of measurement. One respondent’s definition of 
frequent might meet another respondent’s definition of sometimes. Ratio data relies on equal 
variance between the units for all respondents. In this study, this issue is dealt with by recoding 
the dependent variable as a 0, 1 dichotomous variable. Respondents reporting to often (1) or 
sometimes (2) argue about money were recoded as 1, while those respondents reporting to hardly 
ever (3) or never (4) argue about money were recoded as 0. 
 Independent Variables 
 Financial Behaviors 
Financial behaviors were measured by a summation of a three-item scale based on the 
following questions: (a) How often do you/does your household put off buying something you 
need, such as food, clothing, medical care, or housing because you don’t have money?; (b) 
During the past 12 months, how much difficulty did you/did your household have paying bills?; 
and (c) Thinking about the end of each month over the past 12 months, how much money did 
you/did your household have left over? The first two questions allowed for five responses and 
the last question allowed for four responses, resulting in a possible range of scores of 3 to 14. 
The responses were coded so that a higher score represented more negative financial behaviors.  
 Human Capital 
Intelligence Quotient (I.Q.) was used to measure each respondent’s endowed human 
capital. I.Q. was measured continuously from the results of the 1986 administration of the 
Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, Revised (PPVT-R). According to the NLSY79 Child and 
Young Adult Data User’s Guide (2009), the PPVT-R is one of the “best-established indicators of 
verbal intelligence and scholastic aptitude across childhood” (p. 114). Due to evidence of 
skewness, I.Q. was transformed to a logarithm. 
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Respondents’ education and income were used as proxies to measure the respondents’ 
attained human capital. Both variables were measured on a continuous variable basis using data 
from the 2008 administration of the NLSY Child/Young Adult (1986-2008) survey. For ease of 
interpretation, income was divided by 1,000. 
 Demographics 
Age was measured continuously. Applying the logic of previous researchers that 
firstborns argue more than laterborns (Michalski & Shackelford, 2002; Rodgers, 2003; Sulloway, 
1996) and following the same analysis (Michalski & Shackelford; Sulloway),  birth order was 
coded by combining the NLSY 1986-2008 cohort categories of secondborn or higher to create 
two categories with firstborn coded as 1 and laterborn coded as 0. 
 As explained above, the dependent variable was unobservable; thus ordinary least 
squares regression would be inappropriate. It is assumed that the error terms are logistic and thus 
a logit model is appropriate. The model is specified as follows, where: 
Sum of financial behaviors, 
 I.Q., 
Education, 
 Income, 
 Age, and 
 Birth order. 
Thus, 
 The Frequency of Money Arguments = β + β∑finbeh + βIQ + βed +βinc + βage + βbthord + εi 
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The frequency of money arguments was measured as a function of one’s summation of 
financial behaviors, I.Q., education, income, age, and birth order. According to the correlation 
matrix, no multicollinearity issues were found. 
 Results 
 Descriptive Statistics 
 Results from the descriptive statistics analysis (Table 2.1) showed an approximate 44% - 
56% split between those respondents who often or sometimes argue about money and those who 
hardly ever or never argue about money. With a range from 3 to 14, the mean score for financial 
behaviors was 6.68. The mean I.Q. for respondents was 3.99 (range = 1.6 - 4.95). Average level 
of education was approximately 13 years (range = 7 - 20 years), and the mean income for 
respondents was $28,362 (range = $0 - $125,000). The sample consisted of approximately 52% 
males and 48% females with an average age of 27 years (range = 18 - 35). Fifty-two percent of 
respondents were firstborns and 48% were laterborns. 
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Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Sample Essay 1 
 N =851 
 
Variable                                                              % 
Money Arguments 
1 = Often/Sometimes    377             44.30%   
0 = Hardly ever/Never   474             55.70% 
Sum of Negative Financial Behaviors 
  Mean (Range)    6.68            (3 - 14) 
I.Q. 
  Mean (Range)    3.99       (1.61 - 4.95) 
Education 
  Mean (Range)              12.92             (7 - 20) 
Income 
  Mean (Range)           $28,362     ($0 - $125,000) 
Age 
  Mean (Range)    27.29             (18 - 35) 
Birth Order 
 1 = Firstborn                   52.17% 
 0 = Laterborn                   47.83% 
Sex 
  1 = Male          51.82% 
  0 = Female          48.18% 
            
 Regression 
In order to predict the likelihood of couples often or sometimes arguing about money or 
hardly ever or never arguing about money, a logistic regression was developed (Table 2.2). The 
Log Likelihood Ratio (80.94) was statistically significant for the model at the p < .001 level. 
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Table 2.2 Logistic Regression – Money Arguments Essay 1 
N =851 
Variable Coefficient 
 
        þ 
Odds Ratio 
 
      O. R. 
Standardized 
beta estimate 
           β 
Intercept   -2.57**   
    
Sum of negative financial behaviors     0.24*** 1.28 0.34 
Log I.Q.    -0.21 0.81        -0.07  
Education    -0.01 1.00 -0.01 
 Income by 1,000     0.01** 1.01 0.14 
 Age     0.06 1.06         0.10 
Male    -0.07 0.94 -0.02 
Firstborn    -0.63*** 0.54 -0.17 
*p <.05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
 Results from the regression model showed that one’s financial behaviors, income, and 
birth order were statistically significant predictors of their frequency of money arguments. 
Respondent’s financial behaviors were the largest contributor to the model with a standardized 
beta estimate of 0.34. Respondents with more negative financial behaviors were 28% more likely 
to argue with their spouse about money (p < .001). Birth order was the second largest contributor 
to the model (β = -0.17). According to the regression, laterborns were more likely to argue about 
money (O. R. = 0.54, p < .001). Finally, when respondents’ income (β = 0.14) increased by 
$1,000, couples were 1% more likely to argue about money (p < .01). One’s I.Q., education, age, 
and sex were not found to be statistically significant in predicting the frequency of money 
arguments. 
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 Discussion 
 The current study was conceptualized to test the hypotheses that the frequency of spousal 
money arguments is influenced by financial behaviors, human capital, birth order, and age. Past 
research literature indicates that several of these variables may predict the frequency of money 
arguments (e. g., Lawrence et al., 1993; Goodman, 1986).  
 Hypothesis One was confirmed: Spouses with more negative financial behaviors were 
more likely to argue about money. Lawrence et al. (1993) used similar financial behaviors 
related to putting off buying certain items and services and difficulty paying bills. Confirming 
Lawrence et al.’s findings, the current study also found a significant association between 
negative financial behaviors and the frequency of money arguments. Arguably, this finding is not 
surprising. If spouses are engaged in financially responsible behaviors, it would be expected they 
are acting as a household maximizing unit, which leads to less disagreements. 
 According to Hypothesis Two, the higher one’s attained and endowed human capital, the 
more frequently one argues about money. This hypothesis was partially confirmed as the only 
component of human capital found to predict the frequency of money arguments was income. 
For working respondents, the higher their income, the more likely couples were found to argue 
about money. This may be interpreted to mean that when there are higher levels of income, more 
and larger financial decisions may ensue which result in additional negotiations and/or 
disagreements about money. As this occurs, spouses may employ unitary utility maximizing 
behavior which creates a non-cooperative marital situation and uses money arguments as the 
threat point. This situation may be in comparison to having just enough money to meet the 
household’s basic needs which creates a cooperative household in which decisions have to be 
household maximizing. 
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 Similar to Lawrence et al. (1993), education as a form of attained human capital was not 
found to influence the frequency of money arguments. In addition, endowed human capital as 
measured by I.Q. was not statistically significant to the model. 
 Based on the past research literature, the current study hypothesized that firstborns were 
more likely to argue about money (e.g., Adler, 1931; Michalski & Shackelford, 2002; Rodgers, 
2003; Sulloway, 1996). In this study, birth order was found to be statistically significant;  
Hypothesis Three was rejected. The opposite was determined: Laterborns were shown to engage 
in more frequent money arguments than firstborns. This counterintuitive finding, which runs 
contrary to prior research, is noteworthy. Two possible explanations present themselves. First, 
Sulloway (1996) relied on older data gathered when the average family size was larger and being 
an only child was relatively rare. In fact, Sulloway used data from Ernst and Angst’s (1983) 
study which was a meta-analysis of previous birth order studies. These studies would presently 
be about 32 to 66 years old (Harris, 2002). Although Rodgers (2003) and Michalski and 
Shackelford (2002) found similar results as Sulloway related to argumentativeness and birth 
order, their sample sizes were relatively small (207 and 438, respectively). This study relied on 
more modern data (1986 to 2008) gathered when family size is generally smaller. The possibility 
exists that at the aggregate level, the change in average family size is changing the significance 
of birth order. As was noted above, being a firstborn child is also highly correlated with other 
characteristics that are correlated with more positive financial behaviors. These other 
characteristics may be overwhelming the impact of birth order. For example, though not 
significant in this study, this study showed that higher I.Q.’s are associated with fewer arguments 
over money. As higher I.Q. is also associated with higher birth order (Black et al., 2005; 2011), 
26 
 
perhaps the impact of higher I.Q. is cancelling out the increased propensity of firstborns to argue. 
Whatever the case, this finding warrants further investigation in future studies. 
Although age has been found to have a positive association with the frequency of money 
arguments (Goodman, 1986; Lawrence et al., 1993), this variable was not significant in 
predicting money arguments in the current study. One possible explanation for this finding is that 
in this particular study the ages of the respondents did not vary greatly. The respondents’ ages 
range from their teens to their 30’s. Perhaps a data set that allowed for more variance in age of 
the respondents would have produced results that were consistent with other studies. An 
interesting focus of analysis for a future study might be to attempt to determine whether age 
functions as a linear variable with a decreased probability of arguing for every year of age or 
whether age produces an intercept where after a certain threshold the tendency to argue over 
money falls off. For the purpose of this study, Hypothesis Four must also be rejected. 
 The results of the regression showed that several of the hypothesized variables were 
predictors of the frequency of money arguments, however, as discussed, not all had the 
association expected. Overall, the model utilized the theoretical framework indicating that the 
frequency of money arguments is associated with financial behavior and income. 
 Implications 
 Research related to possible causes of spousal money arguments is limited (Britt et al., 
2010). The goal of the current study was to further this span of knowledge by examining various 
potential predictors of the frequency of money arguments. This was accomplished by 
conceptualizing money arguments as a threat point in marriage according to Lundberg and 
Pollak’s (1994) theory of non-cooperative game theory. Such a theoretical framework may 
provide a mechanism for other researchers and practitioners to further investigate disagreements 
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about money for couples. A benefit of having additional knowledge of the cause of money 
disagreements exists for practitioners and educators who address couples’ money issues (Dew, 
2008). As Papp et al. (2009) noted, raising awareness possibly even before spouses combined 
their finances, could prevent money related conflicts later in their marriage. In this study, 
financial behaviors, income, and birth order were found to possibly provide insight for the 
integrated disciplines of financial therapy and financial planning.  
 Financial behaviors are often linked to emotional meanings about money, such as self-
worth, security, and respect (Shapiro, 2007). “Thus, when partners have different meanings for 
money, the disagreements may be strongly related to dissolution because they tap deep emotional 
issues” (Dew, 2011, p. 181). Financial counselors and planners may not be equipped to assist 
clients with these types of issues. Therefore, financial therapy may be beneficial for couples 
before they make any major financial decisions in order to determine what emotional links may 
exist related to their financial behaviors, whether negative or positive. Financial therapy can be 
defined as “the integration of cognitive, emotional, behavioral, relational, and economic aspects 
that promote financial health” (Financial Therapy Association, 2011, p.1). Exploring each 
partner’s financial behaviors and any underlying causes for these behaviors may aid in 
establishing a joint utility maximizing marital situation and lead to less contention about money 
matters. Knowing that specific financial behaviors may be a cause for dissension within a 
marriage, may help financial therapists to identify those variables that lead to such behaviors. 
Perhaps, even raising clients’ awareness of their own motivations could reduce future negative 
behaviors.  
 Interesting and helpful to financial counselors and planners is the finding that higher 
respondent’s income leads to more frequent money arguments. When counseling or establishing 
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a plan for couples, the practitioner should take into consideration not only the economic aspects 
related to income, but possibly the function that money plays within the household. Is the couple 
maximizing the household utility or, due to the fact that there is more money available, are they 
actually seeking to maximize their own utility? In an actual practice, it is quite likely that a 
financial planner will see instances of both behaviors. Therefore, being aware of clients’ possible 
motivations will increase the planner’s ability to effectively assist their clients. 
 Results also indicate that financial professionals may want to consider the birth order of 
their clients. Although this is a new concept to the area of financial planning, the study suggests 
that this information may help professionals in identifying certain individuals and their 
propensity to create conflict within their relationships.  
 Overall, collaboration between financial therapists and financial planners is necessary in 
order to fully benefit many clients. Planners and therapists have different sets of skills and areas 
of experience and expertise, which when integrated improve the planning process (Maton, 
Maton, & Martin, 2010). “We position the planner/financial therapist collaboration as a way for 
clients to learn more about themselves and their money” (Maton et al., p. 65). Due to this 
requirement for close collaboration between financial planners and financial therapists, studies 
that shed light on the motivations of clients, and the predictors for these motivations will be 
useful to both financial planners and therapists. 
 Limitations and Recommendations 
While this data set is valuable in that it allows a researcher to capture some behaviors, it 
does have limitations. First, other data sets may allow for a more defined measurement of 
financial behaviors. The current study uses responses to the following three questions in order to 
assess financial behaviors: (a) How often do you/does your household put off buying something 
29 
 
you need, such as food, clothing, medical care, or housing because you don’t have money?; (b) 
During the past 12 months, how much difficulty did you/did your household have paying bills?; 
and (c) Thinking about the end of each month over the past 12 months, how much money did 
you/did your household have left over? Other variables may give more clear insight into one’s 
actual financial behaviors. In addition, these responses are self-reported, which may cause 
sample bias. 
When assessing birth order, the data does not account for the fact that many respondents 
may come from blended families, and family size varies. If so, this may impact the birth order 
effect differently. In addition, the birth order for each individual spouse may have an influence 
on the results of the study. These considerations provide interesting areas for further research.  
 These data only measure the frequency of money arguments and do not consider the 
severity of these arguments. Frequent arguments of limited duration that do not necessarily place 
serious stress on a marriage are obviously a quite different matter than infrequent arguments that 
seriously stress a marriage and may leave one party contemplating utilizing a serious threat 
point. Perhaps other data sets may provide more detailed information related to money 
arguments. These responses are also self-reported, which may bias the sample. 
An additional limitation of this study is that the regression models only included 
respondents who provided complete data. Those individuals who had missing data were not 
included in the models and may have reported differently, leading to outcomes not consistent 
with this study. Finally, the fact that the data for the outcome variable use Likert scales which do 
not produce true ratio level data has been discussed above. These type of scales inject some 
imprecision into data when a researcher is using regression analysis.  
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Although this study has limitations, it definitely provides some other areas for further 
research. This study indicates that further analysis of birth order data is warranted to determine 
whether changes in average family size and child rearing practices call into question prior beliefs 
about birth order based on older data. This study also has another finding that would be of great 
significance to financial planners and financial therapists: the fact that increased levels of income 
tend to lead to an increase of arguing over money indicates that as clients move towards their 
financial goals and command greater resources, professionals must be prepared for their clients’ 
interactions over money to become more contentious. As couples’ income increases, introducing 
them into financial planning may actually be more conducive to marital satisfaction. In addition, 
mandatory premarital counseling may be a consideration to reduce spousal money arguments. 
This study provides useful information to practitioners and policymakers and opens up intriguing 
areas of further research. 
 
 
 
31 
 
 References 
Adler, A. (1931). What life should mean to you. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 
Amato, P. R., & Previti, D. (2003). People’s reasons for divorcing: Gender, social class, the life 
course, and adjustment. Journal of Family Issues, 24(5), 602-626. 
Becker, G. S. (1991) A treatise on the family. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Becker, G. S. (1993). Human capital: A theoretical and empirical analysis with special reference 
to education, 3rd ed. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. 
Black, S. E., Devereux, P. J., & Salvanes, K. G. (2005). The more the merrier? The effect of 
family size and birth order on children’s education. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
120(2), 669-700. 
Black, S. E., Devereux, P. J., & Salvanes, K. G. (2011). Older and wiser? Birth order and IQ of 
young men. CESifo Economic Studies, 57(1), 103-120. 
Britt, S., Grable, J. E., Nelson Goff, B. S., & White, M. (2008). The influence of perceived 
spending behaviors on relationship satisfaction. Financial Counseling and Planning, 
19(1), 31-43. 
Britt, S. L., & Huston, S. J. (2012). The role of money arguments in marriage. Journal of Family 
and Economic Issues. doi: 10.10007/S10834-012-9304-5 
Browning, M., & Chiappori, P. (1998). Efficient intra-household allocations: A general 
characterization and some tests. Econometrica, 66, 1241-1278. 
Dew, J. (2009). The gendered meanings of assets for divorce. Journal of Family and Economic 
Issues, 30(1), 20-31. 
Dew, J. (2011). Financial issues and relationship outcomes among cohabiting individuals. 
Family Relations, 60(2), 178-190. 
32 
 
Dew, J., & Yorgason, J. (2010). Economic pressure and marital conflict in retirement-aged 
couples. Journal of Family Issues, 31(2). 164-188. 
Ernst, C., & Angst, J. (1983). Birth order: Facts and fiction concerning its influence on 
personality: A survey of the literature, 1946-1980, followed by a study of a representative 
young adult population. Berlin and New York: Springer-Verlag. 
Financial Therapy Association. (2011). Retrieved from 
http://www.financialtherapyassociation.org/  
Goodman, M. (1986). Americans and their money: 1986. Money, 15(11), 159-166. 
Gronau, R. (1973). The intrafamily allocation of time: The value of housewives’ time. American 
Economic Review, 63, 634-651. 
Harris, J. R. (2002). The mystery of Born to Rebel: Sulloway’s re-analysis of birth order data. 
Retrieved from https://www.judithrichharris/tna/birth-order/index.htm 
Kirchler, E., Rodler, C., Holzl, E., & Meier, K., (2001). Conflict and decision making in close 
relationships. Hove: The Psychology Press. 
 Konrad, K. A., & Lommerud, K. E. (2000). The bargaining family revisited. The Canadian 
Journal of Economics, 33(2), 471-487. 
Lawrence, F. C., Thomasson, R. H., Wozniak, P. J., & Prawitz, A. D. (1993). Factors relating to 
spousal financial arguments. Financial Counseling and Planning, 4, 85- 94.  
Long, J. S. (1997). Regression models for categorical and limited dependent variables. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Lundberg, S., & Pollak, R. A. (1994). Noncooperative bargaining models of marriage. The 
American Economic Review, 84(2), 132-137.  
33 
 
Maton, C. C., Maton, M., & Martin, W. M. (2010). Collaborating with a therapist: The why, 
who, what, and how. Journal of Financial Planning, 23(2), 62-70. 
Michalski, R. L., & Shackelford, T. K. (2002). An attempted replication of the relationships 
between birth order and personality. Journal of Research in Personality, 36, 182-188. 
NLSY Child and Young Adult Data User’s Guide (2009). Retrieved from  
http://www.nlsinfo.org/usersvc/Child-Young-Adult/2004ChildYA-DataUsersGuide.pdf 
Papp, L. M., Cummings, E. M., & Goeke-Morey, M. C. (2009). For richer, for poorer: Money as 
a topic of marital conflict in the home. Family Relations, 58(1), 91-103. 
Regnier, P., & Gengler, A. (2006). Men women + money. Money, 35(4), 90-98. 
Rodgers, M. F. (2003). The influence of birth order on verbal aggressiveness and 
argumentativeness. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Communication Studies, 
West Virginia University, Morgantown, West Virginia.  
Samuelson, P. A. (1956). Social indifference curves. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70(1), 1-
22.  
Shapiro, M. (2007). Money: A tool for couples therapy therapeutic. Family Process, 46(3), 279-
291. 
Sulloway, F. J. (1996). Born to rebel. New York: Pantheon. 
Vogler, C., Lyonette, C. & Wiggins, R. D. (2008). Money, power and spending decisions in 
intimate relationships. The Sociological Review, 56(1), 117-143. 
 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Chapter 3 - The Influence of Gender Attitudes and Socialization on 
Financial Behaviors 
 Introduction 
 “Women face a variety of financial issues and challenges that either aren’t experienced 
by men, or aren’t experienced to the same degree” (Anthes & Most, 2000, p. 130). Given these 
challenges, women especially need to know how to navigate today’s complex financial 
environment (Anthes & Most). National statistics reveal that the need for women to be involved 
in financial decisions is vitally important. Consider the following: (a) According to the Social 
Security Administration, average life expectancy for women is 81 years versus 73 years for men; 
(b) The U.S. Census states that the average age of widowhood for women is 55 years old; and (c) 
Women were expected to own half of the wealth in the United States by the year 2011 (Women 
& Co., 2009).  
These facts suggest that women, like men, face a multitude of financial issues and 
challenges; however, it is oftentimes more difficult for women than men to succeed in their 
personal money management and attainment of financial independence. Historically, women 
have been financially dependent on men, and changing this attitude and women’s relationship 
with money needs to be developed in order for women to control money rather than money 
controlling them (Anthes & Most, 2000). Bernasek and Bajtelsmit (2002) found that although 
men have traditionally been more likely than women to make household savings and investment 
decisions, women’s involvement has been increasing. 
Over the last two decades, social scientists and economists have contributed considerable 
attention to the area of household economy. Researchers have shown interest in the question of 
how household members organize and manage their financial resources, which has proven to be 
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a problematic and complex task (Burgoyne, 1990; Burgoyne, Clarke, Reibstein, & Edmunds, 
2006; Pahl, 1980; Vogler & Pahl, 1994). These studies have found financial control and access to 
monetary resources in marriages to be highly linked to gender, where women have less control 
over household finances and access to personal spending money. In addition, Anthes and Most 
(2000) found that although men and women share some of the basic money management issues, 
they may often view them in different ways. For example, women are more anxious about their 
financial future and how to secure it, and may face more challenges than men. Included in these 
challenges are the facts that women earn less money than men, are less prepared for retirement, 
and poorer in retirement than men . To further combat the issue of retirement, women live longer 
than men. Additionally, women are more intimidated about financial issues and are more 
conservative than men in their investment decisions (Anthes & Most). These findings relate to 
the higher prevalence of financial deprivation among women.  
With the numerous financial challenges and decisions that face women today, this study 
will examine the possible effects of gender role attitudes (not merely gender differences) on 
women’s financial behaviors. Although this study emphasizes women’s financial behaviors, the 
study seeks to expand the literature determining how gender role attitudes influence women’s 
and men’s financial behaviors. 
 Theoretical Framework and Related Literature 
Theories of human behavior from psychology, sociology, and economics have been used 
to guide the study of financial behaviors. Of these theories, socialization theory and role theory 
consider the effect of gender role attitudes on human behavior, and therefore, financial 
behaviors. Socialization is a process that involves the transmission of norms, attitudes, 
motivations, and behaviors to individuals from various sources, including formal agents (e.g., 
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family or school) and informal agents (e.g., mass media or peers) (Hira, 1997). Socialization 
theory furthermore posits that gender role perceptions are dependent on the fulfillment of social 
roles. Following this perception that gender roles are based on socialization, Eagly (1987) 
developed the social-role theory of sex differences in social behavior from her own research on 
sex differences and gender stereotypes and from other social psychologists’ studies (e.g., Deaux, 
1976; Henley, 1977). The underlying emphasis of social-role theory is that gender roles directly 
influence stereotypic sex differences with the sexes distributed into specific social roles 
indirectly because of attitudes about male and female characteristics.  
 According to social-role theory, human behavior is guided by attitudes held by an 
individual and other people and “roles consist of a set of rules or norms that function as plans or 
blueprints to guide behavior” (Ozmete & Hira, 2011, p. 393). Specifically, people act according 
to socially defined categories (e.g., mother, father, and teacher). In close relation to social-role 
theory are gender roles and the underlying theory they emphasize. Gender role theory suggests 
that non-physical differences between boys and girls are a product of socialization; children learn 
appropriate behavior from the family and culture. These gender roles lead to gender stereotypes, 
such as men being considered the financial providers and women being viewed as caretakers. In 
fact, past studies have shown that women, in general, do have less financial knowledge, have 
more financial concerns, and are less confident about their financial situation as well as have 
more traditional gender roles compared to men (Hira & Mugenda, 2000). Furthermore, role 
theory emphasizes that in order to change behavior, one must change roles, and these roles 
influence beliefs and attitudes (Ozmete & Hira, 2011). In order to change financial behavior, 
women’s gender role beliefs and attitudes must be changed. 
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Role theory, specifically gender role theory (Eagly, 1987), framed the design of this 
study. As shown in Figure 3.1, financial behaviors are conceptualized as a function of one’s 
gender role attitudes and socialization characteristics. Previous literature has also found some 
connection between gender role theory and financial behaviors as detailed below. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Conceptual Framework of Financial Behaviors 
 Financial Behaviors 
Hira and Mugenda (2000) found that differences do exist between men and women and 
how they perceive financial issues and their financial behaviors. When compared with men, Hira 
and Mugenda concluded that women are less likely to let financial concerns interfere with their 
personal relationships; however, they are more likely to let these concerns affect their work 
performance. Women are also more likely than men to use shopping as a means of celebration, 
have less sales resistance, buy things they do not need, and make unplanned purchases. These 
spending behaviors create chaos in their lives. According to Hira and Mugenda, women tend to 
feel less secure about their financial situation, including their financial emergency preparedness, 
their level of savings, and their ability to meet long-term goals when compared with their male 
counterparts. Using a sample of college students, Hayhoe, Leach, Turner, Bruin, and Lawrence 
(2000) found that gender differences existed in credit card purchasing behaviors, financial 
practices, and credit attitudes. Female students used their credit cards more to purchase clothing, 
Gender Role 
Attitudes 
Socialization 
Characteristics 
Financial 
Behaviors 
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while males purchased more electronics, entertainment, and food away from home. In addition, 
female students were more likely than male students to use positive financial practices such as 
keeping a budget, shopping with a list, keepings bills and receipts, planning spending, and saving 
regularly. 
 Several studies have established the existence of gender differences in investing and risk-
taking (Bajtelsmit & Bernasek, 1996; Eckel & Grossman, 2002; Grable, 2000). Strong gender-
based risk preferences regarding financial decisions about business practices and investments 
have been observed with males showing a greater willingness to take risks (Miller & Stark, 
2002). Since women tend to be more conservative investors, they may see a negative effect on 
their investment returns. Anthes and Most (2000) noted that a Charles Schwab study of clients’ 
total investment portfolios found that 73% of women owned stocks compared to 86% of men. In 
addition, 26% of women owned low-risk certificates of deposit, versus just 18% of men. Based 
on a review of the literature, men and women engage in different financial behaviors and have 
different perceptions of financial issues. These differences may be accountable to their gender 
and their attitudes about the roles they accepted based on their gender. 
 Gender Role Attitudes 
Gender roles are “shared expectations (about appropriate qualities and behaviors) that 
apply to individuals on the basis of their socially identified gender” (Eagly, 1987, p.12). The 
attitudes about these roles typically are considered as traditional or nontraditional, where 
traditional gender roles are those which meet the expectations of differing roles for men and 
women (Firestone, Harris, & Lambert, 1999). According to Eagly (1987), a division of labor 
exists between the sexes which leads to sex-typed social behavior. This division of labor is 
determined by the gender stereotypes in which people believe that women are more communal 
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and men are more agentic. Communal qualities refer to being selfless, having concern for others, 
and desiring to have relationships with others. Agentic qualities include self-assertion, self-
expansion, and the urge to master (Bakan, 1966). The social-role interpretation perceives that 
this female stereotype is derived from the domestic role and the male stereotype from men’s 
roles in society and the economy through employment. This division of labor shapes gender-role 
expectations for women to act communally and men agentically, which results in stereotypic 
behavior and furthermore, sex differences in social behavior. 
This division of labor also manifests itself in sex-related beliefs and skills. Based on the 
specific roles occupied by men, they are considered to have higher status and authority than the 
roles occupied by women which is oftentimes not only apparent in the employment arena, but 
also in the household (Eagley, 1987). Men may be more systematic in decision making and 
concerned with goal setting. Also, they are more competitive within their work environment and 
are emotionally detached from their co-workers. Women, on the other hand, are “multi-taskers” 
with little regards for setting specific goals or requiring feedback on their achievements. They 
are also more cooperative within the family context. Therefore, along with gender-role 
expectations, sex-typed skills and beliefs are influenced by the division of labor between the 
sexes (Eagly). 
When socialization theory is used in financial behavior research, financial socialization is 
described as “the process of acquiring and developing values, attitudes, standards, norms, 
knowledge, and behaviors that contribute to the financial viability and well-being of the 
individual” (Danes, 1994, p.128). Evidence supports that gender differences in financial 
management are because of differential gender socialization (Ozmete & Hira, 2011). 
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Further supporting gender role theory and that children are a product of socialization, the 
Dreyfus Gender Investment Comparison Survey (as reported by Anthes & Most, 2000) found 
that parents treat sons and daughters differently concerning money; sons are encouraged to start 
earning money at a younger age (13) than girls (16-18), and twice as many sons as daughters 
were encouraged by their parents to save. To further support this inequality, Newcomb and 
Rabow’s (1999) study of gender and money found: (a) Parents’ expectations regarding money 
for their sons and daughters differs dramatically, with sons expected to work and save, be 
introduced to family finances, and receive less support from families; (b) Men believe they have 
greater financial knowledge than females; (c) Men felt more positive about money and others 
that make money; (d) Men also indicated that those who earn money are rational, responsible, 
and attractive; (e) Money provides men with self-worth and control; (f) Men envy those who 
make a substantial amount of money, where women found them to be immoral and intimidating; 
(g) Women had a greater fear of finances and were more confused about investments; and (h) 
Males desire earnings more than women and desire financial dependence less. These differential 
expectations and behaviors establish different money tracks for sons and daughters. “Growing up 
on these different tracks leaves a legacy of attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors that differentiate men 
from women” (Newcomb & Rabow, 1999, p. 867). Furthermore, the authors stated that these 
differences may handicap women. The above data supports the implication that gender role 
attitudes do differ between men and women. 
 Socialization Characteristics 
Several demographic factors known to influence financial behaviors include sex, age, 
race/ethnicity, income, and marital status. Utilizing their online financial self-assessment tool—
the Financial Fitness Quiz—O’Neill and Xiao (2006) found that the five most often performed 
41 
 
financial practices involved having a checking account to pay bills, having enough money each 
month to pay household expenses, having insurance to cover big unexpected expenses, 
comparison shopping for major purchases, and keeping organized financial records. Not only did 
males have higher mean scores than females on the Financial Fitness Quiz, but older respondents 
reported having better financial practices than younger respondents. O’Neill and Xiao also 
determined that financial practices existed according to racial differences: Asian respondents had 
the highest average scores followed by Whites, Native Americans/Others, African-Americans, 
and Hispanics. In their study of college students, Grable and Joo (2006) also found that African-
American students portrayed less desirable financial behaviors. Specifically, African-American 
students in their sample carried higher credit card balances and displayed less desirable financial 
behaviors than non-Hispanic White students. 
According to Sunden and Surette (1998), marital status affects retirement investment 
decisions. They found that among single women, single men, married women, and married men, 
that married women were least likely to have a defined contribution/employee managed 
retirement plan. Past studies have shown how a woman’s age, education, and income affect her 
financial behaviors. O’Neill and Xiao’s (2006) Financial Fitness Quiz determined that 
respondents with higher levels of education and income reported better financial practices. An 
established relationship also exists between socioeconomic status and positive financial 
behaviors (Perry & Morris, 2005). Higher socioeconomic status, in addition to older age and 
contributing a higher proportion to household income, is associated with better perceptions of 
one’s financial situation (Malone, Stewart, Wilson, & Korsching, 2010). However, such as with 
several other demographic characteristics, much of the research related to women specifically 
concentrates on the study of the relationship between these variables and risk tolerance and/or 
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retirement planning. According to Joo and Pauwels (2002), women with higher levels of 
education and higher income were more confident about their retirement. Women with lower 
levels of risk aversion also displayed more retirement confidence.  
 Bernasek and Bajtelsmit (2002) found that women’s involvement in household financial 
decisions increases with their share of household income and their formal financial education, 
while involvement decreased when spouse’s share of household income and formal financial 
education increases. Bernasek and Bajtelsmit’s study considered household financial decisions 
regarding saving and investment decisions. The current study seeks to expand the understanding 
of attitudinal and socialization characteristics as determinants of financial behaviors related to 
everyday financial matters. 
Specific hypotheses for the current study were based on the research regarding role and 
socialization theory. Utilizing this theoretical framework, the primary purpose of this study was 
to determine the influence of gender role attitudes, sex, age, race, income, and marital status on 
men and women’s financial behaviors. The following hypotheses were used: 
H1: Nontraditional gender role attitudes have a statistically positive association with 
financial behaviors. 
H2: Socialization characteristics, including sex, age, race, income, and marital status will  
influence financial behaviors. 
 Methods 
Respondent data were retrieved from the National Longitudinal Survey of Child/Young 
Adult (1986-2008) cohort. This sample consists of all children born to NLSY79 female 
respondents. The child survey, conducted biennially, provides comprehensive child data. In 
addition, longitudinal information on the family background on family characteristics is reported. 
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By providing extensive data related to the respondents’ attitudes towards gender roles, responses 
to certain measurements of financial behaviors, and demographic characteristics, the NLSY79 
Child/Young Adult survey is an ideal data set for this study. 
 Dependent Variables 
The NLSY data captures three financial behaviors used in this study. The three behaviors 
are: (a) How often do you/does your household put off buying something you need, such as food, 
clothing, medical care, or housing because you don’t have money?; (b) During the past 12 
months, how much difficulty did you/did your household have paying bills?; and (c) Thinking 
about the end of each month over the past 12 months, how much money did you/did your 
household have left over?. The questions (a) and (b) above were coded 1 through 5 and question 
(c) was coded 1 through 4 with higher scores representing what are generally believed to be more 
negative financial behaviors. As these are self-reported scales, some difficulty of analysis is 
presented in that the ratios between different points on the scale are unlikely to be uniform for 
different respondents. Thus, they were recoded as dichotomous dependent variables with 1 
representing very positive behaviors (including only reported responses of 1) and 0 representing 
negative behaviors (including all other reported responses). 
 Independent Variables 
 Gender Role Attitudes 
 Gender role attitudes were operationalized by responses to the following statements: (a) 
A woman’s place is in the home, (b) A wife with family has no time for other employment, (c) A 
working wife feels more useful (reverse coded), (d) Employment of wives leads to juvenile 
delinquency, (e) Inflation necessitates employment of both parents (reverse coded), (f) 
Traditional husband/wife roles are best, (g) Men should share housework (reverse coded), and 
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(h) Women are happier in traditional roles. Each statement allows four response categories: (a) 
strongly disagree, (b) disagree, (c) agree, and (d) strongly agree. Responses were retrieved from 
the 2006 and 2008 administrations of the survey. Responses from both reporting years were 
combined because those who reported gender role attitudes in 2006, did not report again in 2008. 
This combination allowed for a more representative sample of the total amount of respondents to 
the gender role attitudes. Statement (d) was not reported in the 2006 survey, therefore, it was also 
eliminated in the 2008 data. After recoding, a scale with scores ranging from 7 to 28 resulted 
with higher scores representing more traditional gender role attitudes. 
 Demographic Characteristics 
Age was measured continuously. Race was coded by combining the NLSY 1986-2008 
cohort categories of Black and Hispanic to create two categories with non-Black, non-Hispanic 
respondents coded as 1 and Black and Hispanic respondents coded as 0. The data included five 
categories for marital status which were recoded as 1 = married and 0 = not married (never 
married, divorced, separated, or widowed). Respondents’ income was measured continuously 
(divided by 1,000 for the regressions to allow ease of interpretation). Where, 
 Financial Behavior1 = Delayed buying, 
 Financial Behavior2 = Difficulty paying bills, 
 Financial Behavior3 = Money left over, 
  = Gender role attitudes, 
  = Age, 
  = Race, 
  = Income,  
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  = Marital status, and 
  = Sex. 
Three logistic regression equations, assuming the following relationships, were estimated,  
  Financial Behavior1 = f(βgra, βage, βrace, βinc, βmarstat, βsex) (2) 
 Financial Behavior2 = f(βgra, βage, βrace, βinc, βmarstat, βsex) (3) 
 Financial Behavior3 = f(βgra, βage, βrace, βinc, βmarstat, βsex) (4) 
Each financial behavior of the respondent was measured as a function of their gender role 
attitudes, age, race, respondent’s income, marital status, and sex. The correlation matrix revealed 
no multicollinearity issues to be concerned about. 
 Results 
 Descriptive Statistics 
 Approximately 40% of respondents never put off buying necessary items such as food, 
clothing, medical care, or housing because they did not have enough money. For the second 
financial behavior, 37% of respondents reported having no difficulty at all paying their bills. 
Thirdly, only approximately 11% of respondents had more than enough money left over at the 
end of the month.  
 With a range from 14 years to 36 years old, the average age of respondents was 
approximately 26 years. Almost 75% of the sample was married, and 62% were non-Black, non-
Hispanic. Mean income for respondents was $21,418 (range = $0 - $119,116). Utilizing a range 
of scores from 11 to 26, the mean score for gender role attitudes was 20.23. The sample was 
comprised of an approximate 50% - 50% split between male and female respondents.  
46 
 
Table 3.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Sample Essay 2 
 
Variable                                                                                                                     % 
Financial Behavior 1 – Not Putting Off Buying Necessities (N = 2,020)  
1 = Never                                              860           42.57%   
0 = Rarely/Occasionally/            1,160                      57.43%      
      Frequently/ All the time          
Financial Behavior 2 – No Difficulty Paying Bills (N = 2,011)      
1 = No difficulty at all                 734             36.50%   
0 = Little/Some/ Quite a bit/           1,277            63.50% 
       A great deal 
Financial Behavior 3 – Having Money Left Over (N = 2,000) 
1 = More than enough money left over            221             11.05% 
0 = Some/Just enough/Not enough           1,779             88.95%  
Age 
  Mean (Range)             25.77           (14 - 36) 
Marital Status        
 1 = Married                   74.70% 
 0 = Not Married                  25.30% 
Race  
 1 = Non-Black, Non-Hispanic                62.33% 
 0 = Black and Hispanics                 37.67% 
Sex 
 1 = Male                   50.40% 
 0 = Female                   49.60% 
 Income 
  Mean (Range)         $21,418            ($0 - $119,116) 
Gender Role Attitudes 
  Mean (Range)             20.23            (11 - 26) 
*Demographic and attitudinal statistics based on maximum regression size of N = 2,020. 
 Regression Analysis 
 Three logistic regression models were utilized in order to assess the probability of 
respondents engaging in positive or negative financial behaviors. Each model used a financial 
behavior question as the dependent variable. The outcome variable for regression model one was 
whether respondents put off buying necessities. The second model predicted if respondents 
reported having difficulty paying their bills. The third financial behavior determined in model 
three was if respondents have money left over at the end of the month. The Log Likelihood Ratio 
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was statistically significant for all three models at the p < .001 level (128.70, 86.00, and 51.74, 
respectively). 
 Results from the first logistic regression model indicated that age, race, sex, and 
respondents’ income were statistically significant in predicting one’s probability of not putting 
off buying necessities. Similar to model one, the second logistic regression model showed that 
age, race, sex, and income were predictors of not having difficulty paying bills; however, marital 
status was also considered statistically significant. According to the third model, only age and 
income were significant predictors of one having money left over at the end of the month. Each 
model is described in more detail below. 
 Regression 1: Not Putting Off Buying Necessities 
 As shown in Table 3.2, with a standardized beta estimate of -0.20, age was the largest 
contributor to the model, indicating that older respondents are more likely to put off buying 
necessary items (O. R. = 0.92, p < .001). Respondents’ income was the second largest 
contributor to the model (β = 0.18). As one’s income increased by $1,000, they were 2% more 
likely to not put off buying necessary items (O. R. = 1.02, p < .001). Race and sex had the third 
and fourth largest contributions to the model (β = 0.13 and 0.09, respectively). Non-Black/Non-
Hispanic respondents were 65% more likely to not put off buying necessary items than 
Black/Hispanic respondents (p < .001), and males were 36% more likely than females to engage 
in positive financial behavior by not putting off buying necessities (p < .001). 
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Table 3.2 Logistic Regression Model 1 Essay 2 – Do Not Put Off Buying Necessities 
N = 2,020 
Variable Coefficient 
 
        þ 
Odds 
Ratio 
O. R. 
Standardized 
beta estimate 
          β 
Intercept     1.51   
Age    -0.09***   0.92        -0.20 
Married    -0.01   0.99 -0.00 
Non-Black/Non-Hispanic     0.50***   1.65 0.13 
Male     0.31***   1.36 0.09 
Income by 1,000     0.02***   1.02 0.18 
Sum of  traditional gender role attitudes    -0.02   0.98        -0.02 
*p < .05, **p < .01, p < .001    
 
 Regression 2: No Difficulty Paying Bills 
 Using the same independent variables as the first model, the second regression model 
considered one’s financial behaviors by responses to whether they had difficulty paying bills 
(Table 3.3). Age was the largest contributor to model one; however, in model two, this variable 
was only the second largest contributor (β = -0.15). Rather, respondents’ income was the largest 
contributor to model two (β = 0.20). As one’s income increased by $1,000, respondents were 2% 
more likely to not have difficulty paying their bills (p < .001). Very similar to model one, as age 
increased by one year, one was more likely to have difficulty paying their bills (O. R. = 0.94, p < 
.001). Third, with a standardized beta estimate of 0.08, males were approximately 32% more 
likely than females to display positive financial behavior by not having difficulty paying their 
bills (p < .01). Marital status and race made equal contributions to the model with standardized 
beta estimates of -0.06 and 0.06, respectively. Respondents who were not married were more 
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likely than married respondents to not have difficulty paying their bills (O. R. = 0.78, p < .05) 
and non-Black, non-Hispanic respondents were more likely to not have difficulty paying their 
bills than Black/Hispanic respondents (O. R. = 1.25, p < .05). 
Table 3.3 Logistic Regression Model 2 Essay 2 – No Difficulty Paying Bills 
 N =2,011 
Variable Coefficient 
 
       þ 
Odds 
Ratio 
O. R. 
Standardized 
beta estimate 
           β 
Intercept  1.22   
Age -0.06***   0.94        -0.15 
Married -0.25*   0.78        -0.06 
Non-Black/Non-Hispanic   0.22*   1.25         0.06 
Male   0.28**   1.32 0.08 
Income by 1,000   0.02***   1.02 0.20 
Sum of traditional gender role attitudes  -0.04   0.96        -0.04 
*p < .05, **p < .01, p < .001    
 Regression 3: Has Money Left Over 
 The third regression model (Table 3.4) used the same independent variables as model one 
and model two. However, model three used responses referring to if the respondent has money 
left over at the end of the month as the dependent variable. Only two variables were found to be 
predictors of this financial behavior. Age and respondents’ income both contributed equally to 
the model (β = -0.22 and 0.22, respectively). When age increased by one year, individuals were 
more likely to not have money left over at the end of the month (O. R. = 0.91, p < .001). 
Respondents were 2% more likely to have money left over at the end of the month when their 
income increased by $1,000 (p < .001). 
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Table 3.4 Logistic Regression Model 3 Essay 2 – Has Money Left Over 
N =2,000 
Variable Coefficient 
 
         þ 
Odds 
Ratio 
O. R. 
Standardized 
beta estimate 
           β 
Intercept    -0.82   
Age    -0.09***   0.91       -0.22 
Married     0.08    1.08         0.02 
Non-Black/Non-Hispanic     0.20   1.22         0.05 
Male     0.27   1.32         0.08 
Income by 1,000     0.02***   1.02 0.22 
Sum of traditional gender role attitudes     0.02   1.02         0.02 
*p < .05, **p < .01, p < .001    
 
 Discussion  
The current study hypothesized that financial behaviors are influenced by gender role 
attitudes and social characteristics, including sex, age, race, income, and marital status. Previous 
research has shown that a person’s gender role attitudes, and social characteristics may impact 
financial behaviors (e.g., Grable & Joo, 2006; Malone et al., 2010; O’Neill & Xiao, 2006; 
Ozmete & Hira, 2011; Perry & Morris, 2005; Sunden & Surette, 1998). The following discussion 
focuses on the results of the three regression models that explored three distinct financial 
behaviors as an assessment of one’s overall financial behavior. 
 The first regression model was used to determine if any of the above mentioned variables 
may predict putting off buying necessary items, such as food, clothing, medical care, or housing 
because of lack of enough money. Statistically significant predictors in this model were age, 
race, sex, and respondents’ income. Hypothesis Two was confirmed (excluding marital status): 
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Respondents’ socialization characteristics, including age, race, sex, income, and marital status 
will influence their financial behaviors as related to putting off buying necessary items. A 
demographic profile of individuals who reported having more positive financial behaviors, by 
not putting off buying necessities because they did not have money, included those who were 
younger, non-Black/non-Hispanic males, and those with higher incomes. Marital status was the 
only socialization characteristic that was not significant in this model. Hypothesis One was 
rejected since gender role attitudes were not found to be a predictor of one putting off buying 
necessary items.  
Financial behavior as related to having difficulty paying bills anytime during the past 12 
months was assessed in the second regression model. This model confirmed Hypothesis Two. 
Whereas four of the five socialization characteristics were found to be significant predictors in 
model one, all five of the variables were associated with difficulty paying bills. Similar to model 
one, younger respondents, non-Black/non-Hispanics, males, and those with higher incomes were 
less likely to have difficulty paying their bills. However, marital status was also statistically 
significant in predicting this particular behavior, with unmarried individuals exhibiting more 
positive financial behaviors. Once again, Hypothesis One was rejected. Gender role attitudes had 
no significance in determining whether respondents have difficulty paying their bills.  
 The third model assessed whether one generally has money left over at the end of the 
month as the financial behavior. Only two variables were found to be significant to support 
Hypothesis Two. Younger respondents and those with higher incomes were more likely to have 
money left over at the end of the month. Marital status, race, and sex did not contribute to the 
model. As with model one and model two, one’s gender role attitudes were not significant in 
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predicting whether respondents displayed positive financial behaviors by having money left over 
at the end of the month. 
 The results of the combined regressions showed that all of the hypothesized socialization 
characteristics were predictors of one or more of the measured financial behaviors. Age and 
income were the only variables significant in all three models. These results suggest that one’s 
age and income have the most influence on one’s financial behaviors. The first indication is that 
the more money one has, the more financially responsible behaviors someone will exhibit. 
Income has been found to have a positive association with financial behaviors (O’Neill & Xiao, 
2006). Surprisingly, in each model as age increased, respondents reported having more negative 
financial behaviors, suggesting that younger people are more financially responsible. This 
finding is contrary to O’Neill and Xiao’s (2006) study which reported that older respondents 
have better financial behaviors than younger respondents. It is possible that a consistent 
relationship between age and financial behaviors does not exist. Perhaps financial behaviors by 
age are really a function of generational attitudes towards money. It is not unreasonable to 
suppose that common “coming of age” experiences such as the great depression, the relative 
affluence and security of the fifties, or perhaps this current financial crisis will have a lasting 
impact on the financial behaviors of those who experience these events at some point in their 
lives.  
 This study hypothesized that nontraditional gender role attitudes would have a positive 
association with financial behaviors. However, gender role attitudes were not significant in 
predicting any of the three financial behaviors. These results are contrary to previous studies 
(Hira & Mugenda, 2000; Ozmete & Hira, 2011), which when reviewed present a reasonable 
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supposition that gender role attitudes do impact the choices and actions that a person takes. 
However, gender role attitudes may not drive every measurable financial behavior. 
 Using a framework of Eagly’s (1987) gender role theory, the current study hypothesized 
that one’s financial behaviors are a function of socialization characteristics and gender role 
attitudes. Although gender role attitudes were not statistically significant, males were found to 
display more positive behaviors than females in two of the regression models. These findings 
suggest that gender role attitudes may not influence financial behaviors, but that gender does 
influence financial behaviors. Gender was found to be a determinant of various financial 
behaviors in previous studies (Anthes & Most, 2000; Bajtelsmit & Bernasek, 1996; Eckel & 
Grossman, 2002; Grable, 2000; Hayhoe et al., 2000; Hira & Mugenda, 2000). As Anthes and 
Most (2000) suggested, women are not as experienced as men in financial issues and, 
historically, women have been financially dependent on men. This study presented an issue that 
can arise in survey research. A fair assessment could be made that currently society paints less 
traditional female gender role attitudes more positively than traditional female gender role 
attitudes. Thus, when taking a survey the respondent may answer as they believe they “should” 
while their gender indicates the choices they actually make. Obviously, this is one of the issues 
related to self-reporting.   
 Implications 
Financial planners are often challenged when they suggest that clients can change 
behaviors in which they have engaged in for several years. However, it is possible to alter 
clients’ behaviors by integrating their practices with a financial therapist. Financial therapists are 
trained “to guide clients to adopt and sustain behavior changes that can make their financial plan 
come to life” (Maton, Maton, & Martin, 2008, p. 65). Collaboration of financial planners and 
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financial therapists helps clients to gain an understanding of their relationship with money and 
how it affects their lives, which, furthermore, aids planners in providing advice that clients will 
act on (Maton et al.). 
The current study provides useful information for financial planner, counselors, and 
therapists by recognizing socialization characteristics that may influence financial behaviors. 
Social, psychological, and emotional issues and their impact on financial behavior are seriously 
lacking in the formal or continuing education of financial planners. To be effective, financial 
planning educators and advisors need to understand factors that underlie their clients’ financial 
behaviors. Educational programs are needed that focus on gender differences in spending 
behaviors and their consequences and inconsistencies in an individual’s perceptions of their 
financial situations (Hira & Mugenda, 2000). 
 As Anthes and Most (2000) found, the biggest challenge for the financial planning 
community is raising awareness about the difficult financial issues that women face, and the 
need to help women clients address their attitudes toward money. Their findings further suggest 
that financial planners need to motivate women to examine their own personal money history in 
order to overcome gender and cultural stereotyping.  One other issue that financial planners and 
therapists should consider is that perhaps their female clients behave more traditionally than they 
will report they do. This should be taken into account when working with female clients.  
 Limitations and Recommendations 
Future researchers should consider the limitations of this study. First, other data sets may 
provide more defined information to measure financial behaviors. The current study used 
responses to the following questions in order to assess financial behaviors: (a) How often do 
you/does your household put off buying something you need, such as food, clothing, medical 
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care, or housing because you don’t have money?; (b) During the past 12 months, how much 
difficulty did you/did your household have paying bills?; and (c) Thinking about the end of each 
month over the past 12 months, how much money did you/did your household have left over?  
Respondents who had missing data were not included in the regression models. Only 
those respondents who provided complete data were used. Therefore, different findings may 
have resulted if individuals who had missing data were also included in the analysis. This is a 
limitation that should be considered. In addition, data for the dependent variable was reduced to 
a binary variable since the original data were not in a ratio level scale.  
While the issue has been raised of a difference in the gender role attitudes that women 
self-report and the actual behavior of the different genders, it certainly has not been conclusively 
proven by this study. Therefore, further research into the issue of the self-reported attitudes of 
women and the actual behaviors of women is a fruitful area for additional inquiry in future 
research.  
The most interesting finding from this paper is that gender role attitudes were not 
significant indicators of financial behaviors, as predicted by gender role theory. However, gender 
was a significant predictor of two of the three financial behaviors. This may indicate a difference 
in self-reported gender role attitudes of women and their actual behaviors. Therefore, financial 
planners and therapists must be aware of a disconnect between client self-reported attitudes and 
client behaviors. This study also indicates that males, for whatever reason, do tend to exhibit 
more positive financial behaviors. Practitioners must be prepared to render additional assistance 
to female clients, and public policymakers attempting to improve financial behaviors, should 
focus on women as this is where improvement is of greatest need. 
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Chapter 4 - The Financial Behaviors of Children Based on Mother’s 
Gender Role Attitudes and Human Capital Transfers 
 Introduction 
The United States has recently faced recession, rising fuel and food prices, a mortgage 
and credit crises, increased bankruptcy filings, and a reduction in savings creating financial 
stressors for individuals and families (McCormick, 2009). The national personal savings rate is 
low, with Americans saving 4% of their disposable income (U. S. Department of Commerce, 
2011). The total amount of consumer debt in the U.S. for 2010 was $2.4 trillion (Federal 
Reserve, 2011). Based on 2010 U. S. Census statistics, this works out to be nearly $7,800 in debt 
for every man, woman, and child in the United States (U. S. Census, 2010). In addition, 
consumers have more than $886 billion in outstanding revolving credit; the average consumer 
has nine credit cards with an average balance of $5,100 per person, which was forecasted to 
increase to $6,500 per person by the end of 2011 (U. S. Census, 2010). Non-business bankruptcy 
filings in 2010 totaled 1,538,033, up 14.4 % from 2009. This was the highest number of non-
business filings for a fiscal year since 2005, immediately prior to the implementation of the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Act in October 2005 (U. S. Courts, 2011). To 
further combat these financial difficulties, the unemployment rate remains near 9.5% (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, 2011). In 2008 (year data was used for this study), similar conditions also 
existed with a personal savings rate of 5.35%, consumer debt of $2.56 trillion, and outstanding 
revolving credit of $957 billion. However, the number of non-business bankruptcy filings was 
considerably less in 2008 (694,855). These conditions place severe economic strain on families 
and, ultimately, children (McCormick, 2009). 
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“The unwise financial patterns of some parents all too often emerge in the lives of their 
children” (Clarke, Heaton, Israelson, & Eggett, 2005, p. 322). Financial decisions made early in 
life have the potential of affecting one’s ability to becoming financially independent and secure 
in adulthood (Martin & Oliva, 2001; Neull & Drabman, 2001). Therefore, with the numerous 
financial challenges and decisions that face young people today, it is necessary to provide skills 
and attitudes to allow them to successfully navigate in a complex financial environment (Clarke 
et al., 2005; McCormick, 2009). Although this study does not look to directly explore financial 
behaviors, it does examine the transfer of general attitudes and financial characteristics from 
mothers to their children. 
Children learn behaviors by modeling what they observe, are taught to practice, and then 
they process this information (Bandura, 1982). According to Jorgensen and Savia (2010), parents 
are the key influences in children’s lives, and the attitudes and knowledge they have about 
money are primarily influenced by their parents. Clarke et al. (2005) found that specifically when 
mothers modeled financial tasks, and adolescents practiced and performed those tasks more 
frequently, the adolescents felt more financially prepared. To further examine this specific 
intergenerational transfer, this study focuses on the mother’s influence on children’s financial 
behaviors. 
This study has three objectives: (a) determine if a mother’s gender role attitudes are 
transferred to her children and, therefore, influence their financial behaviors; (b) determine if a 
mother’s human capital is transferred to her children, and, therefore, influences their financial 
behaviors; and (c) illustrate how these determinants may be beneficial to policymakers and 
practitioners. The first objective will be tested by examining whether a mother’s gender role 
attitudes are intergenerationally transmitted to her children, how they may differ for sons and 
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daughters, and whether this transmission has any effect on the financial behaviors of children. 
Although previous studies have researched the transfer of maternal human capital, the second 
objective expands on this topic by examining whether this transmission has any effect on the 
financial behaviors of children. Finally, understanding what factors influence the next 
generation’s financial behaviors may provide better prescriptions for policymakers and help 
practitioners in improving their financial practices. 
 Theoretical Framework and Related Literature 
According to Becker (1993), human capital is comprised of “expenditures on education, 
training, medical care, etc. However, these produce human, not physical or financial, capital 
because you cannot separate a person from his or her knowledge, skills, health or values the way 
it is possible to move financial and physical assets while the owner stays put” (p. 16). 
Furthermore, of these expenditures, education and training are the most important investments in 
human capital (Becker, 1993), and, as such, parents have a substantial influence on children’s 
education, marital stability, and other dimensions of their lives. Becker’s theory of human capital 
suggests that parents’ endowed and attained human capital influences their children’s endowed 
and attained human capital, and therefore, effects their economic production.  
Vella (1994) combined the constructs of gender roles and human capital to examine the 
effects on labor market behavior. Using a model of human capital attainment, Vella found that 
women’s gender role attitudes have a “dramatic impact upon the individual’s education, labor 
supply, and rate of return to education” (p. 209). The findings also indicated some relationship 
between male education attainment and attitudes, but no relationship between attitudes and labor 
market behavior. Vella concluded that traditional attitudes of gender roles do affect labor market 
behavior. Furthermore, Fortin (2005) found that women’s gender attitudes affect their 
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participation in higher education which is the main determinant of favorable labor market 
outcomes for women. Using an expanded theoretical framework of Becker’s (1993) human 
capital, this study incorporates mothers’ gender role attitudes, traditional versus non-traditional, 
into the model along with their own human capital attainments and endowments and the gender 
role attitudes and human capital attainments and endowments of their children, which further 
affects the children’s financial behaviors (see Figure 4.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Conceptual Framework of Children’s Financial Behaviors 
 Financial Behaviors 
According to Jorgensen and Savia (2010), the recent downturn in the economy 
demonstrated how family life can be impacted when individuals and families are not financially 
capable. Families need to better understand the economy and adopt the skills and knowledge to 
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make better financial decisions. As Danes (1994) found, when children are young, family is the 
primary socialization unit for learning financial capability. According to Danes, financial 
socialization is “the process of acquiring and developing values, attitudes, standards, norms, 
knowledge, and behaviors that contribute to the financial viability and well-being of the 
individual” (p. 128). Using this perception of parental influence on the financial socialization of 
children, Jorgensen and Savia (2010) found that parents were perceived by young adults to have 
a direct and moderately significant influence on a child’s financial attitude and an indirect and 
moderately insignificant influence on financial behavior, which was mediated through financial 
attitudes. They also found that financial knowledge had a significant and large influence on 
financial attitudes, which had a meaningful and important influence on financial behaviors. 
Therefore, as financial knowledge increased, financial attitudes and behaviors of young adults 
improved, which, in turn, lead to better informed financial decisions. Jorgensen and Savia’s 
study suggested that these findings may be important to policymakers and educators in creating 
programs that focus on improving financial behaviors. 
Danes and Haberman (2007) investigated gender differences in high school students in 
financial knowledge, self-efficacy, and behavior after completing a financial planning 
curriculum. Males had more knowledge about credit, auto insurance, and investments entering 
the program; however, females gained more knowledge throughout the program. Also, although 
males felt more confident about making money decisions, females thought that money 
management would affect their future more than males. In addition, males reported achieving 
financial goals more than their female counterparts, but females were more inclined to use 
budgets, compare prices, and discuss money matters with family. 
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The importance of understanding what influences financial behaviors is further evidenced 
in the fact that financial well-being is an outcome of financial behaviors: Financial well-being is 
comprised of individual characteristics, financial behaviors, and financial stressors (Kim, 2000). 
Increased financial stress from credit problems, for example, may not only cause lower financial 
well-being, but negative effects on one’s mental health (Kim, 2003). Diminished financial well-
being may cause social, physical, and emotional stress (Bagwell, 2000). Additionally, Kim  
found that people who practiced positive financial behaviors more often had higher levels of 
financial well-being. 
 Gender Roles/Attitudes 
 Previous research has indicated that differences exist between men and women’s 
financial behaviors. These behaviors may be influenced by the different gender roles that men 
and women adhere to based on social expectations. Gender roles are prescriptions and beliefs 
that are socially and culturally defined about the behavior and emotions of men and women 
(Anselmi & Law, 1998). Consistent with these stereotypical roles, men have traditionally been 
considered financial providers, while women were seen as caretakers, creating a division of labor 
(Ozmete & Hira, 2011). Many social scientists have examined gender roles according to various 
socialization theories. Eagly (1987) developed the social-role theory of sex differences in social 
behavior, which emphasized that this division of labor between the sexes produces gender role 
expectations and sex-typed skills and beliefs that influence sex differences in social behavior. 
The division of labor is determined by the gender stereotypes held by people that women are 
more communal and men are more agentic. Communal qualities are considered to be 
selflessness, concern with others, and desire to be at one with others; agentic refers to self-
assertion, self-expansion, and the urge to master (Bakan, 1966). When individuals form these 
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gender stereotypes and expectations, behavior is influenced by gender roles (Eagly). Studies 
suggest that men and women adopt different gender roles based on their perceptions of what 
factors might determine their financial situations and expectations (Ozmete & Hira, 2011). 
According to Hibbert, Beuthler, and Marin (2004), gender roles are closely aligned with the 
financial information that teens acquire through observation of their families’ financial 
processes. These gender perceptions related to finances become normative attitudes over time as 
children approach their teens (West & Zimmerman, 1991). This internalization of norms further 
influences children’s future expectations and behavior (Greene, 1990).  
 Anthes and Most (2000) suggested that although men and women share many similar 
basic money management concerns, they may often view them in different ways. For example, 
women tend to be more anxious about their financial future and how to secure it, women may 
also face more challenges than men. Some of these challenges include: (a) Women are more 
intimidated about financial issues than men; (b) Women earn less money than men; (c) Women 
are less prepared for retirement; (d) Women receive smaller retirement benefits; (e) Women live 
longer than men; (f) Women are poorer in retirement than men; and (g) Women are more 
conservative than men. As previously mentioned, women’s gender role attitudes affect their 
human capital (i.e., educational attainment and income). 
 Human Capital 
Becker’s theory of human capital (1993) states that “education and training are the most 
important investments in human capital. High school and college education in the United States 
greatly raise a person’s income, even netting out direct and indirect costs of schooling, and after 
adjusting for better family backgrounds and greater abilities of more educated people” (p. 17). 
Wilson (2001) incorporated Becker’s human capital model in her study which supported the 
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model’s implications. The study found evidence that educational attainment does encourage 
utility-maximizing individuals into choosing schooling levels based on economic returns and the 
utility that is derived from the schooling. Furthermore, using a variant of Becker’s theory of 
human capital, Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994) found that the educational attainment of mothers 
augments the production of children’s human capital when unobserved human capital 
endowments and maternal behaviors that may affect human capital are not considered. To further 
support the relationship between parents’ education levels and children’s educational 
attainments, Becker and Tomes (1979) determined that parents with education levels far above 
the mean will have children who also attain high levels of schooling which, along with inherited 
endowments, translates into human capital and earnings when rented on the labor market. 
 Based on Becker’s (1965) concept of human capital, Leibowitz (1974) presented an 
economic model of the process of children’s attainments from endowed and attained human 
capital provided by their parents. Leibowitz (1974) stated, “Income, which is a rent on the stock 
of human capital, depends on the four major sources of capital: home investment (the quality and 
quantity of time inputs), measured ability, final schooling level, and postschool investment” (p. 
S113). In other words, Leibowitz’s conclusion was that income is really a return based on the 
quality of human capital. Leibowitz empirically demonstrated that home investments in children 
are a positive and significant factor in determining children’s ultimate labor market outcomes. 
King, Peterson, Adioetomo, Domingo, and Syed (1986) found that education levels of 
children were impacted more by their mother’s education than their father’s education. Labor 
market productivity and income growth for men and women has been shown to be enhanced by 
education; however, increased education for women has beneficial effects on social well-being, 
which is not always measured by the market. Furthermore, increased levels of education for 
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women improve their productivity in the home, which has an impact on family health, child 
survival, and the investment in children’s human capital (Hill & King, 1995). Using several 
studies from various countries, Behrman (1997) also found a significant positive relationship 
between women’s educational attainment and their children’s educational attainment. 
As suggested by Cooksey, Menaghan, and Jekielek (1997), parents can, and generally do, 
provide financial capital, social capital, and human capital to their children. Financial capital 
consists of providing a conducive learning environment, whereas human capital is contributed 
through parents’ abilities and educational attainments by being effective role models. In addition, 
parents provide social capital through their relations with their children. This transference of 
human capital (endowed and attained) may contribute to children’s human capital and, therefore, 
influence their perceptions and attitudes towards financial issues. 
 Endowed and Attained Human Capital 
 According to Finke (2009), “There is strong empirical evidence that I.Q. is an accurate 
proxy of initial human capital endowment” (p. 2). Finke’s study showed a strong relationship 
between I.Q. and financial decision making. The current study also uses I.Q. as a proxy for 
endowed human capital. In Haveman and Wolfe’s (1995) review and critique of the empirical 
research on the links between investments in children and their attainments, they found that 
variables used to describe parental characteristics or choices were the most commonly used in 
the studies. The studies revealed that the most fundamental economic factor is the parents’ 
human capital, which was most often measured by years of schooling attained. This variable was 
found to be “statistically significant and quantitatively important” (Haveman & Wolfe, 1995, p. 
1855). These studies also considered family income to be the best measure of the level of 
economic resources that parents devote to the children, resulting in the children’s educational 
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attainments. This variable was found to be positively associated with educational attainment and 
statistically significant in most studies. Therefore, as in previous studies, education and income 
will be used as proxies for attained human capital in the current study. In addition, this study 
conceptualizes children’s financial behaviors as a form of attained human capital influenced by 
education and income. 
Overall, the literature provides a background for the conceptualization of this study. Past 
research provides a rich collection of studies related to gender roles, human capital theory, and 
financial behaviors. Based on the research literature and the proposed theoretical framework, the 
following hypotheses are used as the focus of this study: 
H1: Mother’s endowed and attained human capital has a statistically positive association 
with their children’s financial behaviors. 
H2: Mother’s nontraditional gender role attitudes have a statistically positive association 
with their children’s financial behaviors. 
H3: Children’s endowed and attained human capital has a statistically positive association 
with their own financial behaviors. 
H4: Children’s nontraditional gender role attitudes have a statistically positive association 
with their own financial behaviors.  
 Methods 
Data for the study were collected from two administrations of the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth (NLSY), sponsored by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Mother’s data was 
retrieved from the NLSY (1979-2008) administration. This sample is a nationally representative 
sample of 12,686 young men and women who were 14 to 22 years old when they were first 
surveyed in 1979. The respondents, and their spouses, if applicable, were interviewed annually 
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from 1979 through 1994 and are currently interviewed on a biennial basis. This study was 
interested in mother’s attributes, therefore the sample was limited to females with children. 
Respondent (i.e., child) data were retrieved from the NLSY79 Child/Young Adult (1986-
2008) administration. This sample consists of all children born to NLSY79 female respondents. 
Conducted biennially, this child survey includes comprehensive child data. This data is coupled 
with longitudinal information on the family background, education, employment histories, and 
economic well-being of their NLSY79 mothers. Both administrations provide an expansive data 
set for this study. 
 This study attempts to address the issue of the intergenerational transmission of a 
mother’s gender role attitudes and human capital to her children, and how this impacts a child’s 
financial behaviors. Thus, a model using financial behaviors as a dependent variable and various 
indicators of gender role attitudes and both endowed and attained human capital is suggested. As 
will be explained below, logistic regression was used to develop appropriate models. 
 Dependent Variables 
The NLSY data provides variables that may be used to measure financial behaviors. 
 There are three questions that address this issue: (a) How often do you/does your household put 
off buying something you need, such as food, clothing, medical care, or housing because you 
don’t have money?; (b) During the past 12 months, how much difficulty did you/did your 
household have paying bills?; and (c) Thinking about the end of each month over the past 12 
months, how much money did you/did your household have left over? These variables were 
coded with (a) and (b) above allowing five responses and (c) allowing four responses with higher 
scores representing more negative financial behaviors. By their very nature, Likert scales contain 
imprecision. The level of increase or decrease as one moves up and down the scale will not be 
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uniform from respondent to respondent. For this reason, the data was recoded as a dichotomous 
0, 1 variable. Reported responses of 1 represent very positive behaviors and responses ranging 
from 2 to 5 on questions (a ) and (b) and 2 to 4 on question (c) were recoded as 0, representing 
negative behaviors. Each financial behavior was assumed to be a function of the independent 
variables explained below. 
 Independent Variables 
 Gender Role Attitudes 
 The mother’s gender role attitudes were operationalized by responses to the following 
statements: (a) A woman’s place is in the home; (b) A wife with family has no time for other 
employment; (c) A working wife feels more useful (reverse coded); (d) Employment of wives 
leads to juvenile delinquency; (e) Inflation necessitates employment of both parents (reverse 
coded); (f) Traditional husband/wife roles are best; (g) Men should share housework (reverse 
coded); and (h) Women are happier in traditional roles. Each statement was assessed using four 
response categories: (a) strongly disagree, (b) disagree, (c) agree, and (d) strongly agree. Three 
of the items were recoded, resulting in a scale with scores ranging from 8 to 32 with higher 
scores indicating that the respondent possessed more traditional gender role attitudes. These 
responses were retrieved from the 2004 administration of the survey, which was the most current 
year that the gender role attitude questions were reported. 
The children’s gender role attitudes were also operationalized using responses to the 
above mentioned statements, excluding (d). Responses for the children were used from the 2006 
and 2008 administration of the survey. These responses were combined because those who 
reported gender role attitudes in 2006 did not report again in 2008. Therefore, the combined 
sample is representative of the total number of respondents to the gender role attitudes. 
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Statement (d) was not reported in the 2006 data, and therefore it was also eliminated in the 2008 
data for more accuracy. After recoding the same three responses as the mother’s data, a scale 
with scores ranging from 7 to 28 resulted with higher scores representing more traditional gender 
role attitudes. 
 Endowed Human Capital 
 I.Q. was used to measure the mother’s and child’s endowed human capital. Mothers’ I.Q. 
was assessed using the results from the NLSY 1981 administration of the Armed Forces 
Qualification Test (2006, revised), while children’s I.Q. was determined from the results of the 
1986 administration of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-Revised. These tests are generally 
considered reliable and valid measurements of I.Q. (Rodgers, Cleveland, van den Oord, & Rowe, 
2000). Both variables were measured on a continuous scale. Both I.Q. measurements were 
transformed to logarithms due to skewness in the data. 
 Attained Human Capital 
 Education and income were used as proxies to measure mother’s and child’s attained 
human capital. Both variables were measured on a continuous basis using data from the 2008 
administration of the NLSY (1979-2008) survey for mothers and 2008 administration of the 
Child/Young Adult (1986-2008) survey for children. However, for the regressions, income was 
divided by 1,000 for ease of interpretation. 
Empirical Model 
Where, 
 Financial Behavior1 = Delayed buying, 
 Financial Behavior2 = Difficulty paying bills, 
 Financial Behavior3 = Money left over, 
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  = Mother’s gender role attitudes, 
  = Mother’s I.Q., 
  = Mother’s education, 
  = Mother’s income, 
  = Child’s gender role attitudes, 
  = Child’s I.Q., 
  = Child’s education, and 
  = Child’s income. 
 Using the basic logistic regression equation,  
  
Three regression equations was estimated.  
 Financial Behavior1 = f(βmgra, βmIQ, βmed, βminc, βcgra, βcIQ, βced, βcinc) (1) 
 Financial Behavior2 = f(βmgra, βmIQ, βmed, βminc, βcgra, βcIQ, βced, βcinc) (2) 
Financial Behavior3 = f(βmgra, βmIQ, βmed, βminc, βcgra, βcIQ, βced, βcinc) (3) 
Each financial behavior of the child was measured as a function of a summation of the mother’s 
gender role attitudes, I.Q., education, income, and their children’s own summation of gender role 
attitudes, I.Q., education, and income. The correlation matrix revealed that no multicollinearity 
issues exist. 
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 Results 
 Descriptive Statistics 
 Approximately 40% of respondents never put off buying necessary items such as food, 
clothing, medical care, or housing because they did not have enough money. For the second 
financial behavior, approximately 35% had no difficulty at all paying their bills. Finally, 
assessing the third financial behavior, only approximately 10% of the respondents reported 
having more than enough money left over at the end of the month.  
 Based on a range from 13 to 32 with higher scores representing more traditional gender 
role attitudes, the mothers’ mean score was 24.13. Mothers’ mean I.Q. score was 30,289.20 
(range = 172 - 98,645) and their educational level was approximately 13 years (range = 3 - 20 
years). In addition, the average income for mothers was $28,078.42 (range = $100 - $307,823). 
 Utilizing a range from 10 to 23, children’s mean score for gender role attitudes was 
17.12. Children’s mean I.Q. score was 57.77 (range = 1 - 141). Similar to their mothers, children 
reported educational levels of approximately 13 years (range = 7 - 20 years), and a slightly lower 
average income of $26,606.55 (range = $45 - $129,116). The sample included approximately a 
50% - 50% split between males and females. Descriptive data is shown in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics of the Sample Essay 3 
N = 1,351 
Variable                                                                                            % 
Financial Behavior 1 – Not Putting Off Buying Necessities 
1 = Never      534    39.53% 
0 = Rarely/Occasionally/      817     60.47%    
      Frequently/ All the time           
Financial Behavior 2 – No Difficulty Paying Bills        
1 = No difficulty at all    468    34.64%  
0 = Little/Some/ Quite a bit/     883    65.36% 
       A great deal 
Financial Behavior 3 – Having Money Left Over 
1 = More than enough money left over  132      9.77% 
0 = Some/Just enough/Not enough   1,219     90.23% 
Mother’s Gender Role Attitudes 
  Mean (Range)       24.13 (13 - 32) 
Mother’s Human Capital 
I.Q. 
 Mean (Range)     30,289.20        (172 - 98,645) 
Education 
  Mean (Range)     12.70 years    (3 - 20) 
Income  
  Mean (Range)                 $28,078   ($100 - $307,823) 
Child’s Gender Role Attitudes 
  Mean (Range)     17.12     (10 - 23) 
Child’s Human Capital 
I.Q. 
 Mean (Range)     57.77     (1 -141) 
Education 
Mean (Range)      12.98 years    (7 - 20) 
Income 
Mean (Range)             $26,607                              ($45 - $129,116) 
Sex 
1 = Male      671    49.67% 
0 = Female   680                                      50.33%  
 Regression Analysis 
 Three logistic regressions were used to assess the likelihood of respondents displaying 
positive or negative financial behaviors. Each model incorporated one of the financial behavior 
questions as the dependent variable. The first model considered responses to the question of 
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whether respondents put off buying necessary items. Respondents in regression model two 
reported whether they have difficulty paying bills. Finally, regression model three included 
responses referring to if the respondents have money left over at the end of the month. The Log 
Likelihood Ratio was statistically significant for all three models at the p < .001 level (95.53, 
78.68, and 56.70, respectively). 
 Results from the first logistic regression model showed that the mother’s gender role 
attitudes, I.Q., and education, and the child’s income were statistically significant predictors of a 
child’s probability of not putting off buying necessary items. The second logistic regression 
model results also indicated that these variables, excluding mother’s I.Q., but including child’s 
I.Q., were predictive of the child’s probability of not having difficulty paying their bills. 
According to the third logistic regression model, the mother’s I.Q. and education and the child’s 
income were found to be statistically significant predictors of the child having money left over at 
the end of the month. 
Regression 1: Not Putting Off Buying Necessities 
 Mother’s I.Q. was the largest contributor to the model with a standardized beta estimate 
of 0.17, indicating that the higher the mother’s I.Q, the less likely their child would display 
negative financial behaviors by putting off buying necessary items (O. R. = 1.29, p < .001). The 
second largest contributor to the model was the child’s income (β = 0.16). As a child’s income 
increased by $1,000, they were 1% more likely to not put off buying necessary items (p < .001). 
Results also indicated that mother’s gender role attitudes (β = -0.10) and education ((β = 0.10) 
made equal contributions to the model. As the mother’s gender role attitudes increased by one 
unit (more traditional), her child was more likely to put off buying necessary items (O. R. = 0.94, 
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p < .01). For each additional year of a mother’s education, children were more likely to not put 
off buying necessary items (O. R. = 1.08, p < .01).  Results are shown in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2 Logistic Regression Model 1 Essay 3 – Do Not Put Off Buying Necessities 
N= 1,351 
Variable Coefficient 
 
         þ 
Odds Ratio 
       O. R. 
Standardized 
beta estimate 
          β 
Intercept  -3.01***   
Mother’s sum of traditional gender role 
attitudes 
 -0.06** 0.94 -0.10 
Mother’s log I.Q.   0.26*** 1.29  0.17 
Mother’s education   0.08** 1.08  0.10 
Mother’s income by 1.000  -0.00 1.00        -0.00 
Child’s sum of traditional gender role 
attitudes 
  0.01 1.01         0.01 
Child’s log I.Q.  -0.15 0.86 -0.06 
Child’s education   0.04 1.04  0.04 
Child’s income by 1,000   0.01*** 1.01  0.16 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001    
 
Regression 2: No Difficulty Paying Bills 
 The second regression model (Table 4.3) used the same independent variables as the first 
model; however, the dependent variable representing financial behaviors referred to responses to 
whether the child had difficulty paying bills. While mother’s I.Q. was the largest contributor to 
the first regression model, this variable was not found to be statistically significant in the second 
regression model. With a standardized beta estimate of 0.23, child’s income was the largest 
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contributor to the model. For every $1,000 increase in child’s income, they were 2% more likely 
to not have difficulty paying their bills (p < .001). Similar to the first model, mother’s gender 
role attitudes were found to be statistically significant, whereas the more traditional her gender 
role attitude, her child was more likely to have difficulty paying bills (O. R. = 0.93, p < .001). 
This variable was the second largest contributor to the model (β = -0.12). As with the first model, 
mother’s education was the third largest contributor to the model (β = 0.09). As a mother’s level 
of education increased by one year, her child was more likely to report not having difficulty 
paying their bills (O. R. = 1.08, p < .05). Finally, child’s I.Q. was found to be statistically 
significant in model three (β = -0.07). The higher the child’s I.Q., the more difficulty they had 
paying their bills (O. R. = 0.84, p < .05). 
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Table 4.3 Logistic Regression Model 2 Essay 3 – No Difficulty Paying Bills 
 N= 1,351 
Variable Coefficient 
         
      þ 
Odds Ratio 
 
      O. R.  
Standardized 
beta estimate 
         Β 
Intercept  -0.60   
Mother’s sum of traditional gender role 
attitudes 
 -0.07*** 0.93 -0.12 
Mother’s log I.Q.   0.07 1.07  0.05 
Mother’s education   0.07* 1.08  0.09 
Mother’s income by 1,000  -0.00 1.00        -0.05 
Child’s sum of traditional gender role 
attitudes 
 -0.00 1.00        -0.00 
Child’s log I.Q.  -0.17* 0.84 -0.07 
Child’s education   0.02 1.02  0.02 
Child’s income by 1,000   0.02*** 1.02  0.23 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001    
 
Regression 3: Has Money Left Over 
 As with models one and two, the third regression model used the same independent 
variables. In order to capture financial behaviors, this model utilized responses to whether the 
child had money left over at the end of the month as the dependent variable. Although mother’s 
gender role attitudes were found to be statistically significant in both model one and model two, 
this variable was not significant in predicting if respondents reported having money left over at 
the end of the month. Similar to the first two models, the child’s income and mother’s education 
were contributors to the model (β = 0.23 and 0.12, respectively). As the largest contributor to 
model three, as child’s income increased by $1,000, they were 2% more likely to have money 
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left over at the end of the month (O. R. =1.02, p < .001). Found to be a predictor in model one, 
but not in model two, mother’s I.Q. was statistically significant in this model (p < .05). With a 
standardized beta estimate of 0.15, this variable made the second largest contribution to the 
model.   The higher the mother’s I.Q., the more likely her child was to display more positive 
financial behaviors by having money left over at the end of the month (O.R. = 1.25). The child 
was also more likely to report having money left over as the mother’s level of education 
increased (O. R. = 1.10, p < .05). Logistic results are shown in Table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4 Logistic Regression Model 3 Essay 3 – Has Money Left Over 
N= 1,351 
Variable Coefficient 
 
         þ 
Odds Ratio 
 
     O. R. 
Standardized 
beta estimate 
           β 
Intercept   -6.87***   
Mother’s sum of traditional gender role 
attitudes 
  -0.03 0.97 -0.05 
Mother’s log I.Q.    0.23* 1.25  0.15 
Mother’s education    0.10* 1.10  0.12 
Mother’s income by 1,000   -0.00 1.00        -0.02 
Child’s sum of traditional gender role 
attitudes 
   0.05 1.05         0.04 
Child’s log I.Q.    0.03 1.03  0.01 
Child’s education    0.02 1.02  0.03 
Child’s income by 1,000    0.02*** 1.02  0.23 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001    
 
 Discussion 
 The current study hypothesized that children’s financial behaviors are influenced by their 
mother’s gender role attitudes, human capital, and their own gender role attitudes and human 
capital. Past studies have shown that parents influence their children’s lives and behaviors 
(Danes, 1994; Jorgensen & Savia, 2010). Specifically, mothers’ behaviors have been found to 
impact their children’s financial behaviors (Clarke et al., 2005). The following discussion 
focuses on the results of the three regression models that assessed three distinct financial 
behaviors of the children. 
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 The first regression model was used to determine if any of the above mentioned variables 
have an impact on whether children reported putting off buying necessary items, such as food, 
clothing, medical care, or housing because they don’t have enough money. A mother’s gender 
role attitudes, endowed human capital, and attained human capital (education) were found to be 
statistically significant in predicting this financial behavior. Hypothesis One was confirmed: 
Mother’s endowed and attained human capital has a statistically positive association with their 
children’s financial behaviors related to putting off buying necessary items. As mother’s I.Q. and 
level of education increased, her child is less likely to put off buying necessary items because 
they did not have enough money. As hypothesized (Hypothesis Two), a mother’s nontraditional 
gender role attitudes were found to have a statistically positive association with her children's 
probability of not putting off buy necessities. Results from the model showed that the more 
traditional the mother’s gender role attitudes, the more likely their children will display this 
negative financial behavior. In addition, children’s income had a statistically positive association 
with their own financial behaviors. Children were less likely to put off buying necessities when 
they have larger incomes. This result partially confirmed Hypothesis Three: Children’s endowed 
and attained human capital has a statistically positive association with their own financial 
behaviors. Children’s endowed human capital (I.Q.) and level of education were not found to be 
predictors of this particular financial behavior. Children’s gender role attitudes also did not 
influence whether they put off buying necessary items because they don’t have enough money, 
therefore Hypothesis Four was rejected. 
 The children’s possibility of having difficulty paying bills anytime during the past 12 
months was assessed in the second regression model. Although the first model fully confirmed 
Hypothesis One, this model only partially confirmed this hypothesis. As with model one, the 
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mother’s attained human capital (education) had a statistically positive association with her 
children not having difficulty paying their bills. The higher the level of the mother’s education, 
the less likely her child will have difficulty paying bills. Also used as a measure of attained 
human capital, mother’s income was not significant in predicting this behavior. Unlike model 
one, Mother’s I Q. was not significant in model two. However, similar to model one, Hypothesis 
Two was confirmed in this model: Mother’s nontraditional gender role attitudes have a 
statistically positive association with their children having no difficulty paying their bills. 
Children’s endowed and attained human capital was significant in predicting this behavior 
(Hypothesis Three). The children’s income influenced their probability of having difficulty 
paying their bills. As in model one, as the child’s income increased they are more likely to 
engage in positive financial behaviors. Additionally, children’s I.Q. was found to be statistically 
significant in predicting children’s difficulty paying their bills. Contrary to the hypothesis, this 
variable was found to have a negative association with this financial behavior. The higher the 
child’s I.Q., they were more likely to have difficulty paying their bills.. This finding is both 
counterintuitive and inconsistent with the results of the other models. Children’s nontraditional 
gender role attitudes had no influence on their own financial behaviors as related to having 
difficulty paying their bills, which rejects Hypothesis Four. 
 The third model used responses to whether the child generally has money left over at the 
end of the month as the financial behavior. Gender role attitudes of either the mother or child 
were not found to be statistically significant in this model, therefore rejecting Hypothesis Two 
and Four. Hypothesis One was confirmed: Mother’s endowed and attained human capital had a 
statistically positive association with their children’s financial behaviors related to having money 
left over at the end of the month. Specifically, the higher the mother’s I.Q. and level of 
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education, the more likely her child was to display positive financial behaviors by having money 
left over at the end of the month. As in the previous two models, Hypothesis Three was partially 
confirmed: Children’s endowed and attained human capital had a statistically significant 
association with their own financial behaviors by having money left over at the end of the month. 
As the child’s income increased, they were more likely to have money left over. The child’s level 
of education and I.Q. were not significant. 
 The results of the combined regressions showed that several of the hypothesized variables 
were predictors of one or more of the measured financial behaviors, excluding mother’s income, 
child’s education, and child’s gender role attitudes. Children’s income, a measurement of 
attained human capital, was the only variable significant in all three models. These results 
suggest that one’s income has the most influence on one’s financial behaviors, indicating that the 
more money one has, the more financially responsible they will behave. Income is dependent on 
educational attainment and measured ability, such as I.Q. (Becker, 1965; Leibowitz, 1974). 
Therefore, surprisingly, the child’s I.Q. as a measurement of endowed human capital was found 
to have a negative impact on their financial behaviors. One possible explanation is that higher 
I.Q. may, in fact, not be universally associated with better financial behaviors. Perhaps on a 
statistically significant level, with higher I.Q. also comes a possible unwarranted confidence that 
there is no need to promptly pay bills because extensions and more income in the following 
months will always be forthcoming. The possibility exists that as one’s I.Q. increases, one is 
more likely to be in a high status profession that causes one to be more likely to engage in 
conspicuous consumption and thus, actually have worse financial behaviors. In fact, Zagorsky 
(2007) found in his study using NLSY79 data that higher I.Q. scores sometimes increase the 
probability of individuals being in financial difficulty. In the future, this could be an area where 
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further inquiry would be productive. In addition, respondents’ level of education as a partial 
measurement of endowed human capital was not a contributor to their financial behaviors. 
 Using a theoretical framework of human capital, the current study hypothesized that a 
mother’s human capital and gender role attitudes transfer to her children in their portrayal of 
financial behaviors. As hypothesized, mother’s attributes were found to influence children’s 
financial behaviors. A mother’s human capital, endowed and attained, impact her children to 
some degree and how they behaved related to their finances. Mother’s I.Q. and level of education 
positively influence their children’s financial behaviors; however, mother’s income had no 
impact in any of the models.  
Gender role attitudes of one generation, specifically mother’s, appears to affect the 
financial behaviors of the next generation. Similar to Moen, Erickson, and Dempster-McClain 
(1997), using women’s gender role attitudes, the current study has shown that mothers “do place 
their imprint on the next generation” (p. 292). Overall, children of more traditional mothers 
engaged in more negative financial behaviors. Results provided support that an intergenerational 
transmission of human capital and gender role attitudes from mothers to children does have an 
influence on their financial behaviors. 
 Implications 
 Prior research has focused on how human capital and gender role attitudes may affect 
one’s behaviors. However, the purpose of this study was to determine the influence of these 
variables across a generation, and its impact specifically on financial behaviors. These findings 
suggest that individuals display certain behaviors not only based on their own attributes, but 
those that are inherited or attained from their mothers. According to Shim, Barber, Card, Xiao, 
and Serido (2009), financial habits formed as one transitions into adulthood may persist into and 
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throughout adulthood. Young adults are generally thought to be ill prepared for the financial 
marketplace and research is needed to understand how young people learn and practice good 
financial behaviors (Koonce, Mimura, Mauldin, Rupured, & Jordan, 2008). Therefore, exploring 
the root of certain behaviors early in life may aid in developing positive financial behaviors. 
This study provides insight for financial planning professionals and educators to the 
existence of gender differences, and their effect on attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors surrounding 
money. As Hira and Mugenda (2000) suggest, financial professionals “can take an inward look 
and reflect upon their own behavior, examining not only their current methods of counseling 
their clients, in light of gender, but their personal financial practices, as well” (p. 91). According 
to Klontz, Kahler, and Klontz (2008), interior exploration of one’s own financial beliefs and 
behaviors may help many financial professionals use their exterior skills more effectively to help 
clients. Such an examination may allow planners to relate to individuals and their beliefs and 
behaviors and suggest courses of action to enhance their financial well-being. Understanding 
differences that are gender-based may provide guidance for financial counselors, planners, 
educators, therapists, and policymakers to better target programs to individuals. These links 
between gender attitudes and/or beliefs, and, ultimately, behaviors provide rich areas for future 
research. 
 Financial planners and financial counselors may utilize this information when working 
with clients by considering the link between their financial decision-making and their 
background. Financial therapy, as defined by the Financial Therapy Association (2011, p.1) is 
“the integration of cognitive, emotional, behavioral, relational, and economic aspects that 
promote financial health.” Financial therapists may benefit from these findings in order to 
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identify certain characteristics that prove to be problematic in relation to one’s financial 
decision-making. 
 Limitations and Recommendations 
 The limitations of this study should be considered for future research related to children’s 
financial behaviors. Other data sets may be more useful for measuring the outcome variable. For 
the current study, financial behavior was assessed by responses to the following three items: (a) 
How often do you/your household put off buying something you need-such as food, clothing, 
medical care, or housing-because you don’t have money?; (b) During the past 12 months, how 
much difficulty did you/your household have paying bills?; and (c) Thinking about the end of 
each month over the past 12 months, did you/your household have enough money left over? 
Other characteristics found in other data sets may more accurately measure financial behavior. In 
addition, the responses to these financial behaviors and gender role attitudes are self-reported, 
which may have biased the sample. 
Another consideration is the regressions in this study only used respondent data that was 
complete. Respondents who had any missing data were not included in the regression models. If 
all respondents had been used, including those with some missing data, the results of the study 
may not have been consistent with the findings of this study. In addition, data for the dependent 
variable was transformed to a binary variable since the original data were not in a ratio level 
scale.  
One limitation of a study that examines gender differences and relies on Becker’s work is 
that Becker’s work treats gender differences as exogenous to the model. Becker was attempting 
to develop a mathematically rigorous framework where both spouses were jointly working to 
produce a particular output.  In accomplishing this, the indifference curves of the parties are 
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aggregated. In aggregating the indifference curves, the summation take into account the different 
preferences of the two parties. In aggregating these indifference curves and transforming them 
into a production function framework, it is of no mathematical significance whether differing 
preferences are a function of gender, class, education, or simply taste. All that matters is that the 
preferences be accurately measured and that the human capital endowments of the parties be 
accurately accounted for. This process allows for the joint production of an output and places the 
root cause of differing preferences outside of the model.  
 Limitations of this study are outweighed by the insight provided to this body of research. 
This study is among the first to examine predictors of financial behaviors across generations. The 
recent state of the economy stresses the need to improve upon financial behaviors and 
individuals’ financial situations. Financial planning, coupled with financial therapy, may 
contribute to the achievement of these goals. 
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Chapter 5 - Conclusions 
 These three essays were designed to understand the determinants of financial behaviors. 
Much of the significance of this work is tied to a study of observable behaviors and self-reported 
attitudes. In financial planning and financial therapy and in the making of public policy related to 
financial behaviors, the planner, therapist or policymaker is attempting to influence behavior in 
the direction that tends to lead to more positive financial outcomes. 
 Essay 1 
 In the first paper, the current study addressed the determinants of marital arguments over 
money. It is self-evident that marital stress exhibited by money arguments is not conducive to 
maximizing the joint production function that marriage should optimally be. Utilizing Lundberg 
and Pollak’s (1994) theory of non-cooperative game theory, this study conceptualized money 
arguments as a threat point in a marriage. The frequency of these money arguments were found 
to be influenced by financial behaviors, respondent’s income, and birth order. As expected, those 
who exhibited more positive financial behaviors were less likely to engage in spousal money 
arguments. In contrast to public opinion, more money does not necessarily result in fewer 
arguments. According to the theoretical framework, people with higher educational attainment 
and income may have a preference for maximizing individual versus couple/joint utility.  
The finding related to birth order was unexpected. Contrary to past research, laterborn 
individuals, in comparison to firstborns, were more likely to have spousal money arguments. 
This counterintuitive finding may be associated with the fact that data used in previous studies 
was much older when family sizes were generally larger and only children were rare, in 
comparison to families reporting in this study’s  more current data set. These findings support the 
idea that oftentimes couples may need to seek financial help from a financial planner in 
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collaboration with a financial therapist. Together, the two interrelated, but distinct, disciplines 
allow insight into what behaviors and characteristics may be the cause of dissension within a 
marriage, and how to change such behaviors, in order to accomplish a successful financial 
outcome.  
 This first essay contributes to theory by taking into consideration that money 
arguments, as threat points, may be used as an enforcement mechanism that stops short of 
divorce. Threats far short of divorce more accurately represent many marital relationships. 
Divorce is a very extreme sanction that is, as a general rule, costly to both partners and therefore 
probably not a credible threat for behaviors that are only moderately annoying. By developing a 
game theoretical perspective that incorporates threat points far short of the ultimate spousal 
sanction of divorce, real world marital relationships are more accurately modeled.  
 Theory is, by necessity, an abstraction from reality that requires simplifying assumptions; 
thus theory does not completely mirror reality. Therefore, any step that can be taken to model 
reality consistent with sound theory, where the assumptions more accurately represent the 
underlying reality, is an advance and a step worth taking. This first essay takes a step in more 
accurately modeling the framework surrounding money arguments within the marital 
relationship. 
 Essay 2 
 The second paper examined one generation’s predictors of financial behaviors. 
Traditional economic theories typically do not sufficiently account for gender, therefore this 
study used a framework of Eagly’s (1987) gender role theory. This study hypothesized that an 
individual’s financial behaviors are influenced by certain socialization characteristics and their 
gender role attitudes (traditional versus nontraditional). Age, marital status, race, sex, and 
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income were all found to be significant in predicting at least one of three financial behaviors that 
were assessed. Age and income were the only two variables consistent across all the behaviors. 
As predicted, the higher the income, respondents engaged in more positive financial behaviors. 
Surprisingly, as age increased, more negative financial behaviors were displayed. Perhaps the 
most interesting finding to this study is that gender role attitudes were not statistically significant 
in predicting any of the financial behaviors, but gender itself was significant for two of the 
behaviors. Males were found to engage in more positive financial behaviors than women. These 
findings may suggest that a difference may exist between what women self-report as gender role 
attitudes and their actual behaviors. In light of this finding, practitioners, including financial 
planners, counselors, or therapists, should be privy to this differential and its impact on women’s 
financial behaviors, and how to best assist their clients.  
The primary contribution of the second paper demonstrated in an empirically rigorous 
way that when studying financial behavioral outcomes, gender matters. As a practitioner, this is 
significant. As a general rule, women exhibit less desirable financial behaviors than men. This 
finding highlights for a practitioner the need to pay special attention and put increased effort into 
assuring that females receive the financial education and training that they need in order to 
succeed financially. This could perhaps also indicate that current methods of imparting financial 
information are relatively successful with males and should not be discontinued, but other 
methods should be developed to more effectively reach females. Thus this research confirms as 
in so many other areas, gender matters. 
 Essay 3 
The third paper explored the intergenerational transfer of attitudes and human capital 
across generations and their linkage to current financial behaviors of the respondents. Using a 
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theoretical framework of Becker’s (1993) theory of human capital, this study conceptualized that 
a mother’s human capital and gender role attitudes transfer to her children and influence their 
financial behaviors. In addition, the children’s own human capital and gender role attitudes are 
considered to be predictive of their financial behaviors. Results showed that a mother’s human 
capital, endowed and attained, impacts her children’s financial behaviors to some degree. The 
mother’s I.Q. and level of education have a statistically significant positive association with her 
children’s financial behaviors. However, contrary to what was hypothesized, mother’s income 
had no impact on all of the financial behaviors. Children’s income was the only variable found to 
be predictive of all three financial behaviors. Perhaps the most compelling finding of this study is 
that a mother’s gender role attitudes were found to influence two of the three financial behaviors 
of their children. Overall, this essay determined that a mother’s human capital and gender role 
attitudes may transfer to the next generation and, ultimately, influence her children’s financial 
behaviors. These findings suggest that individuals do not only act on their own attitudes and 
characteristics, but they may also be impacted by the attitudes and characteristics of the prior 
generation, specifically their mothers. Considering this linkage may prove to be beneficial to 
financial planners, counselors, and therapists when exploring the causes of some clients’ 
financial behaviors.  
This essay expands on a long accepted model (Becker’s theory of human capital) by 
isolating the impact of the mother and also incorporating gender role attitudes. According to the 
U.S. Census (2010), there were 9.9 million single mothers living with children younger than 18, 
up from 3.4 million in 1970. In a country where households are increasingly headed by a single 
female, a thorough understanding of the mother’s impact on the financial behavioral outcomes of 
children will allow the practitioner to more accurately focus on the needs of clients’ from this 
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type of household unit. While this essay not only advances theory by including only mothers (in 
comparison to parents) and introducing gender role attitudes into a model of human capital 
theory, it also isolates the impact of the parental figure that in many instances will be the only 
parental figure in the client’s life.  
 Summary 
For a financial planner, counselor, or therapist, or for that matter, a public policymaker, 
these issues are all linked. If, for example, a policymaker was attempting to design legislation by 
improving the financial behaviors of the populous at large, looking at these studies, it would 
become apparent that a lasting impact on future generations could be achieved by influencing the 
gender role attitudes of the current generation of young mothers. This scenario suggests that the 
issue of financial behaviors and gender cannot be separated. In using limited governmental funds 
to achieve the maximum benefit, these studies provide some evidence that targeting females who 
tend to exhibit worse financial behaviors could perhaps have the greatest public policy impact. 
As the last two studies clearly indicate, gender matters. 
When viewed together, the implications of the second and third papers in this series of 
essays is also quite interesting. The second paper suggests that a woman’s gender role attitudes 
do not seem to impact her financial behaviors in a significant way; however, in the third paper it 
is demonstrated that a mother’s gender role attitudes do seem to impact her children’s financial 
behaviors. At first glance, these findings seem counterintuitive; however, these findings may 
point to something quite profound. A woman’s self-reported beliefs concerning her gender role 
attitudes may actually not matter that much in determining her own financial behaviors, but they 
may be instrumental in influencing choices her children make that will ultimately influence their 
financial behaviors. Perhaps a young woman who accepts less traditional definitions of gender 
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roles will also be more likely to obtain a higher level of education and earn a higher income. 
Whatever the explanation for this finding, these studies do suggest that gender role attitudes 
within families tend to have an influence and interact with financial behaviors in a subtle, yet 
significant way, suggesting a potentially rich area for future inquiry. 
 These studies shed light on the factors that lead to positive financial behaviors. At this 
time, and under the current financial crisis, improving the ability of public policymakers to 
legislate, personal financial planners/counselors/therapists to modify financial behaviors, and 
financial educators to teach better financial practices is of critical national importance. 
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Appendix A - Codebooks 
 Child Codebook 
Table A.1 NLSY79 Child/Young Adult Codebook 
CODEBOOK 
NLSY79 Child/Young Adult (1986-2008) 
 
Variable Question  NLSY 
Question 
Number 
Descriptive Statistics – Complete Data 
Frequency of 
arguments about 
money 
2008 
 
HOW 
FREQUENTLY R 
AND PARTNER 
ARGUE ABOUT 
MONEY 
 
 
 
How frequently do you and 
your [husband/wife/partner] 
have arguments 
about.... 
 
RESPONSE CHOICE: 
"....money?" 
 
Y20170.02  254       1 Often 
 522       2 Sometimes 
 559       3 Hardly Ever 
 427       4 Never 
 ------- 
 1762 
 
Refusal(-1)            9 
Don't Know(-2)         6 
TOTAL =========>    1777      
MISSING(-7)    9718 
Min:              1        Max:              4        
Mean:                2.66 
 
Financial Behavior 
1 
2008 
 
HOW OFTEN R 
OR R'S 
HOUSEHOLD 
PUTS OFF 
BUYING 
SOMETHING 
NECESSARY 
 
 
 
How often [do you/does hour 
household] put off buying 
something you need - such  
as food, clothing, medical 
care, or housing - because 
you don't have money?  
Would you say... 
 
 
 
Y22325.00 3054       1 Never 
  586       2 Rarely 
  980       3 Occasionally 
  340       4 Frequently 
  307       5 All the time 
  ------- 
  6267 
 
Refusal(-1)            5 
Don't Know(-2)        33 
TOTAL =========>    6305      
MISSING(-7)    5190 
Financial Behavior 
2 
2008 
 
DIFFICULTY R 
OR R'S 
HOUSEHOLD 
HAS PAYING 
BILLS 
 
 
During the past 12 months, 
how much difficulty [did 
you/did your household] 
have 
paying bills? Would you 
say... 
 
 
   Y22326.00 2394       1 no difficulty at all 
1944       2 a little difficulty 
1193       3 some difficulty 
  429       4 quite a bit of difficulty 
  227       5 a great deal of difficulty 
 ------- 
 6187 
 
Refusal(-1)            4 
Don't Know(-2)       114 
TOTAL =========>    6305      
MISSING(-7)    5190 
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Financial Behavior 
3 
2008 
 
MONEY LEFT 
OVER AT END 
OF MONTH 
 
Thinking about the end of 
each month over the past 12 
months, [did you/did your  
household] generally end up 
with... 
 
 
Y23327.00  811      1 more than enough money left over 
2841     2 some money left over  
2052     3 just enough to make ends meet                  
  398     4 not enough to make ends meet 
  ------- 
 6102 
 
Refusal(-1)            6 
Don't Know(-2)       197 
TOTAL =========>    6305      
MISSING(-7)    5190 
  
 
Gender Role 
Attitude 1 
2006 
 
FAMILY 
ATTITUDES - 
PLACE OF 
WOMAN IS IN 
THE HOME? 
 
 
 
 
2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A woman's place is in the 
home, not the office or shop. 
 
Do you.... 
 
 
 
 Y19205.01  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y22365.00  
2298       1 Strongly Disagree 
 2800      2 Disagree 
   576      3 Agree 
   122      4 Strongly Agree 
  ------- 
  5796 
 
Refusal(-1)            2 
Don't Know(-2)        41 
TOTAL =========>    5839      
MISSING(-7)    5656 
 
 
 213       1 Strongly Disagree 
 541       2 Disagree 
   96       3 Agree 
     7       4 Strongly Agree 
 ------- 
  857 
 
Refusal(-1)            1 
Don't Know(-2)        17 
TOTAL =========>     875      
MISSING(-7)   10620 
 
Gender Role 
Attitude 2 
2006 
 
FAMILY 
ATTITUDES - 
WIFE WITH 
FAMILY HAS NO 
TIME FOR 
OTHER 
EMPLOYMENT? 
            
 
2008 
 
A wife who carries out her 
full family responsibilities 
doesn't have time for  
outside employment. 
 
Do you.... 
Y19205.02 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y22366.00 
1489       1 Strongly Disagree   
3528       2 Disagree 
  676       3 Agree 
    89       4 Strongly Agree 
  ------- 
  5782 
 
Refusal(-1)            2 
Don't Know(-2)        56 
TOTAL =========>    5840      
MISSING(-7)    5655 
  
 
213       1 Strongly Disagree 
 541      2 Disagree 
   96      3 Agree 
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     7      4 Strongly Agree 
 ------- 
 857 
  
Refusal(-1)            1 
Don't Know(-2)        17 
TOTAL =========>     875      
MISSING(-7)   10620 
Gender Role 
Attitude 3 
2006 
 
FAMILY 
ATTITUDES - 
WORKING WIFE 
FEELS MORE 
USEFUL? 
 
 
 
 
2008 
 
A working wife feels more 
useful than one who doesn't 
hold a job. 
 
Do you.... 
 
 
19205.03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y22367.00 
  487       1 Strongly Disagree 
 2075      2 Disagree 
 2596      3 Agree 
   475      4 Strongly Agree 
  ------- 
 5633 
 
Refusal(-1)            1 
Don't Know(-2)       206 
TOTAL =========>    5840      
MISSING(-7)    5655 
  
 
  55       1 Strongly Disagree 
 298      2 Disagree 
 415      3 Agree 
   55      4 Strongly Agree 
 ------- 
  823 
 
Refusal(-1)            0 
Don't Know(-2)        52 
TOTAL =========>     875      
MISSING(-7)   10620 
 
Gender Role 
Attitude 4 
2006 
 
FAMILY 
ATTITUDES - 
INFLATION 
NECESSITATES 
EMPLOYMENT 
OF BOTH  
PARENTS? 
 
2008 
Employment of both parents 
is necessary to keep up with 
the high cost of living. 
 
Do you.... 
 
Y19205.05 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y22369.00 
  124       1 Strongly Disagree 
1207       2 Disagree 
3283       3 Agree 
 1159      4 Strongly Agree 
 ------- 
 5773 
 
Refusal(-1)            2 
Don't Know(-2)        65 
TOTAL =========>    5840      
MISSING(-7)    5655 
 
   18       1 Strongly Disagree 
 197       2 Disagree 
 518       3 Agree 
 125       4 Strongly Agree 
 ------- 
 858 
 
Refusal(-1)            0 
Don't Know(-2)        17 
TOTAL =========>     875      
MISSING(-7)   10620 
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Gender Role 
Attitude 5 
2006 
 
FAMILY 
ATTITUDES - 
TRADITIONAL 
HUSBAND/WIFE 
ROLES BEST? 
 
 
 
 
2008 
It is much better for 
everyone concerned if the 
man is the achiever outside 
the  
home and the woman takes 
care of the home and family. 
 
Do you... 
 
Y19205.06 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y22370.00 
  1035       1 Strongly Disagree 
  3276       2 Disagree 
  1286       3 Agree 
    153       4 Strongly Agree 
  ------- 
  5750 
 
Refusal(-1)            2 
Don't Know(-2)        88 
TOTAL =========>    5840      
MISSING(-7)    5655 
 
 
  155       1 Strongly Disagree 
  457       2 Disagree 
  230       3 Agree 
    14       4 Strongly Agree 
 ------- 
  856 
Refusal(-1)            0 
Don't Know(-2)        19 
TOTAL =========>     875      
MISSING(-7)   10620 
 
Gender Role 
Attitude 6 
2006 
 
FAMILY 
ATTITUDES - 
MEN SHOULD 
SHARE 
HOUSEWORK? 
 
 
 
 
2008 
Men should share the work 
around the house with 
women, such as doing 
dishes,  
cleaning and so forth. 
 
Do you... 
 
Y19205.07 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y22371.00 
    54       1 Strongly Disagree 
  240       2 Disagree 
 3469      3 Agree 
 2059      4 Strongly Agree 
 ------- 
 5822 
 
Refusal(-1)            1 
Don't Know(-2)        17 
TOTAL =========>    5840      
MISSING(-7)    5655 
 
 
    6       1 Strongly Disagree 
  34       2 Disagree 
 575      3 Agree 
 253      4 Strongly Agree 
 ------- 
  868 
 
Refusal(-1)            0 
Don't Know(-2)         7 
TOTAL =========>     875      
MISSING(-7)   10620 
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Gender Role 
Attitude 7 
2006 
 
FAMILY 
ATTITUDES - 
WOMEN ARE 
HAPPIER IN 
TRADITIONAL 
ROLES? 
 
 
 
2008 
Women are much happier if 
they stay at home and take 
care of their children. 
 
Do you... 
 
Y19205.08 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Y22372.00 
  648       1 Strongly Disagree 
3339       2 Disagree 
1398       3 Agree 
  123       4 Strongly Agree 
 ------- 
 5508 
 
Refusal(-1)            4 
Don't Know(-2)       328 
TOTAL =========>    5840      
MISSING(-7)    5655 
 
 
   93       1 Strongly Disagree 
 490       2 Disagree 
 221       3 Agree 
     9       4 Strongly Agree 
 ------- 
 813 
 
Refusal(-1)            0 
Don't Know(-2)        62 
TOTAL =========>     875      
MISSING(-7)   10620 
Age of Respondent  
2008 
 
 
AGE OF YOUNG 
ADULT (IN 
YEARS) AT 
DATE OF 
INTERVIEW 
 
COMMENT: AGE OF 
YOUNG ADULT AT DATE 
OF INTERVIEW 
 
 
Y22671.00      171          14: 14 YEARS OLD 
     312          15: 15 YEARS OLD 
     311          16: 16 YEARS OLD 
     351          17: 17 YEARS OLD 
     481          18: 18 YEARS OLD 
     369          19: 19 YEARS OLD 
     399          20: 20 YEARS OLD 
     415          21: 21 YEARS OLD 
     424          22: 22 YEARS OLD 
     408          23: 23 YEARS OLD 
     414          24: 24 YEARS OLD 
     411          25: 25 YEARS OLD 
     387          26: 26 YEARS OLD 
     351          27: 27 YEARS OLD 
     320          28: 28 YEARS OLD 
     245          29: 29 YEARS OLD 
     192          30: 30 YEARS OLD 
     133          31: 31 YEARS OLD 
     103          32: 32 YEARS OLD 
      65           33: 33 YEARS OLD 
      26           34: 34 YEARS OLD 
      15           35: 35 YEARS OLD 
       1            36: 36 YEARS OLD 
       2            37: 37 YEARS OLD 
  ------- 
    6306 
 
Refusal(-1)            0 
Don't Know(-2)         0 
TOTAL =========>    6306      
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MISSING(-7)    5189 
  
Min:            14        Max:            37        
Mean:               22.48 
  
 
Sex of Respondent 
 
 
SEX OF CHILD 
Survey Year: 
XRND 
 C00054.00 5870       1 MALE 
5624       2 FEMALE 
 ------- 
11494 
 
Refusal(-1)            0 
Don't Know(-2)         0 
Invalid Skip(-3)       1 
TOTAL =========>   11495      
MISSING(-7)       0 
  
 
Birth Order of 
Respondent 
 
BIRTH ORDER 
OF CHILD  
Survey Year: 
XRND 
 C00058.00   4925           1 
  3748           2 
  1785           3 
    656           4 
    224           5 
      87           6 
      38           7 
      16           8 
        8           9 
        4          10 
        2          11 
  ------- 
 11493 
 
Refusal(-1)            0 
Don't Know(-2)         0 
Invalid Skip(-3)       2 
TOTAL =========>   11495      
MISSING(-7)       0 
  
Min:             1        Max:             11        
Mean:                1.96 
 
Education of 
Respondent 
 
HIGHEST GRADE 
OF SCHOOL 
COMPLETED AS 
OF 2008 
Highest Grade Completed by 
Respondent as of the 2008 
Interview 
 
 
Y22673.00     0       1 1ST GRADE 
    0       2 2ND GRADE 
    1       3 3RD GRADE 
    1       4 4TH GRADE 
    0       5 5TH GRADE 
    8       6 6TH GRADE 
  76       7 7TH GRADE 
 372      8 8TH GRADE 
 454      9 9TH GRADE 
 599      10 10TH GRADE 
 711      11 11TH GRADE 
2089     12 12TH GRADE 
  644     13 1ST YEAR COLLEGE 
 586      14 2ND YEARCOLLEGE 
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  302     15 3RD YEARCOLLEGE 
  324     16 4TH YEAR COLLEGE 
    73     17 5TH YEARCOLLEGE 
    44     18 6TH YEARCOLLEGE 
    11     19 7TH YEARCOLLEGE 
      8     20 8TH YEARCOLLEGE OR MORE      
      1     95 UNGRADED 
      1     0 None 
  ------- 
    6305 
  
Refusal(-1)            0 
Don't Know(-2)         0 
Invalid Skip(-3)       1 
TOTAL =========>    6306      
MISSING(-7)    5189 
  
 
 Marital Status of 
Respondent 
2008 
 
OFFICIAL 
MARITAL 
STATUS 
COMMENT: Official 
Marital Status - Constructed 
 
 
Y22675.00    5078           0: NEVER MARRIED 
     888           1: MARRIED 
     146           2: SEPARATED 
     183           3: DIVORCED 
      10            6: WIDOWED 
  ------- 
    6305 
  
Refusal(-1)            0 
Don't Know(-2)         0 
Invalid Skip(-3)       1 
TOTAL =========>    6306      
MISSING(-7)    5189 
  
Min:              0        Max:              6        
Mean:                 .28 
     
Race of 
Respondent 
2008 
 
RACE OF CHILD 
(MOTHER'S 
RACIAL/ETHNIC 
COHORT FROM 
SCREENER) 
RACE OF CHILD 
(MOTHER'S 
RACIAL/ETHNIC 
COHORT FROM 
SCREENER) 
 
SEE YOUTH REFERENCE 
NUMBER R( 2147.) 
 
C00053.00 2209   1 HISPANIC 
3187   2 BLACK 
6099   3 NON-BLACK, NON-HISPANIC 
  ------- 
 11495 
  
Refusal(-1)            0 
Don't Know(-2)         0 
TOTAL =========>   11495      
MISSING(-7)       0 
  
Respondent Income  
from Wages 
Survey Year: 2008 
 
TOTAL INCOME 
FROM WAGES 
AND SALARY IN 
2007 
 
 
During 2005, how much did 
you receive from wages, 
salary, commissions, or tips  
from all (other) jobs [-
military or civilian-] before 
deductions for taxes or  
anything else? 
 
 
Y22241.00 THIS VARIABLE HAS BEEN TOP-
CODED.  THE VALUE OF 119116 
REPRESENTS THE MEAN OF THE 
TOP VALUES OF Q15-5 and Q15-9. 
 
   1218        0 
     425        1 TO 999 
     225        1000 TO 1999 
     224        2000 TO 2999 
     171        3000 TO 3999 
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     125        4000 TO 4999 
     162        5000 TO 5999 
     113        6000 TO 6999 
     115        7000 TO 7999 
       97        8000 TO 8999 
       75        9000 TO 9999 
     439       10000 TO 14999 
     381       15000 TO 19999 
     376       20000 TO 24999 
    1026      25000 TO 49999 
     260       50000 TO 99999999: 50000+ 
  ------- 
    5432 
  
Refusal(-1)           40 
Don't Know(-2)    833  (Go To Y22242.00) 
TOTAL =========>    6305      
MISSING(-7)    5190 
  
Min:           0        Max:       119116        
Mean:            14215.41 
  
 
Respondent Income 
from Farm or 
Business 
Survey Year: 2008 
 
TOTAL INCOME 
FROM FARM OR 
BUSINESS IN 
2007 
 
 
How much did you receive 
AFTER EXPENSES? 
 
 
Y22245.00 THIS VARIABLE HAS BEEN TOP-
CODED.  THE VALUE OF 119116 
REPRESENTS THE MEAN OF THE 
TOP VALUES OF Q15-5 and Q15-9. 
 
        7        0 
      55        1 TO 999 
      18        1000 TO 1999 
      13        2000 TO 2999 
       6         3000 TO 3999 
       8         4000 TO 4999 
       7         5000 TO 5999 
       5         6000 TO 6999 
       1         7000 TO 7999 
       2         8000 TO 8999 
       3         9000 TO 9999 
      14        10000 TO 14999 
      10        15000 TO 19999 
       4         20000 TO 24999 
       9         25000 TO 49999 
       4         50000 TO 99999999: 50000+ 
  ------- 
     166 
  
Refusal(-1)            2 
Don't Know(-2)        15 
TOTAL =========>     183      
MISSING(-7)   11312 
  
Min:           0        Max:       100000        
Mean:             7248.34 
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I.Q. of Respondent 
 
PEABODY 
PICTURE 
VOCABULARY 
TEST-REVISED 
FORM L (PPVT):  
TOTAL RAW  
SCORE 
 
PEABODY PICTURE 
VOCABULARY TEST-
REVISED FORM L 
(PPVT): TOTAL RAW 
SCORE 86 INT 
C05809.00         2           0 
      84           1 TO 9 
     268          10 TO 19 
     228          20 TO 29 
     252          30 TO 39 
     322          40 TO 49 
     315          50 TO 59 
     309          60 TO 69 
     270          70 TO 79 
     275          80 TO 89 
     179          90 TO 99 
     294          100 TO 9999999: 100+ 
  ------- 
    2798 
  
Refusal(-1)            0 
Don't Know(-2)         0 
Invalid Skip(-3)     423 
TOTAL =========>    3221      
MISSING(-7)    8274 
  
Min:            0        Max:            149        
Mean:               58.16 
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 Mother Codebook 
Table A.2 NLSY79 (1979-2010) Codebook 
CODEBOOK 
NLSY79(1979-2010) 
 
Variable Question  NLSY 
Question 
Number 
Descriptive Statistics – Complete Data 
Gender Role 
Attitude 1 
2004 
 
FAMILY 
ATTITUDES - 
WOMAN'S 
PLACE IS IN THE 
HOME? 
 
 
We are interested in your 
opinion about the 
employment of wives. I will 
read a  
series of statements and after 
each one I would like to 
know whether you  
strongly agree, agree, 
disagree, or strongly 
disagree. 
 
RESPONSE CHOICE: "A 
woman's place is in the 
home, not in the office or 
shop." 
 
 
R84185.00    164       1 Strongly agree 
   577       2 Agree 
 3516       3 Disagree 
 3226       4 Strongly Disagree 
   137       8 (DK) 
     25       9 (REFUSE) 
  ------- 
    7645 
  
Refusal(-1)            0 
Don't Know(-2)         0 
TOTAL =========>    7645    
VALID SKIP(-4)      16     NON-
INTERVIEW(-5)    5025 
  
Min:              1        Max:              9        
Mean:                3.41 
  
 
Gender Role 
Attitude 2 
2004 
 
FAMILY 
ATTITUDES - 
WIFE WITH 
FAMILY HAS NO 
TIME FOR 
OTHER 
EMPLOYMENT? 
          
 
We are interested in your 
opinion about the 
employment of wives. I will 
read a  
series of statements and after 
each one I would like to 
know whether you  
strongly agree, agree, 
disagree, or strongly 
disagree. 
 
RESPONSE CHOICE: "A 
wife who carries out her full 
family responsibilities   
doesn't have time for outside 
employment." 
 
 
R84185.01  207        1 Strongly agree 
1082       2 Agree 
 4111      3 Disagree 
 2066      4 Strongly Disagree 
    151     8 (DK) 
      28     9 (REFUSE) 
  ------- 
   7645 
  
Refusal(-1)            0 
Don't Know(-2)         0 
TOTAL =========>    7645    
VALID SKIP(-4) 16   
NON-INTERVIEW(-5)   5025 
  
Min:              1        Max:              9        
Mean:                 3.2 
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Gender Role 
Attitude 3 
2004 
 
FAMILY 
ATTITUDES - 
WORKING WIFE 
FEELS MORE 
USEFUL? 
 
 
We are interested in your 
opinion about the 
employment of wives. I will 
read a  
series of statements and after 
each one I would like to 
know whether you  
strongly agree, agree, 
disagree, or strongly 
disagree. 
 
RESPONSE CHOICE: "A 
working wife feels more 
useful than one who doesn't 
hold a job." 
 
 
R84185.02    652       1 Strongly agree 
 2938       2 Agree 
 2805       3 Disagree 
   858       4 Strongly Disagree 
   348       8 (DK) 
     44       9 (REFUSE) 
  ------- 
  7645 
  
Refusal(-1)            0 
Don't Know(-2)         0 
TOTAL =========>    7645    
VALID SKIP(-4)   16      
NON-INTERVIEW(-5)   5025 
  
Min:              1        Max:              9        
Mean:                2.82 
  
Gender Role 
Attitude 4 
2004 
 
FAMILY 
ATTITUDES - 
EMPLOYMENT 
OF WIVES 
LEADS TO 
JUVENILE 
DELINQUENCY? 
            
 
 
We are interested in your 
opinion about the 
employment of wives. I will 
read a  
series of statements and after 
each one I would like to 
know whether you  
strongly agree, agree, 
disagree, or strongly 
disagree. 
 
RESPONSE CHOICE: "The 
employment of wives leads 
to more juvenile 
delinquency." 
 
 
R84185.03   283        1 Strongly agree 
1664        2 Agree 
 4051       3 Disagree 
 1364       4 Strongly Disagree 
   247       8 (DK) 
     36       9 (REFUSE) 
  ------- 
 7645 
  
Refusal(-1)            0 
Don't Know(-2)         0 
TOTAL =========>    7645    
VALID SKIP(-4)      16      
NON-INTERVIEW(-5)    5025 
  
Min:              1        Max:              9        
Mean:                3.08 
Gender Role 
Attitude 5 
2004 
 
             
FAMILY 
ATTITUDES - 
INFLATION 
NECESSITATES 
EMPLOYMENT 
OF BOTH 
PARENTS? 
 
We are interested in your 
opinion about the 
employment of wives. I will 
read a  
series of statements and after 
each one I would like to 
know whether you  
strongly agree, agree, 
disagree, or strongly 
disagree. 
 
RESPONSE CHOICE: 
"Employment of both 
parents is necessary to keep 
up with the high cost of 
living." 
 
 
 
 R84185.04 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
    1898       1 Strongly agree 
    4122       2 Agree 
    1271       3 Disagree 
     205        4 Strongly Disagree 
     121        8 (DK) 
      28         9 (REFUSE) 
  ------- 
    7645 
  
Refusal(-1)            0 
Don't Know(-2)         0 
TOTAL =========>    7645    
VALID SKIP(-4)      16      
NON-INTERVIEW(-5)    5025 
  
Min:              1        Max:              9        
Mean:                2.09 
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Gender Role 
Attitude 6 
2004 
 
FAMILY 
ATTITUDES - 
TRADITIONAL 
HUSBAND/WIFE 
ROLES BEST? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We are interested in your 
opinion about the 
employment of wives. I will 
read a series of statements 
and after each one I would 
like to know whether you  
strongly agree, agree, 
disagree, or strongly 
disagree. 
 
RESPONSE CHOICE: "It is 
much better for everyone 
concerned if the man is the  
achiever outside the home 
and the woman takes care of 
the   home and family." 
 
 
  
   271       1 Strongly agree 
 1660       2 Agree 
 4040       3 Disagree 
 1446       4 Strongly Disagree 
   195       8 (DK) 
     33       9 (REFUSE) 
  ------- 
  7645 
  
Refusal(-1)            0 
Don't Know(-2)         0 
TOTAL =========>    7645    
VALID SKIP(-4)      16      
NON-INTERVIEW(-5)    5025 
  
Min:              1        Max:              9        
Mean:                3.05 
  
 
Gender Role 
Attitude 7 
2004 
 
             
FAMILY 
ATTITUDES - 
MEN SHOULD 
SHARE 
HOUSEWORK? 
 
 
We are interested in your 
opinion about the 
employment of wives. I will 
read a series of statements 
and after each one I would 
like to know whether you  
strongly agree, agree, 
disagree, or strongly 
disagree. 
 
RESPONSE CHOICE: "Men 
should share the work 
around the house with 
women, such as doing 
dishes, cleaning, and so 
forth." 
 
 
R84185.06 2778       1 Strongly agree 
4440       2 Agree 
  278       3 Disagree 
    81       4 Strongly Disagree 
    49       8 (DK) 
    19       9 (REFUSE) 
  ------- 
  7645 
  
Refusal(-1)            0 
Don't Know(-2)         0 
TOTAL =========>    7645    
VALID SKIP(-4)      16      
NON-INTERVIEW(-5)    5025 
  
Min:              1        Max:              9        
Mean:                1.75 
Gender Role 
Attitude 8 
2004 
 
 
 FAMILY 
ATTITUDES - 
WOMEN ARE 
HAPPIER IN 
TRADITIONAL 
ROLES? 
 
 
We are interested in your 
opinion about the 
employment of wives. I will 
read a series of statements 
and after each one I would 
like to know whether you  
strongly agree, agree, 
disagree, or strongly 
disagree. 
 
RESPONSE CHOICE: 
"Women are much happier if 
they stay at home and take 
care of their children." 
 
 
R84185.07      242       1 Strongly agree 
   1929       2 Agree 
   3913       3 Disagree 
     917       4 Strongly Disagree 
     587       8 (DK) 
       57       9 (REFUSE) 
  ------- 
    7645 
  
Refusal(-1)            0 
Don't Know(-2)         0 
TOTAL =========>    7645    
VALID SKIP(-4)      16      
NON-INTERVIEW(-5)    5025 
  
Min:              1        Max:              9        
Mean:                3.23 
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Education of 
Respondent 
2008 
 
 
Highest Grade 
Completed as of 
May 1 Survey Year 
(Revised) 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
COMMENT: Highest Grade 
Completed (Revised) 
DATA CORRECTION: 383 
CASES WERE 
CORRECTED FROM A 
CODE OF "12" TO A 
CODE OF LESS  
THAN 12, ON 11/17/10.  
SEE ERRATA FOR 1979-
2008 RELEASE, MAY 2010 
FOR FURTHER  
DETAILS. 
 
T22107.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      4       0 NONE 
      0       93 PRE-KINDERGARTEN 
      0       94 KINDERGARTEN 
      2       1 1ST GRADE 
      0       2 2ND GRADE 
    10       3 3RD GRADE 
     8        4 4TH GRADE 
     6        5 5TH GRADE 
    28       6 6TH GRADE 
    39       7 7TH GRADE 
  112       8 8TH GRADE 
  183       9 9TH GRADE 
  177       10 10TH GRADE 
  215       11 11TH GRADE 
3337       12 12TH GRADE 
  691      13 1ST YEAR COLLEGE 
  818      14 2ND YEAR    COLLEGE 
  406      15 3RD YEAR COLLEGE 
  912      16 4TH YEAR COLLEGE 
  224      17 5TH YEAR COLLEGE 
  299      18 6TH YEAR COLLEGE 
  122      19 7TH YEAR COLLEGE 
  164     20 8TH YEAR COLLEGE OR MORE 
      0      95 UNGRADED 
  ------- 
 7757 
  
Refusal(-1)            0 
Don't Know(-2)         0 
TOTAL =========>    7757    
VALID SKIP(-4)       0      
NON-INTERVIEW(-5)    4929 
  
Respondent 
Income from 
Wages 
2008 
 
 
TOTAL INCOME 
FROM WAGES 
AND SALARY IN 
PAST 
CALENDAR 
YEAR  
             
(TRUNCATED) 
 
[During/(Not counting any 
money you received from 
your military service...)  
During] [calendar year prior 
to survey year], how much 
did you receive from  
wages, salary, commissions, 
or tips from all (other) jobs, 
before deductions for 
taxes or anything else? 
 
T20767.00   1383        0 
      67        1 TO 999 
      68        1000 TO 1999 
      58        2000 TO 2999 
      63        3000 TO 3999 
      53        4000 TO 4999 
      63        5000 TO 5999 
      40        6000 TO 6999 
      48        7000 TO 7999 
      60        8000 TO 8999 
      37        9000 TO 9999 
     366       10000 TO 14999 
     370       15000 TO 19999 
     470       20000 TO 24999 
    2165      25000 TO 49999 
    2117      50000 TO 99999999: 50000+ 
  ------- 
    7428 
  
Refusal(-1)          127   (Go To T20772.00) 
Don't Know(-2)   191   (Go To T20775.00) 
Invalid Skip(-3)       2 
TOTAL =========>    7748    
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VALID SKIP(-4)       9      
NON-INTERVIEW(-5)    4929 
  
Min:          0        Max:        307823        
Mean:            40172.11 
  
 
Respondent Income 
from Farm or 
Business 
 
TOTAL INCOME 
FROM FARM OR 
BUSINESS IN 
PAST 
CALENDAR 
YEAR  
             
(TRUNCATED) 
 
How much did you receive 
after expenses from [your 
(farm(s) and/or  
business(es)/professional 
practice(s))]? 
 
 
T20788.00       18        0 
      20        1 TO 999 
      20        1000 TO 1999 
      19        2000 TO 2999 
       6         3000 TO 3999 
       7         4000 TO 4999 
      16        5000 TO 5999 
       7         6000 TO 6999 
       4         7000 TO 7999 
       5         8000 TO 8999 
       1         9000 TO 9999 
      33        10000 TO 14999 
      23        15000 TO 19999 
      21        20000 TO 24999 
      56        25000 TO 49999 
      60        50000 TO 99999999: 50000+ 
  ------- 
     316 
  
Refusal(-1)       2   (Go To T20791.00) 
Don't Know(-2)    13   (Go To T20794.00) 
TOTAL =========>     331    
VALID SKIP(-4)    7426      
NON-INTERVIEW(-5)    4929 
  
Min:         0        Max:         315400        
Mean:            30985.41 
  
 
I.Q. of 
Respondent 
Survey Year: 
1981 
 
PROFILES, 
ARMED FORCES 
QUALIFICATION 
TEST (AFQT) 
%ILE SCORE - 
REVISED 2006 
 
 
ORIGINAL QUESTION 
NAME: *CREATED 
 
SEE ATTACHMENT 106 
ADDENDUM FOR 
DEFINITIONS 
NOTE: (SEE R( 6182.))  3 
IMPLIED DECIMAL 
PLACES 
 
 
 ACTUAL %AGE 
 
UNIVERSE: All 
 
Refusal(-1)            0 
Don't Know(-2)         0 
TOTAL =========>   11914    
VALID SKIP(-4)     281      
NON-INTERVIEW(-5)     491 
  
Min:         0        Max:        100000        
Mean:    42395.61         
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Appendix B - Copy of Programming and Output Files 
 Child Rename 
PROC SQL; 
CREATE TABLE DISS.CHILD AS 
SELECT C0000100 AS CID, 
 
  
    C0005700 AS CBIRTHDATE,     
    C0000200 AS CMOMID, 
    C0005300 AS CRACE, 
    C0005400 AS CSEX, 
    C0005800 AS CBIRTHORD, 
    C0580900 AS CPPVTRAW86, 
    C0581000 AS CPPVTSTD86, 
    C0581100 AS CPPVTPRCT86,     
    C3857600 AS CRELBAP08, 
    C3857601 AS CRELEPIS08, 
    C3857602 AS CRELLUT08, 
    C3857603 AS CRELMETH08, 
    C3857604 AS CRELPRES08, 
    C3857605 AS CRELCATH08, 
    C3857606 AS CRELJEW08, 
    C3857607 AS CRELMUS08, 
    C3857608 AS CRELMORM08, 
    C3857609 AS CRELOCHR08, 
    C3857610 AS CRELOPROS08, 
    C3857611 AS CRELOT08, 
    C3857612 AS CRELNONE08, 
    Y1638400 AS CWAGE04, 
    Y1638500 AS CWAGEEST04, 
    Y1639000 AS CFARM04, 
    Y1639700 AS CSWAGE04, 
    Y1640100 AS CSFARM04, 
    Y1644900 AS CCREDCRD04, 
    Y1645300 AS CFAMINC04, 
    Y1645400 AS CFAMINCE04, 
    Y1645500 AS CFB104, 
    Y1645600 AS CFB204, 
    Y1645700 AS CFB304, 
    Y1672700 AS CAGE04, 
    Y1672900 AS CED04, 
    Y1908700 AS CWAGE06, 
    Y1908800 AS CWAGEEST06, 
    Y1909300 AS CFARM06, 
    Y1910100 AS CSWAGE06, 
    Y1910600 AS CSFARM06,     
    Y1917200 AS CFB106, 
    Y1917300 AS CFB206, 
    Y1917400 AS CFB306, 
    Y1920501 AS CGRA106, 
    Y1920502 AS CGRA206, 
    Y1920503 AS CGRA306, 
    Y1920505 AS CGRA406, 
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    Y1920506 AS CGRA506, 
    Y1920507 AS CGRA606, 
    Y1920508 AS CGRA706, 
    Y1948500 AS CAGE06, 
    Y1948700 AS CED06, 
    Y1948900 AS CMS06, 
    Y2017000 AS CCHORES08, 
    Y2017002 AS CMONEY08, 
    Y2018006 AS CHHFIN08, 
    Y2018106 AS CSHHFIN08, 
    Y2018300 AS CSEPACCT08, 
    Y2018301 AS CJOINTAC08, 
    Y2018302 AS CSEPCC08, 
    Y2018303 AS CJOINTCC08, 
    Y2018400 AS CSHAREEXP08, 
    Y2224100 AS CWAGE08, 
    Y2224200 AS CWAGEEST08, 
    Y2224500 AS CFARMA08, 
    Y2224600 AS CFARMB08, 
    Y2225400 AS CSWAGE08, 
    Y2225900 AS CSFARM08,      
    Y2232300 AS CFAMINC08, 
    Y2232400 AS CFAMINCE08, 
    Y2232500 AS CFB108, 
    Y2232600 AS CFB208, 
    Y2232700 AS CFB308, 
    Y2236500 AS CGRA108, 
    Y2236600 AS CGRA208, 
    Y2236700 AS CGRA308, 
    Y2236800 AS CGRA408, 
    Y2236900 AS CGRA508, 
    Y2237000 AS CGRA608, 
    Y2237100 AS CGRA708, 
    Y2237200 AS CGRA808, 
    Y2267100 AS CAGE08, 
    Y2267300 AS CED08, 
    Y2267500 AS CMS08, 
    Y2267800 AS CREGION08 
 
 FROM DISS.CHILD; 
 Adult Rename 
PROC SQL; 
CREATE TABLE DISS.ADULT AS 
SELECT R0000100 AS ID, 
 
    R0214700 AS RACE, 
    R0214800 AS SEX, 
    R0216400 AS REGION79,  
    R0618301 AS AFQT06,     
    R8315800 AS MIL04, 
    R8316300 AS WAGE04, 
    R8318200 AS FARM04, 
    R8325100 AS SMIL04, 
    R8325800 AS SWAGE04, 
    R8328000 AS SFARM04, 
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    R8418500 AS GRA104, 
    R8418501 AS GRA204, 
    R8418502 AS GRA304, 
    R8418503 AS GRA404, 
    R8418504 AS GRA504, 
    R8418505 AS GRA604, 
    R8418506 AS GRA704, 
    R8418507 AS GRA804, 
    R8496000 AS FAM04, 
    R8497000 AS ED04, 
    R8497200 AS AGE04, 
    T0911800 AS MIL06, 
    T0911900 AS MILLOW06, 
    T0912000 AS MILHI06, 
    T0912400 AS WAGE06, 
    T0912600 AS WAGELOW06, 
    T0912800 AS WAGEHI06, 
    T0913900 AS FARM06, 
    T0914100 AS FARMLOW06, 
    T0914300 AS FARMHI06, 
    T0920200 AS SMIL06, 
    T0920300 AS SMILLOW06, 
    T0920400 AS SMILHI06, 
    T0920800 AS SWAGE06, 
    T0920900 AS SWAGELOW06, 
    T0921100 AS SWAGEHI06, 
    T0922200 AS SFARM06, 
    T0922300 AS SFARMLOW06, 
    T0922400 AS SFARMHI06, 
    T0960500 AS RISK106, 
    T0960600 AS RISK1LOW06, 
    T0960700 AS RISK1HI06, 
    T0960800 AS RISK206, 
    T0960900 AS RISK2LOW06, 
    T0961000 AS RISK2HI06, 
    T0961100 AS RISK306, 
    T0961200 AS RISK3LOW06, 
    T0961300 AS RISK3HI06, 
    T0961400 AS RISK406, 
    T0961500 AS RISK4LOW06, 
    T0961600 AS RISK4HI06, 
    T0987600 AS FAM06, 
    T0988800 AS ED06, 
    T0989000 AS AGE06, 
    T1298000 AS OCC08, 
    T2050600 AS CHORES08, 
    T2050602 AS MONEY08, 
    T2076100 AS MIL08, 
    T2076400 AS MILLOW08, 
    T2076500 AS MILHIGH08, 
    T2076700 AS WAGE08, 
    T2076900 AS WAGELOW08, 
    T2077100 AS WAGEHI08, 
    T2078800 AS FARM08, 
    T2084900 AS SMIL08, 
    T2085000 AS SMILLOW08, 
    T2085100 AS SMILHI08, 
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    T2085500 AS SWAGEA08, 
    T2085700 AS SWAGEB08,     
    T2209900 AS FAM08, 
    T2210300 AS REGION08, 
    T2210500 AS MS08, 
    T2210700 AS ED08, 
    T2210800 AS AGE08 
 
 FROM DISS.ADULT; 
PROC SQL; 
CREATE TABLE DISS.ADULT AS 
SELECT R0000100 AS ID, 
 
    R0214700 AS RACE, 
    R0214800 AS SEX, 
    R0216400 AS REGION79,  
    R0618301 AS AFQT06,     
    R8315800 AS MIL04, 
    R8316300 AS WAGE04, 
    R8318200 AS FARM04, 
    R8325100 AS SMIL04, 
    R8325800 AS SWAGE04, 
    R8328000 AS SFARM04, 
    R8418500 AS GRA104, 
    R8418501 AS GRA204, 
    R8418502 AS GRA304, 
    R8418503 AS GRA404, 
    R8418504 AS GRA504, 
    R8418505 AS GRA604, 
    R8418506 AS GRA704, 
    R8418507 AS GRA804, 
    R8496000 AS FAM04, 
    R8497000 AS ED04, 
    R8497200 AS AGE04, 
    T0911800 AS MIL06, 
    T0911900 AS MILLOW06, 
    T0912000 AS MILHI06, 
    T0912400 AS WAGE06, 
    T0912600 AS WAGELOW06, 
    T0912800 AS WAGEHI06, 
    T0913900 AS FARM06, 
    T0914100 AS FARMLOW06, 
    T0914300 AS FARMHI06, 
    T0920200 AS SMIL06, 
    T0920300 AS SMILLOW06, 
    T0920400 AS SMILHI06, 
    T0920800 AS SWAGE06, 
    T0920900 AS SWAGELOW06, 
    T0921100 AS SWAGEHI06, 
    T0922200 AS SFARM06, 
    T0922300 AS SFARMLOW06, 
    T0922400 AS SFARMHI06, 
    T0960500 AS RISK106, 
    T0960600 AS RISK1LOW06, 
    T0960700 AS RISK1HI06, 
    T0960800 AS RISK206, 
    T0960900 AS RISK2LOW06, 
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    T0961000 AS RISK2HI06, 
    T0961100 AS RISK306, 
    T0961200 AS RISK3LOW06, 
    T0961300 AS RISK3HI06, 
    T0961400 AS RISK406, 
    T0961500 AS RISK4LOW06, 
    T0961600 AS RISK4HI06, 
    T0987600 AS FAM06, 
    T0988800 AS ED06, 
    T0989000 AS AGE06, 
    T1298000 AS OCC08, 
    T2050600 AS CHORES08, 
    T2050602 AS MONEY08, 
    T2076100 AS MIL08, 
    T2076400 AS MILLOW08, 
    T2076500 AS MILHIGH08, 
    T2076700 AS WAGE08, 
    T2076900 AS WAGELOW08, 
    T2077100 AS WAGEHI08, 
    T2078800 AS FARM08, 
    T2084900 AS SMIL08, 
    T2085000 AS SMILLOW08, 
    T2085100 AS SMILHI08, 
    T2085500 AS SWAGEA08, 
    T2085700 AS SWAGEB08,     
    T2209900 AS FAM08, 
    T2210300 AS REGION08, 
    T2210500 AS MS08, 
    T2210700 AS ED08, 
    T2210800 AS AGE08 
 
 FROM DISS.ADULT; 
 Regression Editor Paper 1 
DATA REGRESSION; SET DISS.FINAL; 
 
IF CSEX=1 THEN CSEX=1; 
ELSE IF CSEX=2 THEN CSEX=0; *1=MALE 0=FEMALE; 
 
IF CBIRTHORD=1 THEN BO=1; ELSE IF CBIRTHORD IN (2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11) THEN 
BO = 0; ELSE BO = .; 
 
SUMCFB=CFB108 + CFB208 + CFB308; 
CINCOME08=SUM(CWAGE08, CFARMB08); 
IF CRACE=1 THEN CRACE1=1; ELSE CRACE1=0; 
IF CRACE=2 THEN CRACE2=1; ELSE CRACE2=0; 
IF CRACE=3 THEN CRACE3=1; ELSE CRACE3=0; 
 
IF CREGION08=1 THEN CREGION1=1; ELSE CREGION1=0; 
IF CREGION08=2 THEN CREGION2=1; ELSE CREGION2=0; 
IF CREGION08=3 THEN CREGION3=1; ELSE CREGION3=0; 
IF CREGION08=4 THEN CREGION4=1; ELSE CREGION4=0; 
 
IF CMS08 = 1 THEN CMS08 = 1; 
ELSE IF CMS08 = 0 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
ELSE IF CMS08 = 2 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
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ELSE IF CMS08 = 3 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
ELSE IF CMS08 = 6 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
 
IF CMONEY08 = 1 THEN CMONEY08bi = 1; 
ELSE IF CMONEY08 = 2 THEN CMONEY08bi = 1; 
ELSE IF CMONEY08 = 3 THEN CMONEY08bi = 0; 
ELSE IF CMONEY08 = 4 THEN CMONEY08bi = 0; 
else if cmoney08=. then cmoney08bi=.; 
else cmoney08=.; 
 
proc freq; tables cmoney08 cmoney08bi; 
RUN; 
 
 
PROC FREQ; TABLES CSEX 
      
     CRACE1 CRACE2 CRACE3 CRACE CREGION08 CREGION1 CREGION2 CREGION3 CREGION4 
CBIRTHORD CFB108 
     CFB208 
     CFB308 SUMCFB CBIRTHORD SUMGRA CMONEY08; 
PROC MEANS MEAN MEDIAN MIN MAX N; VAR CSEX CPPVTRAW86 CAGE08 CED08 CWAGE08 
CWAGEEST08 CFARMA08 CFARMB08 CINCOME08; RUN; 
 
 
 
 
DATA REGRESSION2; SET REGRESSION; 
 
 
IF CINCOME08 = . THEN CINCOME08_NOMISS=21836; ELSE 
CINCOME08_NOMISS=CINCOME08; 
LOGINC_NOMISS = LOG(CINCOME08_NOMISS);  
IF CPPVTRAW86 LT 0 THEN CPPVTRAW86_NOMISS=58.77; ELSE 
CPPVTRAW86_NOMISS=CPPVTRAW86; 
LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS = LOG(CPPVTRAW86_NOMISS); 
 
CINCOME08_1000=CINCOME08/1000; 
PROC LOGISTIC DESCENDING SIMPLE ; 
MODEL CMONEY08bi = SUMCFB LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS CED08 CINCOME08_1000 CSEX 
CAGE08  BO /STB;RUN; QUIT; 
 
 
DATA REGRESSION2; SET REGRESSION2; 
IF CMONEY08BI IN (1 0); 
IF SUMCFB; 
PROC FREQ; TABLES CMONEY08 CMONEY08BI SUMCGRA SUMCFB BO CSEX; 
PROC MEANS; VAR CMONEY08 SUMCFB LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS CAGE08 CED08 CINCOME08 
BO CSEX; RUN; 
DATA REGRESSION; SET DISS.FINAL; 
 
IF CSEX=1 THEN CSEX=1; 
ELSE IF CSEX=2 THEN CSEX=0; *1=MALE 0=FEMALE; 
 
IF CBIRTHORD=1 THEN BO=1; ELSE IF CBIRTHORD IN (2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11) THEN 
BO = 0; ELSE BO = .; 
 
SUMCFB=CFB108 + CFB208 + CFB308; 
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CINCOME08=SUM(CWAGE08, CFARMB08); 
IF CRACE=1 THEN CRACE1=1; ELSE CRACE1=0; 
IF CRACE=2 THEN CRACE2=1; ELSE CRACE2=0; 
IF CRACE=3 THEN CRACE3=1; ELSE CRACE3=0; 
 
IF CREGION08=1 THEN CREGION1=1; ELSE CREGION1=0; 
IF CREGION08=2 THEN CREGION2=1; ELSE CREGION2=0; 
IF CREGION08=3 THEN CREGION3=1; ELSE CREGION3=0; 
IF CREGION08=4 THEN CREGION4=1; ELSE CREGION4=0; 
 
IF CMS08 = 1 THEN CMS08 = 1; 
ELSE IF CMS08 = 0 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
ELSE IF CMS08 = 2 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
ELSE IF CMS08 = 3 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
ELSE IF CMS08 = 6 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
 
IF CMONEY08 = 1 THEN CMONEY08bi = 1; 
ELSE IF CMONEY08 = 2 THEN CMONEY08bi = 1; 
ELSE IF CMONEY08 = 3 THEN CMONEY08bi = 0; 
ELSE IF CMONEY08 = 4 THEN CMONEY08bi = 0; 
else if cmoney08=. then cmoney08bi=.; 
else cmoney08=.; 
 
proc freq; tables cmoney08 cmoney08bi; 
RUN; 
 
 
PROC FREQ; TABLES CSEX 
      
     CRACE1 CRACE2 CRACE3 CRACE CREGION08 CREGION1 CREGION2 CREGION3 CREGION4 
CBIRTHORD CFB108 
     CFB208 
     CFB308 SUMCFB CBIRTHORD SUMGRA CMONEY08; 
PROC MEANS MEAN MEDIAN MIN MAX N; VAR CSEX CPPVTRAW86 CAGE08 CED08 CWAGE08 
CWAGEEST08 CFARMA08 CFARMB08 CINCOME08; RUN; 
 
 
 
 
DATA REGRESSION2; SET REGRESSION; 
 
 
IF CINCOME08 = . THEN CINCOME08_NOMISS=21836; ELSE 
CINCOME08_NOMISS=CINCOME08; 
LOGINC_NOMISS = LOG(CINCOME08_NOMISS);  
IF CPPVTRAW86 LT 0 THEN CPPVTRAW86_NOMISS=58.77; ELSE 
CPPVTRAW86_NOMISS=CPPVTRAW86; 
LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS = LOG(CPPVTRAW86_NOMISS); 
 
CINCOME08_1000=CINCOME08/1000; 
PROC LOGISTIC DESCENDING SIMPLE ; 
MODEL CMONEY08bi = SUMCFB LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS CED08 CINCOME08_1000 CSEX 
CAGE08  BO /STB;RUN; QUIT; 
 
 
DATA REGRESSION2; SET REGRESSION2; 
IF CMONEY08BI IN (1 0); 
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IF SUMCFB; 
PROC FREQ; TABLES CMONEY08 CMONEY08BI SUMCGRA SUMCFB BO CSEX; 
PROC MEANS; VAR CMONEY08 SUMCFB LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS CAGE08 CED08 CINCOME08 
BO CSEX; RUN; 
DATA REGRESSION; SET DISS.FINAL; 
 
IF CSEX=1 THEN CSEX=1; 
ELSE IF CSEX=2 THEN CSEX=0; *1=MALE 0=FEMALE; 
 
IF CBIRTHORD=1 THEN BO=1; ELSE IF CBIRTHORD IN (2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11) THEN 
BO = 0; ELSE BO = .; 
 
SUMCFB=CFB108 + CFB208 + CFB308; 
CINCOME08=SUM(CWAGE08, CFARMB08); 
IF CRACE=1 THEN CRACE1=1; ELSE CRACE1=0; 
IF CRACE=2 THEN CRACE2=1; ELSE CRACE2=0; 
IF CRACE=3 THEN CRACE3=1; ELSE CRACE3=0; 
 
IF CREGION08=1 THEN CREGION1=1; ELSE CREGION1=0; 
IF CREGION08=2 THEN CREGION2=1; ELSE CREGION2=0; 
IF CREGION08=3 THEN CREGION3=1; ELSE CREGION3=0; 
IF CREGION08=4 THEN CREGION4=1; ELSE CREGION4=0; 
 
IF CMS08 = 1 THEN CMS08 = 1; 
ELSE IF CMS08 = 0 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
ELSE IF CMS08 = 2 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
ELSE IF CMS08 = 3 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
ELSE IF CMS08 = 6 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
 
IF CMONEY08 = 1 THEN CMONEY08bi = 1; 
ELSE IF CMONEY08 = 2 THEN CMONEY08bi = 1; 
ELSE IF CMONEY08 = 3 THEN CMONEY08bi = 0; 
ELSE IF CMONEY08 = 4 THEN CMONEY08bi = 0; 
else if cmoney08=. then cmoney08bi=.; 
else cmoney08=.; 
 
proc freq; tables cmoney08 cmoney08bi; 
RUN; 
 
 
PROC FREQ; TABLES CSEX 
      
     CRACE1 CRACE2 CRACE3 CRACE CREGION08 CREGION1 CREGION2 CREGION3 CREGION4 
CBIRTHORD CFB108 
     CFB208 
     CFB308 SUMCFB CBIRTHORD SUMGRA CMONEY08; 
PROC MEANS MEAN MEDIAN MIN MAX N; VAR CSEX CPPVTRAW86 CAGE08 CED08 CWAGE08 
CWAGEEST08 CFARMA08 CFARMB08 CINCOME08; RUN; 
 
 
 
 
DATA REGRESSION2; SET REGRESSION; 
 
 
IF CINCOME08 = . THEN CINCOME08_NOMISS=21836; ELSE 
CINCOME08_NOMISS=CINCOME08; 
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LOGINC_NOMISS = LOG(CINCOME08_NOMISS);  
IF CPPVTRAW86 LT 0 THEN CPPVTRAW86_NOMISS=58.77; ELSE 
CPPVTRAW86_NOMISS=CPPVTRAW86; 
LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS = LOG(CPPVTRAW86_NOMISS); 
 
CINCOME08_1000=CINCOME08/1000; 
PROC LOGISTIC DESCENDING SIMPLE ; 
MODEL CMONEY08bi = SUMCFB LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS CED08 CINCOME08_1000 CSEX 
CAGE08  BO /STB;RUN; QUIT; 
 
 
DATA REGRESSION2; SET REGRESSION2; 
IF CMONEY08BI IN (1 0); 
IF SUMCFB; 
PROC FREQ; TABLES CMONEY08 CMONEY08BI SUMCGRA SUMCFB BO CSEX; 
PROC MEANS; VAR CMONEY08 SUMCFB LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS CAGE08 CED08 CINCOME08 
BO CSEX; RUN; 
DATA REGRESSION; SET DISS.FINAL; 
 
IF CSEX=1 THEN CSEX=1; 
ELSE IF CSEX=2 THEN CSEX=0; *1=MALE 0=FEMALE; 
 
IF CBIRTHORD=1 THEN BO=1; ELSE IF CBIRTHORD IN (2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11) THEN 
BO = 0; ELSE BO = .; 
 
SUMCFB=CFB108 + CFB208 + CFB308; 
CINCOME08=SUM(CWAGE08, CFARMB08); 
IF CRACE=1 THEN CRACE1=1; ELSE CRACE1=0; 
IF CRACE=2 THEN CRACE2=1; ELSE CRACE2=0; 
IF CRACE=3 THEN CRACE3=1; ELSE CRACE3=0; 
 
IF CREGION08=1 THEN CREGION1=1; ELSE CREGION1=0; 
IF CREGION08=2 THEN CREGION2=1; ELSE CREGION2=0; 
IF CREGION08=3 THEN CREGION3=1; ELSE CREGION3=0; 
IF CREGION08=4 THEN CREGION4=1; ELSE CREGION4=0; 
 
IF CMS08 = 1 THEN CMS08 = 1; 
ELSE IF CMS08 = 0 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
ELSE IF CMS08 = 2 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
ELSE IF CMS08 = 3 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
ELSE IF CMS08 = 6 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
 
IF CMONEY08 = 1 THEN CMONEY08bi = 1; 
ELSE IF CMONEY08 = 2 THEN CMONEY08bi = 1; 
ELSE IF CMONEY08 = 3 THEN CMONEY08bi = 0; 
ELSE IF CMONEY08 = 4 THEN CMONEY08bi = 0; 
else if cmoney08=. then cmoney08bi=.; 
else cmoney08=.; 
 
proc freq; tables cmoney08 cmoney08bi; 
RUN; 
 
 
PROC FREQ; TABLES CSEX 
      
     CRACE1 CRACE2 CRACE3 CRACE CREGION08 CREGION1 CREGION2 CREGION3 CREGION4 
CBIRTHORD CFB108 
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     CFB208 
     CFB308 SUMCFB CBIRTHORD SUMGRA CMONEY08; 
PROC MEANS MEAN MEDIAN MIN MAX N; VAR CSEX CPPVTRAW86 CAGE08 CED08 CWAGE08 
CWAGEEST08 CFARMA08 CFARMB08 CINCOME08; RUN; 
 
 
 
 
DATA REGRESSION2; SET REGRESSION; 
 
 
IF CINCOME08 = . THEN CINCOME08_NOMISS=21836; ELSE 
CINCOME08_NOMISS=CINCOME08; 
LOGINC_NOMISS = LOG(CINCOME08_NOMISS);  
IF CPPVTRAW86 LT 0 THEN CPPVTRAW86_NOMISS=58.77; ELSE 
CPPVTRAW86_NOMISS=CPPVTRAW86; 
LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS = LOG(CPPVTRAW86_NOMISS); 
 
CINCOME08_1000=CINCOME08/1000; 
PROC LOGISTIC DESCENDING SIMPLE ; 
MODEL CMONEY08bi = SUMCFB LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS CED08 CINCOME08_1000 CSEX 
CAGE08  BO /STB;RUN; QUIT; 
 
 
DATA REGRESSION2; SET REGRESSION2; 
IF CMONEY08BI IN (1 0); 
IF SUMCFB; 
PROC FREQ; TABLES CMONEY08 CMONEY08BI SUMCGRA SUMCFB BO CSEX; 
PROC MEANS; VAR CMONEY08 SUMCFB LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS CAGE08 CED08 CINCOME08 
BO CSEX; RUN; 
DATA REGRESSION; SET DISS.FINAL; 
 
IF CSEX=1 THEN CSEX=1; 
ELSE IF CSEX=2 THEN CSEX=0; *1=MALE 0=FEMALE; 
 
IF CBIRTHORD=1 THEN BO=1; ELSE IF CBIRTHORD IN (2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11) THEN 
BO = 0; ELSE BO = .; 
 
SUMCFB=CFB108 + CFB208 + CFB308; 
CINCOME08=SUM(CWAGE08, CFARMB08); 
IF CRACE=1 THEN CRACE1=1; ELSE CRACE1=0; 
IF CRACE=2 THEN CRACE2=1; ELSE CRACE2=0; 
IF CRACE=3 THEN CRACE3=1; ELSE CRACE3=0; 
 
IF CREGION08=1 THEN CREGION1=1; ELSE CREGION1=0; 
IF CREGION08=2 THEN CREGION2=1; ELSE CREGION2=0; 
IF CREGION08=3 THEN CREGION3=1; ELSE CREGION3=0; 
IF CREGION08=4 THEN CREGION4=1; ELSE CREGION4=0; 
 
IF CMS08 = 1 THEN CMS08 = 1; 
ELSE IF CMS08 = 0 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
ELSE IF CMS08 = 2 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
ELSE IF CMS08 = 3 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
ELSE IF CMS08 = 6 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
 
IF CMONEY08 = 1 THEN CMONEY08bi = 1; 
ELSE IF CMONEY08 = 2 THEN CMONEY08bi = 1; 
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ELSE IF CMONEY08 = 3 THEN CMONEY08bi = 0; 
ELSE IF CMONEY08 = 4 THEN CMONEY08bi = 0; 
else if cmoney08=. then cmoney08bi=.; 
else cmoney08=.; 
 
proc freq; tables cmoney08 cmoney08bi; 
RUN; 
 
 
PROC FREQ; TABLES CSEX 
      
     CRACE1 CRACE2 CRACE3 CRACE CREGION08 CREGION1 CREGION2 CREGION3 CREGION4 
CBIRTHORD CFB108 
     CFB208 
     CFB308 SUMCFB CBIRTHORD SUMGRA CMONEY08; 
PROC MEANS MEAN MEDIAN MIN MAX N; VAR CSEX CPPVTRAW86 CAGE08 CED08 CWAGE08 
CWAGEEST08 CFARMA08 CFARMB08 CINCOME08; RUN; 
 
 
 
 
DATA REGRESSION2; SET REGRESSION; 
 
 
IF CINCOME08 = . THEN CINCOME08_NOMISS=21836; ELSE 
CINCOME08_NOMISS=CINCOME08; 
LOGINC_NOMISS = LOG(CINCOME08_NOMISS);  
IF CPPVTRAW86 LT 0 THEN CPPVTRAW86_NOMISS=58.77; ELSE 
CPPVTRAW86_NOMISS=CPPVTRAW86; 
LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS = LOG(CPPVTRAW86_NOMISS); 
 
CINCOME08_1000=CINCOME08/1000; 
PROC LOGISTIC DESCENDING SIMPLE ; 
MODEL CMONEY08bi = SUMCFB LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS CED08 CINCOME08_1000 CSEX 
CAGE08  BO /STB;RUN; QUIT; 
 
 
DATA REGRESSION2; SET REGRESSION2; 
IF CMONEY08BI IN (1 0); 
IF SUMCFB; 
PROC FREQ; TABLES CMONEY08 CMONEY08BI SUMCGRA SUMCFB BO CSEX; 
PROC MEANS; VAR CMONEY08 SUMCFB LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS CAGE08 CED08 CINCOME08 
BO CSEX; RUN; 
DATA REGRESSION; SET DISS.FINAL; 
 
IF CSEX=1 THEN CSEX=1; 
ELSE IF CSEX=2 THEN CSEX=0; *1=MALE 0=FEMALE; 
 
IF CBIRTHORD=1 THEN BO=1; ELSE IF CBIRTHORD IN (2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11) THEN 
BO = 0; ELSE BO = .; 
 
SUMCFB=CFB108 + CFB208 + CFB308; 
CINCOME08=SUM(CWAGE08, CFARMB08); 
IF CRACE=1 THEN CRACE1=1; ELSE CRACE1=0; 
IF CRACE=2 THEN CRACE2=1; ELSE CRACE2=0; 
IF CRACE=3 THEN CRACE3=1; ELSE CRACE3=0; 
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IF CREGION08=1 THEN CREGION1=1; ELSE CREGION1=0; 
IF CREGION08=2 THEN CREGION2=1; ELSE CREGION2=0; 
IF CREGION08=3 THEN CREGION3=1; ELSE CREGION3=0; 
IF CREGION08=4 THEN CREGION4=1; ELSE CREGION4=0; 
 
IF CMS08 = 1 THEN CMS08 = 1; 
ELSE IF CMS08 = 0 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
ELSE IF CMS08 = 2 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
ELSE IF CMS08 = 3 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
ELSE IF CMS08 = 6 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
 
IF CMONEY08 = 1 THEN CMONEY08bi = 1; 
ELSE IF CMONEY08 = 2 THEN CMONEY08bi = 1; 
ELSE IF CMONEY08 = 3 THEN CMONEY08bi = 0; 
ELSE IF CMONEY08 = 4 THEN CMONEY08bi = 0; 
else if cmoney08=. then cmoney08bi=.; 
else cmoney08=.; 
 
proc freq; tables cmoney08 cmoney08bi; 
RUN; 
 
 
PROC FREQ; TABLES CSEX 
      
     CRACE1 CRACE2 CRACE3 CRACE CREGION08 CREGION1 CREGION2 CREGION3 CREGION4 
CBIRTHORD CFB108 
     CFB208 
     CFB308 SUMCFB CBIRTHORD SUMGRA CMONEY08; 
PROC MEANS MEAN MEDIAN MIN MAX N; VAR CSEX CPPVTRAW86 CAGE08 CED08 CWAGE08 
CWAGEEST08 CFARMA08 CFARMB08 CINCOME08; RUN; 
 
 
 
 
DATA REGRESSION2; SET REGRESSION; 
 
 
IF CINCOME08 = . THEN CINCOME08_NOMISS=21836; ELSE 
CINCOME08_NOMISS=CINCOME08; 
LOGINC_NOMISS = LOG(CINCOME08_NOMISS);  
IF CPPVTRAW86 LT 0 THEN CPPVTRAW86_NOMISS=58.77; ELSE 
CPPVTRAW86_NOMISS=CPPVTRAW86; 
LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS = LOG(CPPVTRAW86_NOMISS); 
 
CINCOME08_1000=CINCOME08/1000; 
PROC LOGISTIC DESCENDING SIMPLE ; 
MODEL CMONEY08bi = SUMCFB LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS CED08 CINCOME08_1000 CSEX 
CAGE08  BO /STB;RUN; QUIT; 
 
 
DATA REGRESSION2; SET REGRESSION2; 
IF CMONEY08BI IN (1 0); 
IF SUMCFB; 
PROC FREQ; TABLES CMONEY08 CMONEY08BI SUMCGRA SUMCFB BO CSEX; 
PROC MEANS; VAR CMONEY08 SUMCFB LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS CAGE08 CED08 CINCOME08 
BO CSEX; RUN; 
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 Regression Output Paper 1 
                                          The SAS System           17:13 Tuesday, May 15, 2012   1 
 
                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                              HOW FREQ R & PTR ARGUE ABT MONEY 2008 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  CMONEY08    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         1         147       15.93           147        15.93 
                         2         262       28.39           409        44.31 
                         3         302       32.72           711        77.03 
                         4         212       22.97           923       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 1658 
 
 
                                                        Cumulative    Cumulative 
                 CMONEY08bi    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                 ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                          0         514       55.69           514        55.69 
                          1         409       44.31           923       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 1658 
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                                          The SAS System           17:13 Tuesday, May 15, 2012   2 
 
                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                                           SEX OF CHILD 
 
                                                     Cumulative    Cumulative 
                    CSEX    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                    ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                       0        1252       48.51          1252        48.51 
                       1        1329       51.49          2581       100.00 
 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CRACE1    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        0        2077       80.47          2077        80.47 
                        1         504       19.53          2581       100.00 
 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CRACE2    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        0        1440       55.79          1440        55.79 
                        1        1141       44.21          2581       100.00 
 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CRACE3    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        0        1645       63.73          1645        63.73 
                        1         936       36.27          2581       100.00 
 
 
                             RACE OF CHILD (FROM MOTHERS SCREENER 79) 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                    CRACE    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                    ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1         504       19.53           504        19.53 
                        2        1141       44.21          1645        63.73 
                        3         936       36.27          2581       100.00 
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                                          The SAS System           17:13 Tuesday, May 15, 2012   3 
 
                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                                     REGION OF RESIDENCE 2008 
 
                                                        Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  CREGION08    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                          1         230       10.16           230        10.16 
                          2         523       23.11           753        33.27 
                          3        1189       52.54          1942        85.82 
                          4         321       14.18          2263       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 318 
 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  CREGION1    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         0        2351       91.09          2351        91.09 
                         1         230        8.91          2581       100.00 
 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  CREGION2    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         0        2058       79.74          2058        79.74 
                         1         523       20.26          2581       100.00 
 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  CREGION3    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         0        1392       53.93          1392        53.93 
                         1        1189       46.07          2581       100.00 
 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  CREGION4    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         0        2260       87.56          2260        87.56 
                         1         321       12.44          2581       100.00 
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                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                                       BIRTH ORDER OF CHILD 
 
                                                        Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  CBIRTHORD    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                          1         866       33.55           866        33.55 
                          2         800       31.00          1666        64.55 
                          3         531       20.57          2197        85.12 
                          4         226        8.76          2423        93.88 
                          5          93        3.60          2516        97.48 
                          6          34        1.32          2550        98.80 
                          7          14        0.54          2564        99.34 
                          8           9        0.35          2573        99.69 
                          9           6        0.23          2579        99.92 
                         10           2        0.08          2581       100.00 
 
 
                             HOW OFTEN PUTS OFF BUYING NECESSARY 2008 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CFB108    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1         946       41.84           946        41.84 
                        2         640       28.31          1586        70.15 
                        3         417       18.44          2003        88.59 
                        4         129        5.71          2132        94.29 
                        5         129        5.71          2261       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 320 
 
 
                                   DIFFICULTY PAYING BILLS 2008 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CFB208    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1         810       36.00           810        36.00 
                        2         675       30.00          1485        66.00 
                        3         461       20.49          1946        86.49 
                        4         191        8.49          2137        94.98 
                        5         113        5.02          2250       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 331 
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                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                               MONEY LEFT OVER AT END OF MONTH 2008 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CFB308    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1         243       10.86           243        10.86 
                        2        1024       45.78          1267        56.64 
                        3         789       35.27          2056        91.91 
                        4         181        8.09          2237       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 344 
 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   SUMCFB    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        3         166        7.43           166         7.43 
                        4         341       15.26           507        22.68 
                        5         352       15.75           859        38.43 
                        6         345       15.44          1204        53.87 
                        7         295       13.20          1499        67.07 
                        8         249       11.14          1748        78.21 
                        9         164        7.34          1912        85.55 
                       10         143        6.40          2055        91.95 
                       11          72        3.22          2127        95.17 
                       12          58        2.60          2185        97.76 
                       13          27        1.21          2212        98.97 
                       14          23        1.03          2235       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 346 
 
 
                                       BIRTH ORDER OF CHILD 
 
                                                        Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  CBIRTHORD    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                          1         866       33.55           866        33.55 
                          2         800       31.00          1666        64.55 
                          3         531       20.57          2197        85.12 
                          4         226        8.76          2423        93.88 
                          5          93        3.60          2516        97.48 
                          6          34        1.32          2550        98.80 
                          7          14        0.54          2564        99.34 
                          8           9        0.35          2573        99.69 
                          9           6        0.23          2579        99.92 
                         10           2        0.08          2581       100.00 
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                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   SUMGRA    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                       13           7        0.27             7         0.27 
                       14          21        0.81            28         1.08 
                       15           8        0.31            36         1.39 
                       16           6        0.23            42         1.63 
                       17          15        0.58            57         2.21 
                       18          36        1.39            93         3.60 
                       19          68        2.63           161         6.24 
                       20          90        3.49           251         9.72 
                       21         156        6.04           407        15.77 
                       22         240        9.30           647        25.07 
                       23         421       16.31          1068        41.38 
                       24         511       19.80          1579        61.18 
                       25         249        9.65          1828        70.83 
                       26         230        8.91          2058        79.74 
                       27         204        7.90          2262        87.64 
                       28         106        4.11          2368        91.75 
                       29         123        4.77          2491        96.51 
                       30          34        1.32          2525        97.83 
                       31          19        0.74          2544        98.57 
                       32          37        1.43          2581       100.00 
 
 
                              HOW FREQ R & PTR ARGUE ABT MONEY 2008 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  CMONEY08    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         1         147       15.93           147        15.93 
                         2         262       28.39           409        44.31 
                         3         302       32.72           711        77.03 
                         4         212       22.97           923       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 1658 
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                                       The MEANS Procedure 
 
Variable     Label                                              Mean         Median        Minimum 
ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
CSEX         SEX OF CHILD                                  0.5149167      1.0000000              0 
CPPVTRAW86   PPVT: TOTAL RAW SCORE 86                     58.7745665     59.0000000              0 
CAGE08       AGE OF YA IN YEARS AT DATE OF INTV 2008      25.5315395     26.0000000     14.0000000 
CED08        HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED AS OF 2008 2008      12.5011028     12.0000000      6.0000000 
CWAGE08      INCOME FR WAGES/SALARY/TIPS/COMM 07 2008       21388.67       17083.50              0 
CWAGEEST08   INCOM FR WGS/SLRY/TPS 07 - BEST EST 2008      2.0230415      2.0000000      1.0000000 
CFARMA08     INCOME FROM OWN FARM/BUSINESS IN 07 2008       12796.20        6000.00              0 
CFARMB08     INCOME FROM OWN FARM/BUSINESS IN 07 2008       13065.44        6000.00              0 
CINCOME08                                                   21836.20       18000.00              0 
ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
 
           Variable     Label                                           Maximum       N 
           ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
           CSEX         SEX OF CHILD                                  1.0000000    2581 
           CPPVTRAW86   PPVT: TOTAL RAW SCORE 86                    149.0000000    1557 
           CAGE08       AGE OF YA IN YEARS AT DATE OF INTV 2008      36.0000000    2267 
           CED08        HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED AS OF 2008 2008      20.0000000    2267 
           CWAGE08      INCOME FR WAGES/SALARY/TIPS/COMM 07 2008      119116.00    2024 
           CWAGEEST08   INCOM FR WGS/SLRY/TPS 07 - BEST EST 2008      5.0000000     217 
           CFARMA08     INCOME FROM OWN FARM/BUSINESS IN 07 2008      100000.00      71 
           CFARMB08     INCOME FROM OWN FARM/BUSINESS IN 07 2008      119116.00      71 
           CINCOME08                                                  129116.00    2025 
           ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
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                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                                        Model Information 
 
                          Data Set                      WORK.REGRESSION2 
                          Response Variable             CMONEY08bi 
                          Number of Response Levels     2 
                          Model                         binary logit 
                          Optimization TechnI.Q.ue        Fisher's scoring 
 
 
                             Number of Observations Read        2581 
                             Number of Observations Used         851 
 
 
                                         Response Profile 
 
                               Ordered                        Total 
                                 Value     CMONEY08bi     Frequency 
 
                                     1            1             377 
                                     2            0             474 
 
                               Probability modeled is CMONEY08bi=1. 
 
NOTE: 1730 observations were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory 
      variables. 
 
 
                         Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables 
 
                                                          Standard 
Variable                CMONEY08bi            Mean       Deviation         Minimum         Maximum 
 
SUMCFB                         1          7.405836        2.502609        3.000000       14.000000 
                               0          6.107595        2.431955        3.000000       14.000000 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                           Total          6.682726        2.545200        3.000000       14.000000 
 
LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS           1          3.960497        0.616463        1.609438        4.934474 
                               0          4.005803        0.617401        1.609438        4.948760 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                           Total          3.985732        0.617034        1.609438        4.948760 
 
CED08                          1         12.822281        2.071265        7.000000       19.000000 
                               0         13.004219        2.458102        8.000000       20.000000 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                           Total         12.923619        2.295273        7.000000       20.000000 
 
CINCOME08_1000                 1         28.588321       21.816365               0      119.116000 
                               0         28.182205       22.995819               0      125.000000 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                           Total         28.362118       22.468783               0      125.000000 
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                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                         Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables 
 
                                                          Standard 
Variable                CMONEY08bi            Mean       Deviation         Minimum         Maximum 
 
CSEX                           1          0.511936        0.500522               0        1.000000 
                               0          0.523207        0.499989               0        1.000000 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                           Total          0.518214        0.499962               0        1.000000 
 
CAGE08                         1         27.384615        2.895903       20.000000       35.000000 
                               0         27.213080        3.098618       18.000000       35.000000 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                           Total         27.289072        3.009962       18.000000       35.000000 
 
BO                             1          0.424403        0.494909               0        1.000000 
                               0          0.521097        0.500083               0        1.000000 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                           Total          0.478261        0.499821               0        1.000000 
 
                         Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables 
 
                             Variable 
                             Label 
 
 
 
                             --------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
                             --------------------------------------- 
 
 
                             HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED AS OF 2008 2008 
 
                             --------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
                             --------------------------------------- 
 
 
                             SEX OF CHILD 
 
                             --------------------------------------- 
 
 
                             AGE OF YA IN YEARS AT DATE OF INTV 2008 
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                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                         Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables 
 
                             Variable 
                             Label 
 
 
                             --------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
                             --------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
                                     Model Convergence Status 
 
                          Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
 
                                       Model Fit Statistics 
 
                                                           Intercept 
                                            Intercept            and 
                              Criterion          Only     Covariates 
 
                              AIC            1170.656       1103.716 
                              SC             1175.402       1141.688 
                              -2 Log L       1168.656       1087.716 
 
 
                             Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
 
                     Test                 Chi-Square       DF     Pr > ChiSq 
 
                     Likelihood Ratio        80.9398        7         <.0001 
                     Score                   78.1148        7         <.0001 
                     Wald                    71.4531        7         <.0001 
 
 
                             Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
                                            Standard          Wald                  Standardized 
  Parameter               DF    Estimate       Error    Chi-Square    Pr > ChiSq        Estimate 
 
  Intercept                1     -2.5726      0.8867        8.4177        0.0037 
  SUMCFB                   1      0.2431      0.0322       57.1488        <.0001          0.3411 
  LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS     1     -0.2121      0.1369        2.4015        0.1212         -0.0721 
  CED08                    1    -0.00389      0.0357        0.0119        0.9132        -0.00492 
  CINCOME08_1000           1      0.0113     0.00376        9.0666        0.0026          0.1401 
  CSEX                     1     -0.0646      0.1574        0.1682        0.6817         -0.0178 
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                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                             Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
                                            Standard          Wald                  Standardized 
  Parameter               DF    Estimate       Error    Chi-Square    Pr > ChiSq        Estimate 
 
  CAGE08                   1      0.0591      0.0309        3.6575        0.0558          0.0980 
  BO                       1     -0.6262      0.1689       13.7448        0.0002         -0.1725 
 
 
                                       Odds Ratio Estimates 
 
                                                Point          95% Wald 
                     Effect                  Estimate      Confidence Limits 
 
                     SUMCFB                     1.275       1.197       1.358 
                     LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS       0.809       0.619       1.058 
                     CED08                      0.996       0.929       1.068 
                     CINCOME08_1000             1.011       1.004       1.019 
                     CSEX                       0.937       0.689       1.276 
                     CAGE08                     1.061       0.999       1.127 
                     BO                         0.535       0.384       0.744 
 
 
                   Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
 
                        % Concordant      67.4    Somers' D    0.351 
                        % Discordant      32.3    Gamma        0.352 
                        % Tied             0.3    Tau-a        0.173 
                        Pairs                 178698    c            0.675 
 
 
 The CORR Procedure                                         
                                                                                                   
   8  Variables:    CMONEY08             SUMCFB               LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS CAGE08          
                    CED08                CINCOME08            BO                   CSEX            
                                                                                                   
                                                                                                   
                                        Simple Statistics                                          
                                                                                                   
 Variable                      N         Mean      Std Dev          Sum      Minimum      Maximum  
                                                                                                   
 CMONEY08                    920      2.62935      1.00413         2419      1.00000      4.00000  
 SUMCFB                      920      6.75326      2.55962         6213      3.00000     14.00000  
 LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS        920      3.96551      0.62426         3648      1.60944      4.94876  
 CAGE08                      920     27.20652      3.00539        25030     18.00000     35.00000  
 CED08                       920     12.85652      2.29658        11828      7.00000     20.00000  
 CINCOME08                   851        28362        22469     24136162            0       125000  
 BO                          920      0.47283      0.49953    435.00000            0      1.00000  
 CSEX                        920      0.52717      0.49953    485.00000            0      1.00000  
                                                                                                   
                                        Simple Statistics                                          
                                                                                                   
                  Variable               Label                                                     
                                                                                                   
                  CMONEY08               HOW FREQ R & PTR ARGUE ABT MONEY 2008                     
                  SUMCFB                                                                           
                  LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS                                                             
                  CAGE08                 AGE OF YA IN YEARS AT DATE OF INTV 2008                   
                  CED08                  HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED AS OF 2008 2008                   
                  CINCOME08                                                                        
                  BO                                                                               
                  CSEX                   SEX OF CHILD                                              
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                                Pearson Correlation Coefficients                                   
                                   Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0                                      
                                     Number of Observations                                        
                                                                                                   
                                                                      LOGCPPVTRAW86_               
                                            CMONEY08       SUMCFB             NOMISS       CAGE08  
                                                                                                   
CMONEY08                                     1.00000     -0.30658            0.01421     -0.05177  
HOW FREQ R & PTR ARGUE ABT MONEY 2008                      <.0001             0.6668       0.1166  
                                                 920          920                920          920  
                                                                                                   
SUMCFB                                      -0.30658      1.00000           -0.01234      0.05614  
                                              <.0001                          0.7086       0.0888  
                                                 920          920                920          920  
                                                                                                   
LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS                         0.01421     -0.01234            1.00000      0.46974  
                                              0.6668       0.7086                          <.0001  
                                                 920          920                920          920  
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                                        The CORR Procedure                                         
                                                                                                   
                                Pearson Correlation Coefficients                                   
                                   Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0                                      
                                     Number of Observations                                        
                                                                                                   
                                                                      LOGCPPVTRAW86_               
                                            CMONEY08       SUMCFB             NOMISS       CAGE08  
                                                                                                   
CAGE08                                      -0.05177      0.05614            0.46974      1.00000  
AGE OF YA IN YEARS AT DATE OF INTV 2008       0.1166       0.0888             <.0001               
                                                 920          920                920          920  
                                                                                                   
CED08                                       -0.04668     -0.18040            0.17593      0.18765  
HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED AS OF 2008 2008       0.1572       <.0001             <.0001       <.0001  
                                                 920          920                920          920  
                                                                                                   
CINCOME08                                   -0.01683     -0.30557            0.18451      0.21545  
                                              0.6239       <.0001             <.0001       <.0001  
                                                 851          851                851          851  
                                                                                                   
BO                                           0.04606      0.00369            0.26003      0.47921  
                                              0.1627       0.9111             <.0001       <.0001  
                                                 920          920                920          920  
                                                                                                   
CSEX                                         0.05590     -0.07858           -0.06803     -0.00882  
SEX OF CHILD                                  0.0902       0.0171             0.0391       0.7894  
                                                 920          920                920          920  
                                                                                                   
                                Pearson Correlation Coefficients                                   
                                   Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0                                      
                                     Number of Observations                                        
                                                                                                   
                                                CED08      CINCOME08            BO          CSEX   
                                                                                                   
 CMONEY08                                    -0.04668       -0.01683       0.04606       0.05590   
 HOW FREQ R & PTR ARGUE ABT MONEY 2008         0.1572         0.6239        0.1627        0.0902   
                                                  920            851           920           920   
                                                                                                   
 SUMCFB                                      -0.18040       -0.30557       0.00369      -0.07858   
                                               <.0001         <.0001        0.9111        0.0171   
                                                  920            851           920           920   
                                                                                                   
 LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS                         0.17593        0.18451       0.26003      -0.06803   
                                               <.0001         <.0001        <.0001        0.0391   
                                                  920            851           920           920   
                                                                                                   
 CAGE08                                       0.18765        0.21545       0.47921      -0.00882   
 AGE OF YA IN YEARS AT DATE OF INTV 2008       <.0001         <.0001        <.0001        0.7894   
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                                Pearson Correlation Coefficients                                   
                                   Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0                                      
                                     Number of Observations                                        
                                                                                                   
                                                CED08      CINCOME08            BO          CSEX   
                                                                                                   
 CED08                                        1.00000        0.28734       0.21001      -0.21665   
 HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED AS OF 2008 2008                      <.0001        <.0001        <.0001   
                                                  920            851           920           920   
                                                                                                   
 CINCOME08                                    0.28734        1.00000       0.15173       0.22778   
                                               <.0001                       <.0001        <.0001   
                                                  851            851           851           851   
                                                                                                   
 BO                                           0.21001        0.15173       1.00000       0.02477   
                                               <.0001         <.0001                      0.4531   
                                                  920            851           920           920   
                                                                                                   
 CSEX                                        -0.21665        0.22778       0.02477       1.00000   
 SEX OF CHILD                                  <.0001         <.0001        0.4531                 
                                                  920            851           920           920   
 Regression Editor Paper 2 
;DATA DISS.P2; SET DISS.FINAL; 
 
IF CSEX = 1 THEN CSEX = 1; ELSE IF CSEX = 2 THEN CSEX = 0; * 1 = MALE 0 = 
FEMALE; 
 
IF CRACE = 1 THEN CRACE = 0; 
ELSE IF CRACE = 2 THEN CRACE = 0; 
ELSE IF CRACE = 3 THEN CRACE =1; 
 
CINCOME08 = SUM(CWAGE08, CFARM08); 
CINCOME08_1000=CINCOME08/1000; 
LOGCINCOME08 = LOG(CINCOME08); 
 
IF CMS08 = 1 THEN CMS08 = 1; 
ELSE IF CMS08 = 0 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
ELSE IF CMS08 = 2 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
ELSE IF CMS08 = 3 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
ELSE IF CMS08 = 6 THEN CMS08 = 0; 
 
IF SUMCFB GT 3 THEN HICFB=1;  
ELSE IF 3 LE SUMCFB LE 14 THEN HICFB=0;  
ELSE HICFB=.; 
 
IF CFB108 = 1 THEN HICFB1 =1; ELSE IF 1 LT CFB108 LE 5 THEN HICFB1=0; ELSE 
HICFB1=.;  
IF CFB208 = 1 THEN HICFB2=1; ELSE IF 1 LT CFB208 LE 5 THEN HICFB2=0; ELSE 
HICFB2=.;  
IF CFB308 = 1 THEN HICFB3=1; ELSE IF 1 LT CFB308 LE 4 THEN HICFB3=0; ELSE 
HICFB3=.;  
 
PROC FREQ; TABLES CFB108 HICFB1 CFB208 HICFB2 CFB308 HICFB3; RUN; 
PROC FREQ; TABLES  
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 CAGE08 
 CED08 
 CMS08 
 CRACE 
 CSEX 
 CINCOME08 
 SUMCGRA 
 SUMCFB;  
PROC MEANS MEDIAN MEAN STD MIN MAX N; VAR CAGE08 CED08 CINCOME08 SUMCGRA 
SUMCFB CMS08 CRACE CSEX; RUN;  
 
PROC LOGISTIC DESCENDING SIMPLE; MODEL HICFB1 = CAGE08 CMS08 CRACE CSEX 
CINCOME08_1000 SUMCGRA / STB;  
  RUN; 
  
PROC LOGISTIC DESCENDING SIMPLE; MODEL HICFB2 = CAGE08 CMS08 CRACE CSEX 
CINCOME08_1000 SUMCGRA / STB;  
  RUN; 
 
PROC LOGISTIC DESCENDING SIMPLE; MODEL HICFB3 = CAGE08 CMS08 CRACE CSEX 
CINCOME08_1000 SUMCGRA / STB;  
  RUN;  
 Regression Output Paper 2 
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                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                             HOW OFTEN PUTS OFF BUYING NECESSARY 2008 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CFB108    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1         946       41.84           946        41.84 
                        2         640       28.31          1586        70.15 
                        3         417       18.44          2003        88.59 
                        4         129        5.71          2132        94.29 
                        5         129        5.71          2261       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 320 
 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   HICFB1    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        0        1315       58.16          1315        58.16 
                        1         946       41.84          2261       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 320 
 
 
                                   DIFFICULTY PAYING BILLS 2008 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CFB208    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1         810       36.00           810        36.00 
                        2         675       30.00          1485        66.00 
                        3         461       20.49          1946        86.49 
                        4         191        8.49          2137        94.98 
                        5         113        5.02          2250       100.00 
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                                     Frequency Missing = 331 
 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   HICFB2    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        0        1440       64.00          1440        64.00 
                        1         810       36.00          2250       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 331 
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                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                               MONEY LEFT OVER AT END OF MONTH 2008 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CFB308    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1         243       10.86           243        10.86 
                        2        1024       45.78          1267        56.64 
                        3         789       35.27          2056        91.91 
                        4         181        8.09          2237       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 344 
 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   HICFB3    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        0        1994       89.14          1994        89.14 
                        1         243       10.86          2237       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 344 
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                             AGE OF YA IN YEARS AT DATE OF INTV 2008 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CAGE08    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                       14          10        0.44            10         0.44 
                       15          33        1.46            43         1.90 
                       16          47        2.07            90         3.97 
                       17          38        1.68           128         5.65 
                       18          86        3.79           214         9.44 
                       19          55        2.43           269        11.87 
                       20          79        3.48           348        15.35 
                       21          87        3.84           435        19.19 
                       22          81        3.57           516        22.76 
                       23         110        4.85           626        27.61 
                       24         119        5.25           745        32.86 
                       25         267       11.78          1012        44.64 
                       26         250       11.03          1262        55.67 
                       27         221        9.75          1483        65.42 
                       28         199        8.78          1682        74.19 
                       29         169        7.45          1851        81.65 
                       30         141        6.22          1992        87.87 
                       31         105        4.63          2097        92.50 
                       32          88        3.88          2185        96.38 
                       33          45        1.99          2230        98.37 
                       34          20        0.88          2250        99.25 
                       35          14        0.62          2264        99.87 
                       36           3        0.13          2267       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 314 
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                              HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED AS OF 2008 2008 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                    CED08    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                    ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        6           1        0.04             1         0.04 
                        7           8        0.35             9         0.40 
                        8          93        4.10           102         4.50 
                        9         117        5.16           219         9.66 
                       10         147        6.48           366        16.14 
                       11         178        7.85           544        24.00 
                       12         851       37.54          1395        61.54 
                       13         199        8.78          1594        70.31 
                       14         283       12.48          1877        82.80 
                       15         104        4.59          1981        87.38 
                       16         196        8.65          2177        96.03 
                       17          42        1.85          2219        97.88 
                       18          34        1.50          2253        99.38 
                       19          10        0.44          2263        99.82 
                       20           4        0.18          2267       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 314 
 
 
                                   OFFICIAL MARITAL STATUS 2008 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                    CMS08    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                    ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        0        1725       76.09          1725        76.09 
                        1         542       23.91          2267       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 314 
 
 
                             RACE OF CHILD (FROM MOTHERS SCREENER 79) 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                    CRACE    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                    ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        0        1645       63.73          1645        63.73 
                        1         936       36.27          2581       100.00 
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                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                                           SEX OF CHILD 
 
                                                     Cumulative    Cumulative 
                    CSEX    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                    ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                       0        1252       48.51          1252        48.51 
                       1        1329       51.49          2581       100.00 
146 
 
 
                                          The SAS System           17:13 Tuesday, May 15, 2012  74 
 
                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                                                        Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  CINCOME08    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                          0         228       11.26           228        11.26 
                         30           1        0.05           229        11.31 
                         45           1        0.05           230        11.36 
                         50           1        0.05           231        11.41 
                         60           1        0.05           232        11.46 
                        100           3        0.15           235        11.61 
                        108           1        0.05           236        11.66 
                        112           2        0.10           238        11.76 
                        120           2        0.10           240        11.86 
                        150           1        0.05           241        11.91 
                        154           1        0.05           242        11.96 
                        200          13        0.64           255        12.60 
                        240           1        0.05           256        12.65 
                        300           8        0.40           264        13.04 
                        445           1        0.05           265        13.09 
                        454           1        0.05           266        13.14 
                        455           1        0.05           267        13.19 
                        500           9        0.44           276        13.64 
                        550           1        0.05           277        13.69 
                        600           4        0.20           281        13.88 
                        700           3        0.15           284        14.03 
                        720           1        0.05           285        14.08 
                        750           1        0.05           286        14.13 
                        780           1        0.05           287        14.18 
                        800           5        0.25           292        14.43 
                        844           1        0.05           293        14.48 
                        900           2        0.10           295        14.58 
                       1000          24        1.19           319        15.76 
                       1040           2        0.10           321        15.86 
                       1080           1        0.05           322        15.91 
                       1100           2        0.10           324        16.01 
                       1200           5        0.25           329        16.25 
                       1300           2        0.10           331        16.35 
                       1350           1        0.05           332        16.40 
                       1500          11        0.54           343        16.95 
                       1536           1        0.05           344        17.00 
                       1577           1        0.05           345        17.05 
                       1600           3        0.15           348        17.19 
                       1800           3        0.15           351        17.34 
                       1900           1        0.05           352        17.39 
                       1971           2        0.10           354        17.49 
                       2000          28        1.38           382        18.87 
                       2159           2        0.10           384        18.97 
                       2223           1        0.05           385        19.02 
                       2366           1        0.05           386        19.07 
                       2400           4        0.20           390        19.27 
                       2500           8        0.40           398        19.66 
                       2600           2        0.10           400        19.76 
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                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                                                        Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  CINCOME08    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                       2650           2        0.10           402        19.86 
                       2700           1        0.05           403        19.91 
                       2800           2        0.10           405        20.01 
                       2900           1        0.05           406        20.06 
                       3000          43        2.12           449        22.18 
                       3074           1        0.05           450        22.23 
                       3200           1        0.05           451        22.28 
                       3429           1        0.05           452        22.33 
                       3500          10        0.49           462        22.83 
                       3588           2        0.10           464        22.92 
                       3700           2        0.10           466        23.02 
                       3770           3        0.15           469        23.17 
                       3800           3        0.15           472        23.32 
                       4000          21        1.04           493        24.36 
                       4200           3        0.15           496        24.51 
                       4300           3        0.15           499        24.65 
                       4400           3        0.15           502        24.80 
                       4500           4        0.20           506        25.00 
                       4673           2        0.10           508        25.10 
                       5000          42        2.08           550        27.17 
                       5400           1        0.05           551        27.22 
                       6000          27        1.33           578        28.56 
                       6300           1        0.05           579        28.61 
                       6337           1        0.05           580        28.66 
                       6400           4        0.20           584        28.85 
                       6500           7        0.35           591        29.20 
                       6600           2        0.10           593        29.30 
                       7000          31        1.53           624        30.83 
                       7222           1        0.05           625        30.88 
                       7400           2        0.10           627        30.98 
                       7500           4        0.20           631        31.18 
                       8000          30        1.48           661        32.66 
                       8100           1        0.05           662        32.71 
                       8500           2        0.10           664        32.81 
                       8647           2        0.10           666        32.91 
                       8700           1        0.05           667        32.95 
                       8800           2        0.10           669        33.05 
                       9000          16        0.79           685        33.84 
                       9200           1        0.05           686        33.89 
                       9400           3        0.15           689        34.04 
                       9500           1        0.05           690        34.09 
                       9600           1        0.05           691        34.14 
                       9900           2        0.10           693        34.24 
                      10000          67        3.31           760        37.55 
                      10348           1        0.05           761        37.60 
                      10500           1        0.05           762        37.65 
                      10921           1        0.05           763        37.70 
                      11000          16        0.79           779        38.49 
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                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                                                        Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  CINCOME08    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                      11500           3        0.15           782        38.64 
                      11680           3        0.15           785        38.78 
                      11700           1        0.05           786        38.83 
                      12000          53        2.62           839        41.45 
                      12240           2        0.10           841        41.55 
                      12600           1        0.05           842        41.60 
                      13000          32        1.58           874        43.18 
                      14000          24        1.19           898        44.37 
                      14500           1        0.05           899        44.42 
                      14848           2        0.10           901        44.52 
                      14880           3        0.15           904        44.66 
                      15000          61        3.01           965        47.68 
                      15500           1        0.05           966        47.73 
                      16000          15        0.74           981        48.47 
                      16254           2        0.10           983        48.57 
                      16319           1        0.05           984        48.62 
                      16800           2        0.10           986        48.72 
                      16950           2        0.10           988        48.81 
                      17000          24        1.19          1012        50.00 
                      17167           1        0.05          1013        50.05 
                      17500           2        0.10          1015        50.15 
                      18000          28        1.38          1043        51.53 
                      18467           1        0.05          1044        51.58 
                      18900           2        0.10          1046        51.68 
                      19000          14        0.69          1060        52.37 
                      19070           1        0.05          1061        52.42 
                      19500           3        0.15          1064        52.57 
                      20000          64        3.16          1128        55.73 
                      20192           3        0.15          1131        55.88 
                      20800           5        0.25          1136        56.13 
                      21000          11        0.54          1147        56.67 
                      22000          37        1.83          1184        58.50 
                      22281           1        0.05          1185        58.55 
                      22500           1        0.05          1186        58.60 
                      22600           1        0.05          1187        58.65 
                      22700           2        0.10          1189        58.75 
                      23000          22        1.09          1211        59.83 
                      23240           2        0.10          1213        59.93 
                      23453           2        0.10          1215        60.03 
                      23747           2        0.10          1217        60.13 
                      24000          29        1.43          1246        61.56 
                      24939           1        0.05          1247        61.61 
                      25000          56        2.77          1303        64.38 
                      25500           2        0.10          1305        64.48 
                      25800           1        0.05          1306        64.53 
                      26000          26        1.28          1332        65.81 
                      26133           2        0.10          1334        65.91 
                      26500           1        0.05          1335        65.96 
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                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                                                        Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  CINCOME08    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                      26700           3        0.15          1338        66.11 
                      27000          35        1.73          1373        67.84 
                      27500           1        0.05          1374        67.89 
                      28000          29        1.43          1403        69.32 
                      28500           1        0.05          1404        69.37 
                      28600           1        0.05          1405        69.42 
                      28700           3        0.15          1408        69.57 
                      29000           8        0.40          1416        69.96 
                      30000          81        4.00          1497        73.96 
                      30500           3        0.15          1500        74.11 
                      30680           1        0.05          1501        74.16 
                      31000          11        0.54          1512        74.70 
                      31175           2        0.10          1514        74.80 
                      31766           1        0.05          1515        74.85 
                      32000          32        1.58          1547        76.43 
                      32100           2        0.10          1549        76.53 
                      33000          14        0.69          1563        77.22 
                      34000          14        0.69          1577        77.92 
                      35000          45        2.22          1622        80.14 
                      35200           1        0.05          1623        80.19 
                      36000          25        1.24          1648        81.42 
                      37000          16        0.79          1664        82.21 
                      37800           1        0.05          1665        82.26 
                      38000          16        0.79          1681        83.05 
                      38500           2        0.10          1683        83.15 
                      39000           7        0.35          1690        83.50 
                      39819           1        0.05          1691        83.55 
                      40000          33        1.63          1724        85.18 
                      41000          10        0.49          1734        85.67 
                      41232           3        0.15          1737        85.82 
                      41600           1        0.05          1738        85.87 
                      42000          14        0.69          1752        86.56 
                      43000          15        0.74          1767        87.30 
                      43200           3        0.15          1770        87.45 
                      43801           1        0.05          1771        87.50 
                      44000           1        0.05          1772        87.55 
                      45000          29        1.43          1801        88.98 
                      46000          14        0.69          1815        89.67 
                      47000          16        0.79          1831        90.46 
                      47250           2        0.10          1833        90.56 
                      48000          17        0.84          1850        91.40 
                      49000          13        0.64          1863        92.05 
                      50000          20        0.99          1883        93.03 
                      51000           3        0.15          1886        93.18 
                      52000           9        0.44          1895        93.63 
                      52195           2        0.10          1897        93.73 
                      53000           1        0.05          1898        93.77 
                      54000           3        0.15          1901        93.92 
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                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                                                        Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  CINCOME08    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                      55000           8        0.40          1909        94.32 
                      55200           1        0.05          1910        94.37 
                      56000           3        0.15          1913        94.52 
                      57000           5        0.25          1918        94.76 
                      57500           1        0.05          1919        94.81 
                      58000           3        0.15          1922        94.96 
                      58240           1        0.05          1923        95.01 
                      60000           6        0.30          1929        95.31 
                      62000           2        0.10          1931        95.41 
                      63223           2        0.10          1933        95.50 
                      64500           1        0.05          1934        95.55 
                      65000          16        0.79          1950        96.34 
                      67000           2        0.10          1952        96.44 
                      68000           6        0.30          1958        96.74 
                      70000          16        0.79          1974        97.53 
                      72000           4        0.20          1978        97.73 
                      74500           2        0.10          1980        97.83 
                      75000           8        0.40          1988        98.22 
                      77000           2        0.10          1990        98.32 
                      80000           3        0.15          1993        98.47 
                      81000           2        0.10          1995        98.57 
                      82000           2        0.10          1997        98.67 
                      85000           2        0.10          1999        98.76 
                      86000           1        0.05          2000        98.81 
                      87000           2        0.10          2002        98.91 
                      88000           2        0.10          2004        99.01 
                      89000           1        0.05          2005        99.06 
                      90000           3        0.15          2008        99.21 
                      92000           2        0.10          2010        99.31 
                     119116          14        0.69          2024       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 557 
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                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   SUMCGRA    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        11           2        0.08             2         0.08 
                        12           5        0.19             7         0.27 
                        13           3        0.12            10         0.39 
                        14           9        0.35            19         0.74 
                        15          27        1.05            46         1.78 
                        16          29        1.12            75         2.91 
                        17          87        3.37           162         6.28 
                        18         168        6.51           330        12.79 
                        19         434       16.82           764        29.60 
                        20         683       26.46          1447        56.06 
                        21         620       24.02          2067        80.09 
                        22         316       12.24          2383        92.33 
                        23         136        5.27          2519        97.60 
                        24          47        1.82          2566        99.42 
                        25          13        0.50          2579        99.92 
                        26           2        0.08          2581       100.00 
 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   SUMCFB    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        3         157        6.08           157         6.08 
                        4         413       16.00           570        22.08 
                        5         409       15.85           979        37.93 
                        6         391       15.15          1370        53.08 
                        7         375       14.53          1745        67.61 
                        8         280       10.85          2025        78.46 
                        9         172        6.66          2197        85.12 
                       10         178        6.90          2375        92.02 
                       11          79        3.06          2454        95.08 
                       12          57        2.21          2511        97.29 
                       13          30        1.16          2541        98.45 
                       14          40        1.55          2581       100.00 
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                                       The MEANS Procedure 
 
Variable    Label                                            Median           Mean        Std Dev 
ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
CAGE08      AGE OF YA IN YEARS AT DATE OF INTV 2008      26.0000000     25.5315395      4.4298242 
CED08       HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED AS OF 2008 2008      12.0000000     12.5011028      2.2426449 
CINCOME08                                                  17083.50       21388.67       20317.85 
SUMCGRA                                                  20.0000000     20.1975978      1.7759401 
SUMCFB                                                    6.0000000      6.6679582      2.5112491 
CMS08       OFFICIAL MARITAL STATUS 2008                          0      0.2390825      0.4266173 
CRACE       RACE OF CHILD (FROM MOTHERS SCREENER 79)              0      0.3626501      0.4808582 
CSEX        SEX OF CHILD                                  1.0000000      0.5149167      0.4998743 
ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
 
   Variable    Label                                           Minimum         Maximum       N 
   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
   CAGE08      AGE OF YA IN YEARS AT DATE OF INTV 2008      14.0000000      36.0000000    2267 
   CED08       HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED AS OF 2008 2008       6.0000000      20.0000000    2267 
   CINCOME08                                                         0       119116.00    2024 
   SUMCGRA                                                  11.0000000      26.0000000    2581 
   SUMCFB                                                    3.0000000      14.0000000    2581 
   CMS08       OFFICIAL MARITAL STATUS 2008                          0       1.0000000    2267 
   CRACE       RACE OF CHILD (FROM MOTHERS SCREENER 79)              0       1.0000000    2581 
   CSEX        SEX OF CHILD                                          0       1.0000000    2581 
   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
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                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                                        Model Information 
 
                          Data Set                      DISS.P2 
                          Response Variable             HICFB1 
                          Number of Response Levels     2 
                          Model                         binary logit 
                          Optimization TechnI.Q.ue        Fisher's scoring 
 
 
                             Number of Observations Read        2581 
                             Number of Observations Used        2020 
 
 
                                         Response Profile 
 
                                Ordered                      Total 
                                  Value       HICFB1     Frequency 
 
                                      1            1           860 
                                      2            0          1160 
 
                                 Probability modeled is HICFB1=1. 
 
NOTE: 561 observations were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory 
      variables. 
 
 
                         Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables 
 
                                                      Standard 
 Variable           HICFB1               Mean        Deviation          Minimum          Maximum 
 
 CAGE08                    1        25.163953         4.236034        14.000000        35.000000 
                           0        26.220690         4.393845        14.000000        36.000000 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       Total        25.770792         4.357756        14.000000        36.000000 
 
 CMS08                     1         0.260465         0.439144                0         1.000000 
                           0         0.247414         0.431695                0         1.000000 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       Total         0.252970         0.434822                0         1.000000 
 
 CRACE                     1         0.460465         0.498725                0         1.000000 
                           0         0.314655         0.464579                0         1.000000 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       Total         0.376733         0.484687                0         1.000000 
 
 CSEX                      1         0.565116         0.496030                0         1.000000 
                           0         0.458621         0.498500                0         1.000000 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       Total         0.503960         0.500108                0         1.000000 
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                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                         Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables 
 
                                                      Standard 
 Variable           HICFB1               Mean        Deviation          Minimum          Maximum 
 
 CINCOME08_1000            1        24.002730        23.333821                0       119.116000 
                           0        19.502001        17.526713                0       119.116000 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       Total        21.418153        20.320969                0       119.116000 
 
 SUMCGRA                   1        20.190698         1.737997        11.000000        26.000000 
                           0        20.252586         1.800918        12.000000        25.000000 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       Total        20.226238         1.774232        11.000000        26.000000 
 
                          Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables 
 
                             Variable 
                             Label 
 
                             AGE OF YA IN YEARS AT DATE OF INTV 2008 
 
                             ---------------------------------------- 
 
 
                             OFFICIAL MARITAL STATUS 2008 
 
                             ---------------------------------------- 
 
 
                             RACE OF CHILD (FROM MOTHERS SCREENER 79) 
 
                             ---------------------------------------- 
 
 
                             SEX OF CHILD 
 
                             ---------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
                             ---------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
                             ---------------------------------------- 
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                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                                     Model Convergence Status 
 
                          Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
 
                                       Model Fit Statistics 
 
                                                           Intercept 
                                            Intercept            and 
                              Criterion          Only     Covariates 
 
                              AIC            2757.595       2640.890 
                              SC             2763.206       2680.166 
                              -2 Log L       2755.595       2626.890 
 
 
                             Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
 
                     Test                 Chi-Square       DF     Pr > ChiSq 
 
                     Likelihood Ratio       128.7044        6         <.0001 
                     Score                  125.0280        6         <.0001 
                     Wald                   117.2028        6         <.0001 
 
 
                             Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
                                         Standard          Wald                  Standardized 
     Parameter         DF    Estimate       Error    Chi-Square    Pr > ChiSq        Estimate 
 
     Intercept          1      1.5057      0.6121        6.0519        0.0139 
     CAGE08             1     -0.0850      0.0123       47.8638        <.0001         -0.2043 
     CMS08              1    -0.00596      0.1162        0.0026        0.9591        -0.00143 
     CRACE              1      0.5025      0.0980       26.2697        <.0001          0.1343 
     CSEX               1      0.3084      0.0940       10.7729        0.0010          0.0850 
     CINCOME08_1000     1      0.0160     0.00270       35.3067        <.0001          0.1797 
     SUMCGRA            1     -0.0158      0.0262        0.3621        0.5473         -0.0154 
 
 
                                       Odds Ratio Estimates 
 
                                             Point          95% Wald 
                        Effect            Estimate      Confidence Limits 
 
                        CAGE08               0.918       0.897       0.941 
                        CMS08                0.994       0.792       1.248 
                        CRACE                1.653       1.364       2.003 
                        CSEX                 1.361       1.132       1.637 
                        CINCOME08_1000       1.016       1.011       1.022 
                        SUMCGRA              0.984       0.935       1.036 
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                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                   Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
 
                        % Concordant      63.5    Somers' D    0.275 
                        % Discordant      36.0    Gamma        0.277 
                        % Tied             0.4    Tau-a        0.135 
                        Pairs                 997600    c            0.638 
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                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                                        Model Information 
 
                          Data Set                      DISS.P2 
                          Response Variable             HICFB2 
                          Number of Response Levels     2 
                          Model                         binary logit 
                          Optimization TechnI.Q.ue        Fisher's scoring 
 
 
                             Number of Observations Read        2581 
                             Number of Observations Used        2011 
 
 
                                         Response Profile 
 
                                Ordered                      Total 
                                  Value       HICFB2     Frequency 
 
                                      1            1           734 
                                      2            0          1277 
 
                                 Probability modeled is HICFB2=1. 
 
NOTE: 570 observations were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory 
      variables. 
 
 
                         Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables 
 
                                                      Standard 
 Variable           HICFB2               Mean        Deviation          Minimum          Maximum 
 
 CAGE08                    1        25.347411         4.102109        14.000000        34.000000 
                           0        26.021926         4.434068        14.000000        36.000000 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       Total        25.775733         4.327044        14.000000        36.000000 
 
 CMS08                     1         0.238420         0.426408                0         1.000000 
                           0         0.263117         0.440498                0         1.000000 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       Total         0.254102         0.435464                0         1.000000 
 
 CRACE                     1         0.425068         0.494690                0         1.000000 
                           0         0.350822         0.477414                0         1.000000 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       Total         0.377921         0.484988                0         1.000000 
 
 CSEX                      1         0.568120         0.495676                0         1.000000 
                           0         0.466719         0.499087                0         1.000000 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       Total         0.503729         0.500110                0         1.000000 
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                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                         Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables 
 
                                                      Standard 
 Variable           HICFB2               Mean        Deviation          Minimum          Maximum 
 
 CINCOME08_1000            1        24.788388        23.901296                0       119.116000 
                           0        19.623565        17.679208                0       119.116000 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       Total        21.508687        20.320749                0       119.116000 
 
 SUMCGRA                   1        20.138965         1.778999        11.000000        26.000000 
                           0        20.269381         1.773042        12.000000        25.000000 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       Total        20.221780         1.775887        11.000000        26.000000 
 
                          Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables 
 
                             Variable 
                             Label 
 
                             AGE OF YA IN YEARS AT DATE OF INTV 2008 
 
                             ---------------------------------------- 
 
 
                             OFFICIAL MARITAL STATUS 2008 
 
                             ---------------------------------------- 
 
 
                             RACE OF CHILD (FROM MOTHERS SCREENER 79) 
 
                             ---------------------------------------- 
 
 
                             SEX OF CHILD 
 
                             ---------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
                             ---------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
                             ---------------------------------------- 
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                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                                     Model Convergence Status 
 
                          Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
 
                                       Model Fit Statistics 
 
                                                           Intercept 
                                            Intercept            and 
                              Criterion          Only     Covariates 
 
                              AIC            2641.384       2567.385 
                              SC             2646.991       2606.629 
                              -2 Log L       2639.384       2553.385 
 
 
                             Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
 
                     Test                 Chi-Square       DF     Pr > ChiSq 
 
                     Likelihood Ratio        85.9994        6         <.0001 
                     Score                   84.6992        6         <.0001 
                     Wald                    79.8113        6         <.0001 
 
 
                             Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
                                         Standard          Wald                  Standardized 
     Parameter         DF    Estimate       Error    Chi-Square    Pr > ChiSq        Estimate 
 
     Intercept          1      1.2177      0.6231        3.8185        0.0507 
     CAGE08             1     -0.0622      0.0126       24.5674        <.0001         -0.1485 
     CMS08              1     -0.2451      0.1201        4.1664        0.0412         -0.0588 
     CRACE              1      0.2217      0.1002        4.8952        0.0269          0.0593 
     CSEX               1      0.2799      0.0960        8.5072        0.0035          0.0772 
     CINCOME08_1000     1      0.0177     0.00271       42.4722        <.0001          0.1980 
     SUMCGRA            1     -0.0362      0.0266        1.8587        0.1728         -0.0355 
 
 
                                       Odds Ratio Estimates 
 
                                             Point          95% Wald 
                        Effect            Estimate      Confidence Limits 
 
                        CAGE08               0.940       0.917       0.963 
                        CMS08                0.783       0.619       0.990 
                        CRACE                1.248       1.026       1.519 
                        CSEX                 1.323       1.096       1.597 
                        CINCOME08_1000       1.018       1.012       1.023 
                        SUMCGRA              0.964       0.915       1.016 
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                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                   Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
 
                        % Concordant      60.4    Somers' D    0.213 
                        % Discordant      39.1    Gamma        0.214 
                        % Tied             0.6    Tau-a        0.099 
                        Pairs                 937318    c            0.606 
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                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                                        Model Information 
 
                          Data Set                      DISS.P2 
                          Response Variable             HICFB3 
                          Number of Response Levels     2 
                          Model                         binary logit 
                          Optimization TechnI.Q.ue        Fisher's scoring 
 
 
                             Number of Observations Read        2581 
                             Number of Observations Used        2000 
 
 
                                         Response Profile 
 
                                Ordered                      Total 
                                  Value       HICFB3     Frequency 
 
                                      1            1           221 
                                      2            0          1779 
 
                                 Probability modeled is HICFB3=1. 
 
NOTE: 581 observations were deleted due to missing values for the response or explanatory 
      variables. 
 
 
                         Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables 
 
                                                      Standard 
 Variable           HICFB3               Mean        Deviation          Minimum          Maximum 
 
 CAGE08                    1        25.027149         4.477132        14.000000        33.000000 
                           0        25.897133         4.278953        14.000000        36.000000 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       Total        25.801000         4.308791        14.000000        36.000000 
 
 CMS08                     1         0.280543         0.450284                0         1.000000 
                           0         0.252389         0.434505                0         1.000000 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       Total         0.255500         0.436251                0         1.000000 
 
 CRACE                     1         0.461538         0.499650                0         1.000000 
                           0         0.369309         0.482753                0         1.000000 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       Total         0.379500         0.485384                0         1.000000 
 
 CSEX                      1         0.597285         0.491558                0         1.000000 
                           0         0.489601         0.500032                0         1.000000 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       Total         0.501500         0.500123                0         1.000000 
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                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                         Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables 
 
                                                      Standard 
 Variable           HICFB3               Mean        Deviation          Minimum          Maximum 
 
 CINCOME08_1000            1        27.648253        26.223498                0       119.116000 
                           0        20.836709        19.363907                0       119.116000 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       Total        21.589385        20.340879                0       119.116000 
 
 SUMCGRA                   1        20.253394         1.904313        11.000000        26.000000 
                           0        20.216414         1.761940        11.000000        25.000000 
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                       Total        20.220500         1.777768        11.000000        26.000000 
 
                          Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables 
 
                             Variable 
                             Label 
 
                             AGE OF YA IN YEARS AT DATE OF INTV 2008 
 
                             ---------------------------------------- 
 
 
                             OFFICIAL MARITAL STATUS 2008 
 
                             ---------------------------------------- 
 
 
                             RACE OF CHILD (FROM MOTHERS SCREENER 79) 
 
                             ---------------------------------------- 
 
 
                             SEX OF CHILD 
 
                             ---------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
                             ---------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
                             ---------------------------------------- 
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                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                                     Model Convergence Status 
 
                          Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
 
                                       Model Fit Statistics 
 
                                                           Intercept 
                                            Intercept            and 
                              Criterion          Only     Covariates 
 
                              AIC            1392.238       1352.500 
                              SC             1397.839       1391.707 
                              -2 Log L       1390.238       1338.500 
 
 
                             Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
 
                     Test                 Chi-Square       DF     Pr > ChiSq 
 
                     Likelihood Ratio        51.7374        6         <.0001 
                     Score                   53.6333        6         <.0001 
                     Wald                    50.6327        6         <.0001 
 
 
                             Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
                                         Standard          Wald                  Standardized 
     Parameter         DF    Estimate       Error    Chi-Square    Pr > ChiSq        Estimate 
 
     Intercept          1     -0.8157      0.9707        0.7061        0.4008 
     CAGE08             1     -0.0922      0.0197       21.8057        <.0001         -0.2191 
     CMS08              1      0.0777      0.1799        0.1865        0.6659          0.0187 
     CRACE              1      0.1954      0.1510        1.6740        0.1957          0.0523 
     CSEX               1      0.2740      0.1495        3.3606        0.0668          0.0756 
     CINCOME08_1000     1      0.0194     0.00361       28.7780        <.0001          0.2172 
     SUMCGRA            1      0.0179      0.0414        0.1872        0.6653          0.0175 
 
 
                                       Odds Ratio Estimates 
 
                                             Point          95% Wald 
                        Effect            Estimate      Confidence Limits 
 
                        CAGE08               0.912       0.877       0.948 
                        CMS08                1.081       0.760       1.538 
                        CRACE                1.216       0.904       1.634 
                        CSEX                 1.315       0.981       1.763 
                        CINCOME08_1000       1.020       1.012       1.027 
                        SUMCGRA              1.018       0.939       1.104 
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                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                   Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
 
                        % Concordant      63.5    Somers' D    0.282 
                        % Discordant      35.3    Gamma        0.286 
                        % Tied             1.2    Tau-a        0.056 
                        Pairs                 393159    c            0.641 
   
 
The CORR Procedure                                         
                                                                                                   
   9  Variables:    HICFB1         HICFB2         HICFB3         CAGE08         CMS08              
                    CRACE          CSEX           CINCOME08_1000 SUMCGRA                           
                                                                                                   
                                                                                                   
                                        Simple Statistics                                          
                                                                                                   
 Variable                 N          Mean       Std Dev           Sum       Minimum       Maximum  
                                                                                                   
 HICFB1                2261       0.41840       0.49341     946.00000             0       1.00000  
 HICFB2                2250       0.36000       0.48011     810.00000             0       1.00000  
 HICFB3                2237       0.10863       0.31124     243.00000             0       1.00000  
 CAGE08                2267      25.53154       4.42982         57880      14.00000      36.00000  
 CMS08                 2267       0.23908       0.42662     542.00000             0       1.00000  
 CRACE                 2581       0.36265       0.48086     936.00000             0       1.00000  
 CSEX                  2581       0.51492       0.49987          1329             0       1.00000  
 CINCOME08_1000        2024      21.38867      20.31785         43291             0     119.11600  
 SUMCGRA               2581      20.19760       1.77594         52130      11.00000      26.00000  
                                                                                                   
                                        Simple Statistics                                          
                                                                                                   
                    Variable          Label                                                        
                                                                                                   
                    HICFB1                                                                         
                    HICFB2                                                                         
                    HICFB3                                                                         
                    CAGE08            AGE OF YA IN YEARS AT DATE OF INTV 2008                      
                    CMS08             OFFICIAL MARITAL STATUS 2008                                 
                    CRACE             RACE OF CHILD (FROM MOTHERS SCREENER 79)                     
                    CSEX              SEX OF CHILD                                                 
                    CINCOME08_1000                                                                 
                    SUMCGRA                                                                        
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                                        The CORR Procedure                                         
                                                                                                   
                                Pearson Correlation Coefficients                                   
                                   Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0                                      
                                     Number of Observations                                        
                                                                                                   
                                              HICFB1     HICFB2     HICFB3     CAGE08      CMS08   
                                                                                                   
 HICFB1                                      1.00000    0.39496    0.22985   -0.10887    0.02027   
                                                         <.0001     <.0001     <.0001     0.3353   
                                                2261       2249       2237       2261       2261   
                                                                                                   
 HICFB2                                      0.39496    1.00000    0.35942   -0.07169   -0.02981   
                                              <.0001                <.0001     0.0007     0.1575   
                                                2249       2250       2235       2250       2250   
                                                                                                   
 HICFB3                                      0.22985    0.35942    1.00000   -0.05957    0.03097   
                                              <.0001     <.0001                0.0048     0.1430   
165 
 
                                                2237       2235       2237       2237       2237   
                                                                                                   
 CAGE08                                     -0.10887   -0.07169   -0.05957    1.00000    0.28066   
 AGE OF YA IN YEARS AT DATE OF INTV 2008      <.0001     0.0007     0.0048                <.0001   
                                                2261       2250       2237       2267       2267   
                                                                                                   
 CMS08                                       0.02027   -0.02981    0.03097    0.28066    1.00000   
 OFFICIAL MARITAL STATUS 2008                 0.3353     0.1575     0.1430     <.0001              
                                                2261       2250       2237       2267       2267   
                                                                                                   
 CRACE                                       0.13982    0.07089    0.07192   -0.04241    0.19329   
 RACE OF CHILD (FROM MOTHERS SCREENER 79)     <.0001     0.0008     0.0007     0.0435     <.0001   
                                                2261       2250       2237       2267       2267   
                                                                                                   
 CSEX                                        0.10569    0.09067    0.06456   -0.03930   -0.01023   
 SEX OF CHILD                                 <.0001     <.0001     0.0023     0.0614     0.6264   
                                                2261       2250       2237       2267       2267   
                                                                                                   
 CINCOME08_1000                              0.10954    0.12239    0.10501    0.39101    0.28062   
                                              <.0001     <.0001     <.0001     <.0001     <.0001   
                                                2020       2011       2000       2024       2024   
                                                                                                   
 SUMCGRA                                    -0.02293   -0.04056    0.00293   -0.00474    0.00768   
                                              0.2757     0.0544     0.8899     0.8214     0.7147   
                                                2261       2250       2237       2267       2267   
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                                        The CORR Procedure                                         
                                                                                                   
                                Pearson Correlation Coefficients                                   
                                   Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0                                      
                                     Number of Observations                                        
                                                                                                   
                                                                        CINCOME08_                 
                                               CRACE          CSEX            1000       SUMCGRA   
                                                                                                   
 HICFB1                                      0.13982       0.10569         0.10954      -0.02293   
                                              <.0001        <.0001          <.0001        0.2757   
                                                2261          2261            2020          2261   
                                                                                                   
 HICFB2                                      0.07089       0.09067         0.12239      -0.04056   
                                              0.0008        <.0001          <.0001        0.0544   
                                                2250          2250            2011          2250   
                                                                                                   
 HICFB3                                      0.07192       0.06456         0.10501       0.00293   
                                              0.0007        0.0023          <.0001        0.8899   
                                                2237          2237            2000          2237   
                                                                                                   
 CAGE08                                     -0.04241      -0.03930         0.39101      -0.00474   
 AGE OF YA IN YEARS AT DATE OF INTV 2008      0.0435        0.0614          <.0001        0.8214   
                                                2267          2267            2024          2267   
                                                                                                   
 CMS08                                       0.19329      -0.01023         0.28062       0.00768   
 OFFICIAL MARITAL STATUS 2008                 <.0001        0.6264          <.0001        0.7147   
                                                2267          2267            2024          2267   
                                                                                                   
 CRACE                                       1.00000       0.02747         0.15249       0.02544   
 RACE OF CHILD (FROM MOTHERS SCREENER 79)                   0.1629          <.0001        0.1964   
                                                2581          2581            2024          2581   
                                                                                                   
 CSEX                                        0.02747       1.00000         0.13392      -0.04786   
 SEX OF CHILD                                 0.1629                        <.0001        0.0150   
                                                2581          2581            2024          2581   
                                                                                                   
 CINCOME08_1000                              0.15249       0.13392         1.00000      -0.02047   
                                              <.0001        <.0001                        0.3574   
                                                2024          2024            2024          2024   
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 SUMCGRA                                     0.02544      -0.04786        -0.02047       1.00000   
                                              0.1964        0.0150          0.3574                 
                                                2581          2581            2024          2581   
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DATA DISS.P2; SET DISS.FINAL; 
 
IF CSEX=1 THEN CSEX=1; 
ELSE IF CSEX=2 THEN CSEX=0; *1=MALE 0=FEMALE; 
 
SUMCFB=CFB108 + CFB208 + CFB308; 
 
CINCOME08=SUM(CWAGE08, CFARMB08); 
 
 
IF GRA104 IN (8 9) THEN DELETE; IF GRA204 IN (8 9) THEN DELETE; IF GRA304 IN 
(8 9) THEN DELETE; IF GRA404 IN (8 9) THEN DELETE; IF GRA504 IN (8 9) THEN 
DELETE;  
IF GRA604 IN (8 9) THEN DELETE; IF GRA704 IN (8 9) THEN DELETE; IF GRA804 IN 
(8 9) THEN DELETE;  
IF WAGE08 = . THEN WAGE08 = ((WAGELOW08 + WAGEHI08) / 2); 
INCOME08 = SUM(MIL08, WAGE08, FARM08); 
IF GRA304 = 1 THEN GRA304R = 4; ELSE IF GRA304 = 2 THEN GRA304R = 3; ELSE IF 
GRA304 = 3 THEN GRA304R = 2; ELSE IF GRA304 = 4 THEN GRA304R =1;ELSE GRA304R 
=.; 
IF GRA504 = 1 THEN GRA504R = 4; ELSE IF GRA504 = 2 THEN GRA504R = 3; ELSE IF 
GRA504 = 3 THEN GRA504R = 2; ELSE IF GRA504 = 4 THEN GRA504R =1;ELSE GRA504R 
=.; 
IF GRA704 = 1 THEN GRA704R = 4; ELSE IF GRA704 = 2 THEN GRA704R = 3; ELSE IF 
GRA704 = 3 THEN GRA704R = 2; ELSE IF GRA704 = 4 THEN GRA704R =1;ELSE GRA704R 
=.; 
IF CGRA308 = 1 THEN CGRA308R = 4; ELSE IF CGRA308 = 2 THEN CGRA308R = 3; ELSE 
IF CGRA308 = 3 THEN CGRA308R = 2; ELSE IF CGRA308 = 4 THEN CGRA308R =1; ELSE 
CGRA308R=.; 
IF CGRA508 = 1 THEN CGRA508R = 4; ELSE IF CGRA508 = 2 THEN CGRA508R = 3; ELSE 
IF CGRA508 = 3 THEN CGRA508R = 2; ELSE IF CGRA508 = 4 THEN CGRA508R =1; ELSE 
CGRA508R=.; 
IF CGRA708 = 1 THEN CGRA708R = 4; ELSE IF CGRA708 = 2 THEN CGRA708R = 3; ELSE 
IF CGRA708 = 3 THEN CGRA708R = 2; ELSE IF CGRA708 = 4 THEN CGRA708R =1; ELSE 
CGRA708R=.; 
IF CGRA306 = 1 THEN CGRA306R = 4; ELSE IF CGRA306 = 2 THEN CGRA306R = 3; ELSE 
IF CGRA306 = 3 THEN CGRA306R = 2; ELSE IF CGRA306 = 4 THEN CGRA306R =1; ELSE 
CGRA306R=.; 
IF CGRA506 = 1 THEN CGRA506R = 4; ELSE IF CGRA506 = 2 THEN CGRA506R = 3; ELSE 
IF CGRA506 = 3 THEN CGRA506R = 2; ELSE IF CGRA506 = 4 THEN CGRA506R =1; ELSE 
CGRA506R=.; 
IF CGRA706 = 1 THEN CGRA706R = 4; ELSE IF CGRA706 = 2 THEN CGRA706R = 3; ELSE 
IF CGRA706 = 3 THEN CGRA706R = 2; ELSE IF CGRA706 = 4 THEN CGRA706R =1; ELSE 
CGRA706R=.; 
CGRA806 = 2; 
SUMGRA = GRA104 + GRA204 + GRA304R + GRA404 + GRA504R + GRA604 + GRA704R + 
GRA804;SUMCGRA = CGRA108 + CGRA208 + CGRA308R + CGRA508R + CGRA608 + CGRA708R 
+  
CGRA808; 
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SUMCGRA06 = CGRA106 + CGRA206 + CGRA306R + CGRA506R + CGRA606 + CGRA706R + 
CGRA806; 
IF SUMCGRA = . THEN SUMCGRA = SUMCGRA06; 
IF SUMGRA = . THEN SUMGRA = 24; IF AFQT06 = . THEN AFQT06 = 31928; else 
afqt06=afqt06; LOGAFQT06 = LOG(AFQT06);  
IF ED08 = . THEN ED08 = 12;  
IF INCOME08 = . THEN INCOME08 = 20000; else income08=income08; 
LOGINCOME08 = LOG(INCOME08); 
INCOME08_1000=INCOME08/1000;  
IF CPPVTRAW86 = . THEN CPPVTRAW86 = 57; else CPPVTRAW86=CPPVTRAW86; 
LOGCPPVTRAW86 = LOG(CPPVTRAW86);  
IF CED08 = . THEN CED08 = 12;  
IF CINCOME08 = . THEN CINCOME08 = 7400; else cincome08=cincome08; 
LOGCINCOME08 = LOG(CINCOME08); CINCOME08_1000=CINCOME08/1000; 
 
 
 
IF SUMGRA; 
IF AFQT06; 
IF ED08; 
IF INCOME08; 
IF SUMCGRA; 
IF CPPVTRAW86; 
IF CED08; 
IF CINCOME08; 
IF SUMCFB; 
 
IF SUMCFB GT 3 THEN HICFB=1;  
ELSE IF 3 LE SUMCFB LE 14 THEN HICFB=0;  
ELSE HICFB=.; 
 
IF CFB108 = 1 THEN HICFB1=1; ELSE IF 1 LT CFB108 LE 5 THEN HICFB1=0; ELSE 
HICFB1=.;  
IF CFB208 = 1 THEN HICFB2=1; ELSE IF 1 LT CFB208 LE 5 THEN HICFB2=0; ELSE 
HICFB2=.;  
IF CFB308 = 1 THEN HICFB3=1; ELSE IF 1 LT CFB308 LE 4 THEN HICFB3=0; ELSE 
HICFB3=.;  
 
PROC FREQ; TABLES CFB108 HICFB1 CFB208 HICFB2 CFB308 HICFB3 CSEX; RUN; 
 
PROC FREQ; TABLES 
    GRA104 
    GRA204 
    GRA304R 
 GRA404 
    GRA504R 
 GRA604 
 GRA704R 
    GRA804 
 
 CGRA108 
    CGRA208 
    CGRA308R 
  
   CGRA508R   
 CGRA608 
    CGRA708R 
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 CGRA808 
  
   
CFB108 CFB208 CFB308; RUN; 
    
PROC MEANS; VAR CGRA106 CGRA206 CGRA306 CGRA406 CGRA506 CGRA606 CGRA706 
CGRA108 CGRA208 CGRA308 CGRA508 CGRA608 CGRA708 CGRA808; 
RUN; 
 
PROC MEANS MEDIAN MEAN STD MIN MAX N; VAR 
     AFQT06 
  ED08 
  CPPVTRAW86 
  CED08 
  CINCOME08 
  SUMCFB 
  INCOME08 
     SUMGRA 
  SUMCGRA 
 SUMCFB; 
  RUN; 
 
 
PROC LOGISTIC DESCENDING; MODEL HICFB1 = SUMGRA LOGAFQT06 ED08 INCOME08_1000 
SUMCGRA LOGCPPVTRAW86 CED08 CINCOME08_1000 / STB;  
  RUN; 
  
PROC LOGISTIC DESCENDING; MODEL HICFB2 = SUMGRA LOGAFQT06 ED08 INCOME08_1000 
SUMCGRA LOGCPPVTRAW86 CED08 CINCOME08_1000 / STB;  
  RUN; 
 
PROC LOGISTIC DESCENDING; MODEL HICFB3 = SUMGRA LOGAFQT06 ED08 INCOME08_1000 
SUMCGRA LOGCPPVTRAW86 CED08 CINCOME08_1000 / STB;  
  RUN; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
DATA DISS.P2; SET DISS.FINAL; 
 
IF CSEX=1 THEN CSEX=1; 
ELSE IF CSEX=2 THEN CSEX=0; *1=MALE 0=FEMALE; 
 
SUMCFB=CFB108 + CFB208 + CFB308; 
 
CINCOME08=SUM(CWAGE08, CFARMB08); 
 
 
IF GRA104 IN (8 9) THEN DELETE; IF GRA204 IN (8 9) THEN DELETE; IF GRA304 IN 
(8 9) THEN DELETE; IF GRA404 IN (8 9) THEN DELETE; IF GRA504 IN (8 9) THEN 
DELETE;  
IF GRA604 IN (8 9) THEN DELETE; IF GRA704 IN (8 9) THEN DELETE; IF GRA804 IN 
(8 9) THEN DELETE;  
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IF WAGE08 = . THEN WAGE08 = ((WAGELOW08 + WAGEHI08) / 2); 
INCOME08 = SUM(MIL08, WAGE08, FARM08); 
IF GRA304 = 1 THEN GRA304R = 4; ELSE IF GRA304 = 2 THEN GRA304R = 3; ELSE IF 
GRA304 = 3 THEN GRA304R = 2; ELSE IF GRA304 = 4 THEN GRA304R =1;ELSE GRA304R 
=.; 
IF GRA504 = 1 THEN GRA504R = 4; ELSE IF GRA504 = 2 THEN GRA504R = 3; ELSE IF 
GRA504 = 3 THEN GRA504R = 2; ELSE IF GRA504 = 4 THEN GRA504R =1;ELSE GRA504R 
=.; 
IF GRA704 = 1 THEN GRA704R = 4; ELSE IF GRA704 = 2 THEN GRA704R = 3; ELSE IF 
GRA704 = 3 THEN GRA704R = 2; ELSE IF GRA704 = 4 THEN GRA704R =1;ELSE GRA704R 
=.; 
IF CGRA308 = 1 THEN CGRA308R = 4; ELSE IF CGRA308 = 2 THEN CGRA308R = 3; ELSE 
IF CGRA308 = 3 THEN CGRA308R = 2; ELSE IF CGRA308 = 4 THEN CGRA308R =1; ELSE 
CGRA308R=.; 
IF CGRA508 = 1 THEN CGRA508R = 4; ELSE IF CGRA508 = 2 THEN CGRA508R = 3; ELSE 
IF CGRA508 = 3 THEN CGRA508R = 2; ELSE IF CGRA508 = 4 THEN CGRA508R =1; ELSE 
CGRA508R=.; 
IF CGRA708 = 1 THEN CGRA708R = 4; ELSE IF CGRA708 = 2 THEN CGRA708R = 3; ELSE 
IF CGRA708 = 3 THEN CGRA708R = 2; ELSE IF CGRA708 = 4 THEN CGRA708R =1; ELSE 
CGRA708R=.; 
IF CGRA306 = 1 THEN CGRA306R = 4; ELSE IF CGRA306 = 2 THEN CGRA306R = 3; ELSE 
IF CGRA306 = 3 THEN CGRA306R = 2; ELSE IF CGRA306 = 4 THEN CGRA306R =1; ELSE 
CGRA306R=.; 
IF CGRA506 = 1 THEN CGRA506R = 4; ELSE IF CGRA506 = 2 THEN CGRA506R = 3; ELSE 
IF CGRA506 = 3 THEN CGRA506R = 2; ELSE IF CGRA506 = 4 THEN CGRA506R =1; ELSE 
CGRA506R=.; 
IF CGRA706 = 1 THEN CGRA706R = 4; ELSE IF CGRA706 = 2 THEN CGRA706R = 3; ELSE 
IF CGRA706 = 3 THEN CGRA706R = 2; ELSE IF CGRA706 = 4 THEN CGRA706R =1; ELSE 
CGRA706R=.; 
CGRA806 = 2; 
SUMGRA = GRA104 + GRA204 + GRA304R + GRA404 + GRA504R + GRA604 + GRA704R + 
GRA804;SUMCGRA = CGRA108 + CGRA208 + CGRA308R + CGRA508R + CGRA608 +  
CGRA708R + CGRA808; 
SUMCGRA06 = CGRA106 + CGRA206 + CGRA306R + CGRA406 + CGRA506R + CGRA606 + 
CGRA706R + CGRA806; 
IF SUMCGRA = . THEN SUMCGRA = SUMCGRA06; 
IF SUMGRA = . THEN SUMGRA = 24; IF AFQT06 = . THEN AFQT06 = 31928;LOGAFQT06 = 
LOG(AFQT06); IF ED08 = . THEN ED08 = 12;  
IF INCOME08 = . THEN INCOME08 = 20000;  
LOGINCOME08 = LOG(INCOME08);  
IF CPPVTRAW86 = . THEN CPPVTRAW86 = 57; else CPPVTRAW86=CPPVTRAW86; 
logCPPVTRAW86 = LOG(CPPVTRAW86);  
IF CED08 = . THEN CED08 = 12;  
IF CINCOME08 = . THEN CINCOME08 = 7400; else cincome08=cincome08; 
LOGCINCOME08 = LOG(CINCOME08); 
 
 
 
IF SUMGRA; 
IF AFQT06; 
IF ED08; 
IF INCOME08; 
IF SUMCGRA; 
IF CPPVTRAW86; 
IF CED08; 
IF CINCOME08; 
IF SUMCFB; 
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IF SUMCFB GT 3 THEN HICFB=1;  
ELSE IF 3 LE SUMCFB LE 14 THEN HICFB=0;  
ELSE HICFB=.; 
 
IF CFB108 = 1 THEN HICFB1=1; ELSE IF 1 LT CFB108 LE 5 THEN HICFB1=0; ELSE 
HICFB1=.;  
IF CFB208 = 1 THEN HICFB2=1; ELSE IF 1 LT CFB208 LE 5 THEN HICFB2=0; ELSE 
HICFB2=.;  
IF CFB308 = 1 THEN HICFB3=1; ELSE IF 1 LT CFB308 LE 4 THEN HICFB3=0; ELSE 
HICFB3=.;  
 
PROC FREQ; TABLES CFB108 HICFB1 CFB208 HICFB2 CFB308 HICFB3 CSEX; RUN; 
 
PROC FREQ; TABLES 
    GRA104 
    GRA204 
    GRA304R 
 GRA404 
    GRA504R 
 GRA604 
 GRA704R 
    GRA804 
 
 CGRA108 
    CGRA208 
    CGRA308R 
 
   CGRA508R   
 CGRA608 
    CGRA708R 
 CGRA808 
   
CFB108 CFB208 CFB308; RUN; 
    
PROC MEANS; VAR CGRA106 CGRA206 CGRA306 CGRA406 CGRA506 CGRA606 CGRA706 
CGRA108 CGRA208 CGRA308  CGRA508 CGRA608 CGRA708 CGRA808; 
RUN; 
 
PROC MEANS MEDIAN MEAN STD MIN MAX N; VAR 
     AFQT06 
  ED08 
  CPPVTRAW86 
  CED08 
  CINCOME08 
  SUMCFB 
  INCOME08 
     SUMGRA 
  SUMCGRA 
 HICFB1 HICFB2 HICFB3 CSEX; 
  RUN; 
 
 
PROC LOGISTIC DESCENDING; MODEL HICFB1 = SUMGRA LOGAFQT06 ED08 LOGINCOME08 
SUMCGRA LOGCPPVTRAW86 CED08 LOGCINCOME08 / STB;  
  RUN; 
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PROC LOGISTIC DESCENDING; MODEL HICFB2 = SUMGRA LOGAFQT06 ED08 LOGINCOME08 
SUMCGRA LOGCPPVTRAW86 CED08 LOGCINCOME08 / STB;  
  RUN; 
 
PROC LOGISTIC DESCENDING; MODEL HICFB3 = SUMGRA LOGAFQT06 ED08 LOGINCOME08 
SUMCGRA LOGCPPVTRAW86 CED08 LOGCINCOME08 / STB;  
  RUN;  
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                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                             HOW OFTEN PUTS OFF BUYING NECESSARY 2008 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CFB108    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1         534       39.53           534        39.53 
                        2         392       29.02           926        68.54 
                        3         277       20.50          1203        89.05 
                        4          80        5.92          1283        94.97 
                        5          68        5.03          1351       100.00 
 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   HICFB1    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        0         817       60.47           817        60.47 
                        1         534       39.53          1351       100.00 
 
 
                                   DIFFICULTY PAYING BILLS 2008 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CFB208    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1         468       34.64           468        34.64 
                        2         400       29.61           868        64.25 
                        3         288       21.32          1156        85.57 
                        4         117        8.66          1273        94.23 
                        5          78        5.77          1351       100.00 
 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   HICFB2    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        0         883       65.36           883        65.36 
                        1         468       34.64          1351       100.00 
 
 
                               MONEY LEFT OVER AT END OF MONTH 2008 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CFB308    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1         132        9.77           132         9.77 
                        2         619       45.82           751        55.59 
                        3         478       35.38          1229        90.97 
                        4         122        9.03          1351       100.00 
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                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   HICFB3    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        0        1219       90.23          1219        90.23 
                        1         132        9.77          1351       100.00 
 
 
                                           SEX OF CHILD 
 
                                                     Cumulative    Cumulative 
                    CSEX    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                    ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                       0         680       50.33           680        50.33 
                       1         671       49.67          1351       100.00 
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                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                      FAMILY ATTITUDES - WOMAN'S PLACE IS IN THE HOME? 2004 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   GRA104    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1          30        2.32            30         2.32 
                        2          95        7.35           125         9.67 
                        3         543       42.03           668        51.70 
                        4         624       48.30          1292       100.00 
 
                                      Frequency Missing = 59 
 
 
                     FAMILY ATTITUDES - WIFE HAS NOT TIME FOR OTHER EMP 2004 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   GRA204    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1          53        4.10            53         4.10 
                        2         129        9.98           182        14.09 
                        3         674       52.17           856        66.25 
                        4         436       33.75          1292       100.00 
 
                                      Frequency Missing = 59 
 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   GRA304R    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         1         212       16.41           212        16.41 
                         2         546       42.26           758        58.67 
                         3         404       31.27          1162        89.94 
                         4         130       10.06          1292       100.00 
 
                                      Frequency Missing = 59 
 
 
                     FAMILY ATTITUDES - EMP OF WIVES LEADS TO DELINQUEN 2004 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   GRA404    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1          47        3.64            47         3.64 
                        2         256       19.81           303        23.45 
                        3         759       58.75          1062        82.20 
                        4         230       17.80          1292       100.00 
 
                                      Frequency Missing = 59 
174 
 
 
                                          The SAS System           17:13 Tuesday, May 15, 2012  42 
 
                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   GRA504R    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         1          23        1.78            23         1.78 
                         2         149       11.53           172        13.31 
                         3         699       54.10           871        67.41 
                         4         421       32.59          1292       100.00 
 
                                      Frequency Missing = 59 
 
 
                       FAMILY ATTITUDES - TRAD HUSBAND/WIFE ROLES BEST 2004 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   GRA604    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1          49        3.79            49         3.79 
                        2         235       18.19           284        21.98 
                        3         696       53.87           980        75.85 
                        4         312       24.15          1292       100.00 
 
                                      Frequency Missing = 59 
 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   GRA704R    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         1          13        1.01            13         1.01 
                         2          42        3.25            55         4.26 
                         3         669       51.78           724        56.04 
                         4         568       43.96          1292       100.00 
 
                                      Frequency Missing = 59 
 
 
                     FAMILY ATTITUDES - WOMEN ARE HAPPIER IN TRAD ROLES 2004 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   GRA804    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1          67        5.19            67         5.19 
                        2         286       22.14           353        27.32 
                        3         762       58.98          1115        86.30 
                        4         177       13.70          1292       100.00 
 
                                      Frequency Missing = 59 
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                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                                A WOMANS PLACE IS IN THE HOME 2008 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CGRA108    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         1          17       36.96            17        36.96 
                         2          21       45.65            38        82.61 
                         3           7       15.22            45        97.83 
                         4           1        2.17            46       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 1305 
 
 
                             A WIFE HAS NO TIME FOR OUTSIDE EMPL 2008 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CGRA208    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         1          11       23.91            11        23.91 
                         2          28       60.87            39        84.78 
                         3           6       13.04            45        97.83 
                         4           1        2.17            46       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 1305 
 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  CGRA308R    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         1           4        8.70             4         8.70 
                         2          23       50.00            27        58.70 
                         3          14       30.43            41        89.13 
                         4           5       10.87            46       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 1305 
 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  CGRA508R    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         1          14       30.43            14        30.43 
                         2          27       58.70            41        89.13 
                         3           4        8.70            45        97.83 
                         4           1        2.17            46       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 1305 
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                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                             HUSBND SHOULD ACHIEVE, WIFE AT HOME 2008 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CGRA608    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         1           4        8.70             4         8.70 
                         2          30       65.22            34        73.91 
                         3          12       26.09            46       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 1305 
 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  CGRA708R    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         1          16       34.78            16        34.78 
                         2          29       63.04            45        97.83 
                         4           1        2.17            46       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 1305 
 
 
                              WOMEN HAPPIER STAYING HOME W KIDS 2008 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CGRA808    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         1           2        4.35             2         4.35 
                         2          29       63.04            31        67.39 
                         3          15       32.61            46       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 1305 
 
 
                             HOW OFTEN PUTS OFF BUYING NECESSARY 2008 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CFB108    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1         534       39.53           534        39.53 
                        2         392       29.02           926        68.54 
                        3         277       20.50          1203        89.05 
                        4          80        5.92          1283        94.97 
                        5          68        5.03          1351       100.00 
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                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                                   DIFFICULTY PAYING BILLS 2008 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CFB208    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1         468       34.64           468        34.64 
                        2         400       29.61           868        64.25 
                        3         288       21.32          1156        85.57 
                        4         117        8.66          1273        94.23 
                        5          78        5.77          1351       100.00 
 
 
                               MONEY LEFT OVER AT END OF MONTH 2008 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CFB308    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1         132        9.77           132         9.77 
                        2         619       45.82           751        55.59 
                        3         478       35.38          1229        90.97 
                        4         122        9.03          1351       100.00 
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                                       The MEANS Procedure 
 
Variable  Label                                        N          Mean       Std Dev       Minimum 
ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
CGRA106   A WOMANS PLACE IS IN THE HOME 2006        1305     1.7118774     0.6655789     1.0000000 
CGRA206   A WIFE HAS NO TIME FOR OUTSIDE EMPL 2006  1305     1.8865900     0.6595310     1.0000000 
CGRA306   A WORKING WIFE FEELS MORE USEFUL 2006     1305     2.5547893     0.7931516     1.0000000 
CGRA406   EMPL OF BOTH PARENTS IS NECESSARY 2006    1304     3.1142638     0.7106118     1.0000000 
CGRA506   HUSBND SHOULD ACHIEVE, WIFE AT HOME 2006  1305     2.0314176     0.6701981     1.0000000 
CGRA606   MEN SHOULD SHARE WORK AROUND HOUSE 2006   1305     3.3425287     0.5860663     1.0000000 
CGRA706   WOMEN HAPPIER STAYING HOME W KIDS 2006    1305     2.1325670     0.6917934     1.0000000 
CGRA108   A WOMANS PLACE IS IN THE HOME 2008          46     1.8260870     0.7689632     1.0000000 
CGRA208   A WIFE HAS NO TIME FOR OUTSIDE EMPL 2008    46     1.9347826     0.6799403     1.0000000 
CGRA308   A WORKING WIFE FEELS MORE USEFUL 2008       46     2.5652174     0.8069744     1.0000000 
CGRA508   EMPL OF BOTH PARENTS IS NECESSARY 2008      46     3.1739130     0.6767356     1.0000000 
CGRA608   HUSBND SHOULD ACHIEVE, WIFE AT HOME 2008    46     2.1739130     0.5697698     1.0000000 
CGRA708   MEN SHOULD SHARE WORK AROUND HOUSE 2008     46     3.3043478     0.5914038     1.0000000 
CGRA808   WOMEN HAPPIER STAYING HOME W KIDS 2008      46     2.2826087     0.5441831     1.0000000 
ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
 
                 Variable  Label                                          Maximum 
                 ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                 CGRA106   A WOMANS PLACE IS IN THE HOME 2006           4.0000000 
                 CGRA206   A WIFE HAS NO TIME FOR OUTSIDE EMPL 2006     4.0000000 
                 CGRA306   A WORKING WIFE FEELS MORE USEFUL 2006        4.0000000 
                 CGRA406   EMPL OF BOTH PARENTS IS NECESSARY 2006       4.0000000 
                 CGRA506   HUSBND SHOULD ACHIEVE, WIFE AT HOME 2006     4.0000000 
                 CGRA606   MEN SHOULD SHARE WORK AROUND HOUSE 2006      4.0000000 
                 CGRA706   WOMEN HAPPIER STAYING HOME W KIDS 2006       4.0000000 
                 CGRA108   A WOMANS PLACE IS IN THE HOME 2008           4.0000000 
                 CGRA208   A WIFE HAS NO TIME FOR OUTSIDE EMPL 2008     4.0000000 
                 CGRA308   A WORKING WIFE FEELS MORE USEFUL 2008        4.0000000 
                 CGRA508   EMPL OF BOTH PARENTS IS NECESSARY 2008       4.0000000 
                 CGRA608   HUSBND SHOULD ACHIEVE, WIFE AT HOME 2008     3.0000000 
                 CGRA708   MEN SHOULD SHARE WORK AROUND HOUSE 2008      4.0000000 
                 CGRA808   WOMEN HAPPIER STAYING HOME W KIDS 2008       3.0000000 
                 ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
179 
 
 
                                          The SAS System           17:13 Tuesday, May 15, 2012  47 
 
                                       The MEANS Procedure 
 
Variable     Label                                           Median           Mean        Std Dev 
ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
AFQT06       PROFILES AFQT PRCTILE 2006 (REV) 81           25589.00       30289.20       24150.97 
ED08         HIGHEST GRADE COMPLTD (REV) 2008            12.0000000     12.7017024      2.1954138 
CPPVTRAW86   PPVT: TOTAL RAW SCORE 86                    57.0000000     57.7653590     30.4363406 
CED08        HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED AS OF 2008 2008     12.0000000     12.9785344      2.2221740 
CINCOME08                                                  23453.00       26606.55       20411.22 
SUMCFB                                                    6.0000000      6.7290896      2.5538420 
INCOME08                                                   24000.00       28078.42       21682.16 
SUMGRA                                                   24.0000000     24.1273131      3.1449080 
SUMCGRA                                                  17.0000000     17.1184308      1.6002433 
ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
 
   Variable     Label                                          Minimum         Maximum       N 
   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
   AFQT06       PROFILES AFQT PRCTILE 2006 (REV) 81        172.0000000        98645.00    1351 
   ED08         HIGHEST GRADE COMPLTD (REV) 2008             3.0000000      20.0000000    1351 
   CPPVTRAW86   PPVT: TOTAL RAW SCORE 86                     1.0000000     141.0000000    1351 
   CED08        HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED AS OF 2008 2008      7.0000000      20.0000000    1351 
   CINCOME08                                                45.0000000       129116.00    1351 
   SUMCFB                                                    3.0000000      14.0000000    1351 
   INCOME08                                                100.0000000       307823.00    1351 
   SUMGRA                                                   13.0000000      32.0000000    1351 
   SUMCGRA                                                  10.0000000      23.0000000    1351 
   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
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                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                                        Model Information 
 
                          Data Set                      DISS.P2 
                          Response Variable             HICFB1 
                          Number of Response Levels     2 
                          Model                         binary logit 
                          Optimization TechnI.Q.ue        Fisher's scoring 
 
 
                             Number of Observations Read        1351 
                             Number of Observations Used        1351 
 
 
                                         Response Profile 
 
                                Ordered                      Total 
                                  Value       HICFB1     Frequency 
 
                                      1            1           534 
                                      2            0           817 
 
                                 Probability modeled is HICFB1=1. 
 
 
                                     Model Convergence Status 
 
                          Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
 
                                       Model Fit Statistics 
 
                                                           Intercept 
                                            Intercept            and 
                              Criterion          Only     Covariates 
 
                              AIC            1815.161       1735.630 
                              SC             1820.370       1782.508 
                              -2 Log L       1813.161       1717.630 
 
 
                             Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
 
                     Test                 Chi-Square       DF     Pr > ChiSq 
 
                     Likelihood Ratio        95.5308        8         <.0001 
                     Score                   92.8475        8         <.0001 
                     Wald                    85.7801        8         <.0001 
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                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                             Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
                                         Standard          Wald                  Standardized 
     Parameter         DF    Estimate       Error    Chi-Square    Pr > ChiSq        Estimate 
 
     Intercept          1     -3.0057      0.8967       11.2356        0.0008 
     SUMGRA             1     -0.0596      0.0190        9.8917        0.0017         -0.1034 
     LOGAFQT06          1      0.2555      0.0606       17.7587        <.0001          0.1659 
     ED08               1      0.0795      0.0303        6.8828        0.0087          0.0962 
     INCOME08_1000      1    -0.00028     0.00286        0.0099        0.9207        -0.00340 
     SUMCGRA            1      0.0126      0.0364        0.1194        0.7297          0.0111 
     LOGCPPVTRAW86      1     -0.1498      0.0837        3.1989        0.0737         -0.0585 
     CED08              1      0.0354      0.0284        1.5492        0.2132          0.0434 
     CINCOME08_1000     1      0.0142     0.00317       20.1618        <.0001          0.1601 
 
 
                                       Odds Ratio Estimates 
 
                                             Point          95% Wald 
                        Effect            Estimate      Confidence Limits 
 
                        SUMGRA               0.942       0.908       0.978 
                        LOGAFQT06            1.291       1.146       1.454 
                        ED08                 1.083       1.020       1.149 
                        INCOME08_1000        1.000       0.994       1.005 
                        SUMCGRA              1.013       0.943       1.087 
                        LOGCPPVTRAW86        0.861       0.731       1.014 
                        CED08                1.036       0.980       1.095 
                        CINCOME08_1000       1.014       1.008       1.021 
 
 
                   Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
 
                        % Concordant      64.0    Somers' D    0.285 
                        % Discordant      35.5    Gamma        0.286 
                        % Tied             0.4    Tau-a        0.136 
                        Pairs                 436278    c            0.643 
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                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                                        Model Information 
 
                          Data Set                      DISS.P2 
                          Response Variable             HICFB2 
                          Number of Response Levels     2 
                          Model                         binary logit 
                          Optimization TechnI.Q.ue        Fisher's scoring 
 
 
                             Number of Observations Read        1351 
                             Number of Observations Used        1351 
 
 
                                         Response Profile 
 
                                Ordered                      Total 
                                  Value       HICFB2     Frequency 
 
                                      1            1           468 
                                      2            0           883 
 
                                 Probability modeled is HICFB2=1. 
 
 
                                     Model Convergence Status 
 
                          Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
 
                                       Model Fit Statistics 
 
                                                           Intercept 
                                            Intercept            and 
                              Criterion          Only     Covariates 
 
                              AIC            1745.319       1682.643 
                              SC             1750.528       1729.520 
                              -2 Log L       1743.319       1664.643 
 
 
                             Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
 
                     Test                 Chi-Square       DF     Pr > ChiSq 
 
                     Likelihood Ratio        78.6766        8         <.0001 
                     Score                   78.7390        8         <.0001 
                     Wald                    71.0917        8         <.0001 
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                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                             Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
                                         Standard          Wald                  Standardized 
     Parameter         DF    Estimate       Error    Chi-Square    Pr > ChiSq        Estimate 
 
     Intercept          1     -0.5993      0.9028        0.4407        0.5068 
     SUMGRA             1     -0.0711      0.0193       13.5866        0.0002         -0.1233 
     LOGAFQT06          1      0.0704      0.0589        1.4289        0.2319          0.0457 
     ED08               1      0.0720      0.0307        5.4870        0.0192          0.0871 
     INCOME08_1000      1    -0.00387     0.00305        1.6129        0.2041         -0.0462 
     SUMCGRA            1     0.00165      0.0371        0.0020        0.9645         0.00146 
     LOGCPPVTRAW86      1     -0.1699      0.0850        3.9953        0.0456         -0.0663 
     CED08              1      0.0180      0.0290        0.3830        0.5360          0.0220 
     CINCOME08_1000     1      0.0205     0.00327       39.4477        <.0001          0.2310 
 
 
                                       Odds Ratio Estimates 
 
                                             Point          95% Wald 
                        Effect            Estimate      Confidence Limits 
 
                        SUMGRA               0.931       0.897       0.967 
                        LOGAFQT06            1.073       0.956       1.204 
                        ED08                 1.075       1.012       1.141 
                        INCOME08_1000        0.996       0.990       1.002 
                        SUMCGRA              1.002       0.931       1.077 
                        LOGCPPVTRAW86        0.844       0.714       0.997 
                        CED08                1.018       0.962       1.078 
                        CINCOME08_1000       1.021       1.014       1.027 
 
 
                   Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
 
                        % Concordant      62.7    Somers' D    0.259 
                        % Discordant      36.8    Gamma        0.261 
                        % Tied             0.5    Tau-a        0.118 
                        Pairs                 413244    c            0.630 
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                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                                        Model Information 
 
                          Data Set                      DISS.P2 
                          Response Variable             HICFB3 
                          Number of Response Levels     2 
                          Model                         binary logit 
                          Optimization TechnI.Q.ue        Fisher's scoring 
 
 
                             Number of Observations Read        1351 
                             Number of Observations Used        1351 
 
 
                                         Response Profile 
 
                                Ordered                      Total 
                                  Value       HICFB3     Frequency 
 
                                      1            1           132 
                                      2            0          1219 
 
                                 Probability modeled is HICFB3=1. 
 
 
                                     Model Convergence Status 
 
                          Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
 
                                       Model Fit Statistics 
 
                                                           Intercept 
                                            Intercept            and 
                              Criterion          Only     Covariates 
 
                              AIC             866.672        825.973 
                              SC              871.880        872.850 
                              -2 Log L        864.672        807.973 
 
 
                             Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
 
                     Test                 Chi-Square       DF     Pr > ChiSq 
 
                     Likelihood Ratio        56.6991        8         <.0001 
                     Score                   64.1481        8         <.0001 
                     Wald                    56.0772        8         <.0001 
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                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                             Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
                                         Standard          Wald                  Standardized 
     Parameter         DF    Estimate       Error    Chi-Square    Pr > ChiSq        Estimate 
 
     Intercept          1     -6.8654      1.5926       18.5837        <.0001 
     SUMGRA             1     -0.0290      0.0305        0.9050        0.3414         -0.0502 
     LOGAFQT06          1      0.2258      0.1078        4.3853        0.0362          0.1466 
     ED08               1      0.0964      0.0468        4.2350        0.0396          0.1167 
     INCOME08_1000      1    -0.00165     0.00461        0.1284        0.7201         -0.0197 
     SUMCGRA            1      0.0487      0.0603        0.6543        0.4186          0.0430 
     LOGCPPVTRAW86      1      0.0250      0.1443        0.0300        0.8624         0.00977 
     CED08              1      0.0232      0.0445        0.2718        0.6021          0.0284 
     CINCOME08_1000     1      0.0203     0.00403       25.3134        <.0001          0.2280 
 
 
                                       Odds Ratio Estimates 
 
                                             Point          95% Wald 
                        Effect            Estimate      Confidence Limits 
 
                        SUMGRA               0.971       0.915       1.031 
                        LOGAFQT06            1.253       1.015       1.548 
                        ED08                 1.101       1.005       1.207 
                        INCOME08_1000        0.998       0.989       1.007 
                        SUMCGRA              1.050       0.933       1.182 
                        LOGCPPVTRAW86        1.025       0.773       1.361 
                        CED08                1.023       0.938       1.117 
                        CINCOME08_1000       1.020       1.012       1.029 
 
 
                   Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
 
                        % Concordant      67.7    Somers' D    0.366 
                        % Discordant      31.2    Gamma        0.370 
                        % Tied             1.1    Tau-a        0.065 
                        Pairs                 160908    c            0.683 
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                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                             HOW OFTEN PUTS OFF BUYING NECESSARY 2008 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CFB108    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1         533       39.48           533        39.48 
                        2         392       29.04           925        68.52 
                        3         277       20.52          1202        89.04 
                        4          80        5.93          1282        94.96 
                        5          68        5.04          1350       100.00 
 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   HICFB1    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        0         817       60.52           817        60.52 
                        1         533       39.48          1350       100.00 
 
 
                                   DIFFICULTY PAYING BILLS 2008 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CFB208    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1         468       34.67           468        34.67 
                        2         400       29.63           868        64.30 
                        3         287       21.26          1155        85.56 
                        4         117        8.67          1272        94.22 
                        5          78        5.78          1350       100.00 
 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   HICFB2    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        0         882       65.33           882        65.33 
                        1         468       34.67          1350       100.00 
 
 
                               MONEY LEFT OVER AT END OF MONTH 2008 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CFB308    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1         132        9.78           132         9.78 
                        2         618       45.78           750        55.56 
                        3         478       35.41          1228        90.96 
                        4         122        9.04          1350       100.00 
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                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   HICFB3    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        0        1218       90.22          1218        90.22 
                        1         132        9.78          1350       100.00 
 
 
                                           SEX OF CHILD 
 
                                                     Cumulative    Cumulative 
                    CSEX    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                    ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                       0         679       50.30           679        50.30 
                       1         671       49.70          1350       100.00 
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                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                      FAMILY ATTITUDES - WOMAN'S PLACE IS IN THE HOME? 2004 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   GRA104    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1          30        2.32            30         2.32 
                        2          95        7.36           125         9.68 
                        3         542       41.98           667        51.67 
                        4         624       48.33          1291       100.00 
 
                                      Frequency Missing = 59 
 
 
                     FAMILY ATTITUDES - WIFE HAS NOT TIME FOR OTHER EMP 2004 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   GRA204    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1          53        4.11            53         4.11 
                        2         129        9.99           182        14.10 
                        3         673       52.13           855        66.23 
                        4         436       33.77          1291       100.00 
 
                                      Frequency Missing = 59 
 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   GRA304R    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         1         212       16.42           212        16.42 
                         2         545       42.22           757        58.64 
                         3         404       31.29          1161        89.93 
                         4         130       10.07          1291       100.00 
 
                                      Frequency Missing = 59 
 
 
                     FAMILY ATTITUDES - EMP OF WIVES LEADS TO DELINQUEN 2004 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   GRA404    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1          47        3.64            47         3.64 
                        2         256       19.83           303        23.47 
                        3         758       58.71          1061        82.18 
                        4         230       17.82          1291       100.00 
 
                                      Frequency Missing = 59 
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                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   GRA504R    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         1          23        1.78            23         1.78 
                         2         149       11.54           172        13.32 
                         3         698       54.07           870        67.39 
                         4         421       32.61          1291       100.00 
 
                                      Frequency Missing = 59 
 
 
                       FAMILY ATTITUDES - TRAD HUSBAND/WIFE ROLES BEST 2004 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   GRA604    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1          49        3.80            49         3.80 
                        2         234       18.13           283        21.92 
                        3         696       53.91           979        75.83 
                        4         312       24.17          1291       100.00 
 
                                      Frequency Missing = 59 
 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   GRA704R    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         1          13        1.01            13         1.01 
                         2          42        3.25            55         4.26 
                         3         668       51.74           723        56.00 
                         4         568       44.00          1291       100.00 
 
                                      Frequency Missing = 59 
 
 
                     FAMILY ATTITUDES - WOMEN ARE HAPPIER IN TRAD ROLES 2004 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   GRA804    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1          67        5.19            67         5.19 
                        2         286       22.15           353        27.34 
                        3         761       58.95          1114        86.29 
                        4         177       13.71          1291       100.00 
 
                                      Frequency Missing = 59 
190 
 
 
                                          The SAS System           17:13 Tuesday, May 15, 2012  58 
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                                A WOMANS PLACE IS IN THE HOME 2008 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CGRA108    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         1          17       36.96            17        36.96 
                         2          21       45.65            38        82.61 
                         3           7       15.22            45        97.83 
                         4           1        2.17            46       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 1304 
 
 
                             A WIFE HAS NO TIME FOR OUTSIDE EMPL 2008 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CGRA208    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         1          11       23.91            11        23.91 
                         2          28       60.87            39        84.78 
                         3           6       13.04            45        97.83 
                         4           1        2.17            46       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 1304 
 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  CGRA308R    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         1           4        8.70             4         8.70 
                         2          23       50.00            27        58.70 
                         3          14       30.43            41        89.13 
                         4           5       10.87            46       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 1304 
 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  CGRA508R    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         1          14       30.43            14        30.43 
                         2          27       58.70            41        89.13 
                         3           4        8.70            45        97.83 
                         4           1        2.17            46       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 1304 
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                             HUSBND SHOULD ACHIEVE, WIFE AT HOME 2008 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CGRA608    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         1           4        8.70             4         8.70 
                         2          30       65.22            34        73.91 
                         3          12       26.09            46       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 1304 
 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  CGRA708R    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         1          16       34.78            16        34.78 
                         2          29       63.04            45        97.83 
                         4           1        2.17            46       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 1304 
 
 
                              WOMEN HAPPIER STAYING HOME W KIDS 2008 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CGRA808    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         1           2        4.35             2         4.35 
                         2          29       63.04            31        67.39 
                         3          15       32.61            46       100.00 
 
                                     Frequency Missing = 1304 
 
 
                             HOW OFTEN PUTS OFF BUYING NECESSARY 2008 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CFB108    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1         533       39.48           533        39.48 
                        2         392       29.04           925        68.52 
                        3         277       20.52          1202        89.04 
                        4          80        5.93          1282        94.96 
                        5          68        5.04          1350       100.00 
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                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                                   DIFFICULTY PAYING BILLS 2008 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CFB208    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1         468       34.67           468        34.67 
                        2         400       29.63           868        64.30 
                        3         287       21.26          1155        85.56 
                        4         117        8.67          1272        94.22 
                        5          78        5.78          1350       100.00 
 
 
                               MONEY LEFT OVER AT END OF MONTH 2008 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   CFB308    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        1         132        9.78           132         9.78 
                        2         618       45.78           750        55.56 
                        3         478       35.41          1228        90.96 
                        4         122        9.04          1350       100.00 
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                                       The MEANS Procedure 
 
Variable  Label                                        N          Mean       Std Dev       Minimum 
ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
CGRA106   A WOMANS PLACE IS IN THE HOME 2006        1304     1.7124233     0.6655419     1.0000000 
CGRA206   A WIFE HAS NO TIME FOR OUTSIDE EMPL 2006  1304     1.8865031     0.6597765     1.0000000 
CGRA306   A WORKING WIFE FEELS MORE USEFUL 2006     1304     2.5552147     0.7933069     1.0000000 
CGRA406   EMPL OF BOTH PARENTS IS NECESSARY 2006    1304     3.1142638     0.7106118     1.0000000 
CGRA506   HUSBND SHOULD ACHIEVE, WIFE AT HOME 2006  1304     2.0314417     0.6704547     1.0000000 
CGRA606   MEN SHOULD SHARE WORK AROUND HOUSE 2006   1304     3.3427914     0.5862143     1.0000000 
CGRA706   WOMEN HAPPIER STAYING HOME W KIDS 2006    1304     2.1326687     0.6920491     1.0000000 
CGRA108   A WOMANS PLACE IS IN THE HOME 2008          46     1.8260870     0.7689632     1.0000000 
CGRA208   A WIFE HAS NO TIME FOR OUTSIDE EMPL 2008    46     1.9347826     0.6799403     1.0000000 
CGRA308   A WORKING WIFE FEELS MORE USEFUL 2008       46     2.5652174     0.8069744     1.0000000 
CGRA508   EMPL OF BOTH PARENTS IS NECESSARY 2008      46     3.1739130     0.6767356     1.0000000 
CGRA608   HUSBND SHOULD ACHIEVE, WIFE AT HOME 2008    46     2.1739130     0.5697698     1.0000000 
CGRA708   MEN SHOULD SHARE WORK AROUND HOUSE 2008     46     3.3043478     0.5914038     1.0000000 
CGRA808   WOMEN HAPPIER STAYING HOME W KIDS 2008      46     2.2826087     0.5441831     1.0000000 
ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
 
                 Variable  Label                                          Maximum 
                 ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                 CGRA106   A WOMANS PLACE IS IN THE HOME 2006           4.0000000 
                 CGRA206   A WIFE HAS NO TIME FOR OUTSIDE EMPL 2006     4.0000000 
                 CGRA306   A WORKING WIFE FEELS MORE USEFUL 2006        4.0000000 
                 CGRA406   EMPL OF BOTH PARENTS IS NECESSARY 2006       4.0000000 
                 CGRA506   HUSBND SHOULD ACHIEVE, WIFE AT HOME 2006     4.0000000 
                 CGRA606   MEN SHOULD SHARE WORK AROUND HOUSE 2006      4.0000000 
                 CGRA706   WOMEN HAPPIER STAYING HOME W KIDS 2006       4.0000000 
                 CGRA108   A WOMANS PLACE IS IN THE HOME 2008           4.0000000 
                 CGRA208   A WIFE HAS NO TIME FOR OUTSIDE EMPL 2008     4.0000000 
                 CGRA308   A WORKING WIFE FEELS MORE USEFUL 2008        4.0000000 
                 CGRA508   EMPL OF BOTH PARENTS IS NECESSARY 2008       4.0000000 
                 CGRA608   HUSBND SHOULD ACHIEVE, WIFE AT HOME 2008     3.0000000 
                 CGRA708   MEN SHOULD SHARE WORK AROUND HOUSE 2008      4.0000000 
                 CGRA808   WOMEN HAPPIER STAYING HOME W KIDS 2008       3.0000000 
                 ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
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                                       The MEANS Procedure 
 
Variable     Label                                           Median           Mean        Std Dev 
ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
AFQT06       PROFILES AFQT PRCTILE 2006 (REV) 81           25615.00       30303.25       24154.39 
ED08         HIGHEST GRADE COMPLTD (REV) 2008            12.0000000     12.7022222      2.1961442 
CPPVTRAW86   PPVT: TOTAL RAW SCORE 86                    57.0000000     57.7666667     30.4475816 
CED08        HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED AS OF 2008 2008     12.0000000     12.9792593      2.2228377 
CINCOME08                                                  23453.00       26590.71       20410.47 
SUMCFB                                                    6.0000000      6.7296296      2.5547112 
INCOME08                                                   24000.00       28082.92       21689.57 
SUMGRA                                                   24.0000000     24.1288889      3.1455398 
SUMCGRA                                                  20.0000000     20.1266667      1.9327730 
HICFB1                                                            0      0.3948148      0.4889920 
HICFB2                                                            0      0.3466667      0.4760848 
HICFB3                                                            0      0.0977778      0.2971240 
CSEX         SEX OF CHILD                                         0      0.4970370      0.5001765 
ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
 
   Variable     Label                                          Minimum         Maximum       N 
   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
   AFQT06       PROFILES AFQT PRCTILE 2006 (REV) 81        172.0000000        98645.00    1350 
   ED08         HIGHEST GRADE COMPLTD (REV) 2008             3.0000000      20.0000000    1350 
   CPPVTRAW86   PPVT: TOTAL RAW SCORE 86                     1.0000000     141.0000000    1350 
   CED08        HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED AS OF 2008 2008      7.0000000      20.0000000    1350 
   CINCOME08                                                45.0000000       129116.00    1350 
   SUMCFB                                                    3.0000000      14.0000000    1350 
   INCOME08                                                100.0000000       307823.00    1350 
   SUMGRA                                                   13.0000000      32.0000000    1350 
   SUMCGRA                                                  10.0000000      25.0000000    1350 
   HICFB1                                                            0       1.0000000    1350 
   HICFB2                                                            0       1.0000000    1350 
   HICFB3                                                            0       1.0000000    1350 
   CSEX         SEX OF CHILD                                         0       1.0000000    1350 
   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
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                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                                        Model Information 
 
                          Data Set                      DISS.P2 
                          Response Variable             HICFB1 
                          Number of Response Levels     2 
                          Model                         binary logit 
                          Optimization TechnI.Q.ue        Fisher's scoring 
 
 
                             Number of Observations Read        1350 
                             Number of Observations Used        1350 
 
 
                                         Response Profile 
 
                                Ordered                      Total 
                                  Value       HICFB1     Frequency 
 
                                      1            1           533 
                                      2            0           817 
 
                                 Probability modeled is HICFB1=1. 
 
 
                                     Model Convergence Status 
 
                          Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
 
                                       Model Fit Statistics 
 
                                                           Intercept 
                                            Intercept            and 
                              Criterion          Only     Covariates 
 
                              AIC            1813.304       1744.432 
                              SC             1818.511       1791.303 
                              -2 Log L       1811.304       1726.432 
 
 
                             Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
 
                     Test                 Chi-Square       DF     Pr > ChiSq 
 
                     Likelihood Ratio        84.8716        8         <.0001 
                     Score                   81.7895        8         <.0001 
                     Wald                    77.1101        8         <.0001 
196 
 
 
                                          The SAS System           17:13 Tuesday, May 15, 2012  64 
 
                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                            Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
                                        Standard          Wald                  Standardized 
     Parameter        DF    Estimate       Error    Chi-Square    Pr > ChiSq        Estimate 
 
     Intercept         1     -4.4051      1.0675       17.0285        <.0001 
     SUMGRA            1     -0.0584      0.0189        9.5269        0.0020         -0.1013 
     LOGAFQT06         1      0.2797      0.0605       21.3930        <.0001          0.1817 
     ED08              1      0.0843      0.0300        7.8878        0.0050          0.1020 
     LOGINCOME08       1     -0.0563      0.0627        0.8061        0.3693         -0.0313 
     SUMCGRA           1     -0.0120      0.0298        0.1629        0.6865         -0.0128 
     logCPPVTRAW86     1     -0.1085      0.0830        1.7103        0.1909         -0.0424 
     CED08             1      0.0453      0.0285        2.5276        0.1119          0.0555 
     LOGCINCOME08      1      0.2197      0.0692       10.0931        0.0015          0.1157 
 
 
                                      Odds Ratio Estimates 
 
                                            Point          95% Wald 
                        Effect           Estimate      Confidence Limits 
 
                        SUMGRA              0.943       0.909       0.979 
                        LOGAFQT06           1.323       1.175       1.489 
                        ED08                1.088       1.026       1.154 
                        LOGINCOME08         0.945       0.836       1.069 
                        SUMCGRA             0.988       0.932       1.047 
                        logCPPVTRAW86       0.897       0.762       1.056 
                        CED08               1.046       0.990       1.106 
                        LOGCINCOME08        1.246       1.088       1.427 
 
 
                   Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
 
                        % Concordant      63.6    Somers' D    0.276 
                        % Discordant      36.0    Gamma        0.277 
                        % Tied             0.5    Tau-a        0.132 
                        Pairs                 435461    c            0.638 
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                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                                        Model Information 
 
                          Data Set                      DISS.P2 
                          Response Variable             HICFB2 
                          Number of Response Levels     2 
                          Model                         binary logit 
                          Optimization TechnI.Q.ue        Fisher's scoring 
 
 
                             Number of Observations Read        1350 
                             Number of Observations Used        1350 
 
 
                                         Response Profile 
 
                                Ordered                      Total 
                                  Value       HICFB2     Frequency 
 
                                      1            1           468 
                                      2            0           882 
 
                                 Probability modeled is HICFB2=1. 
 
 
                                     Model Convergence Status 
 
                          Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
 
                                       Model Fit Statistics 
 
                                                           Intercept 
                                            Intercept            and 
                              Criterion          Only     Covariates 
 
                              AIC            1744.469       1692.472 
                              SC             1749.676       1739.342 
                              -2 Log L       1742.469       1674.472 
 
 
                             Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
 
                     Test                 Chi-Square       DF     Pr > ChiSq 
 
                     Likelihood Ratio        67.9970        8         <.0001 
                     Score                   65.2713        8         <.0001 
                     Wald                    61.8271        8         <.0001 
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                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                            Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
                                        Standard          Wald                  Standardized 
     Parameter        DF    Estimate       Error    Chi-Square    Pr > ChiSq        Estimate 
 
     Intercept         1     -1.8667      1.0815        2.9789        0.0844 
     SUMGRA            1     -0.0683      0.0193       12.5575        0.0004         -0.1184 
     LOGAFQT06         1      0.0976      0.0586        2.7707        0.0960          0.0634 
     ED08              1      0.0775      0.0303        6.5464        0.0105          0.0938 
     LOGINCOME08       1     -0.1406      0.0633        4.9349        0.0263         -0.0782 
     SUMCGRA           1     -0.0607      0.0302        4.0309        0.0447         -0.0647 
     logCPPVTRAW86     1     -0.1113      0.0845        1.7322        0.1881         -0.0435 
     CED08             1      0.0286      0.0290        0.9717        0.3242          0.0351 
     LOGCINCOME08      1      0.3624      0.0748       23.4888        <.0001          0.1908 
 
 
                                      Odds Ratio Estimates 
 
                                            Point          95% Wald 
                        Effect           Estimate      Confidence Limits 
 
                        SUMGRA              0.934       0.899       0.970 
                        LOGAFQT06           1.102       0.983       1.237 
                        ED08                1.081       1.018       1.147 
                        LOGINCOME08         0.869       0.767       0.984 
                        SUMCGRA             0.941       0.887       0.999 
                        logCPPVTRAW86       0.895       0.758       1.056 
                        CED08               1.029       0.972       1.089 
                        LOGCINCOME08        1.437       1.241       1.664 
 
 
                   Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
 
                        % Concordant      63.2    Somers' D    0.270 
                        % Discordant      36.3    Gamma        0.271 
                        % Tied             0.5    Tau-a        0.122 
                        Pairs                 412776    c            0.635 
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                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                                        Model Information 
 
                          Data Set                      DISS.P2 
                          Response Variable             HICFB3 
                          Number of Response Levels     2 
                          Model                         binary logit 
                          Optimization TechnI.Q.ue        Fisher's scoring 
 
 
                             Number of Observations Read        1350 
                             Number of Observations Used        1350 
 
 
                                         Response Profile 
 
                                Ordered                      Total 
                                  Value       HICFB3     Frequency 
 
                                      1            1           132 
                                      2            0          1218 
 
                                 Probability modeled is HICFB3=1. 
 
 
                                     Model Convergence Status 
 
                          Convergence criterion (GCONV=1E-8) satisfied. 
 
 
                                       Model Fit Statistics 
 
                                                           Intercept 
                                            Intercept            and 
                              Criterion          Only     Covariates 
 
                              AIC             866.466        822.200 
                              SC              871.674        869.071 
                              -2 Log L        864.466        804.200 
 
 
                             Testing Global Null Hypothesis: BETA=0 
 
                     Test                 Chi-Square       DF     Pr > ChiSq 
 
                     Likelihood Ratio        60.2660        8         <.0001 
                     Score                   53.6718        8         <.0001 
                     Wald                    51.8642        8         <.0001 
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                                      The LOGISTIC Procedure 
 
                            Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
                                        Standard          Wald                  Standardized 
     Parameter        DF    Estimate       Error    Chi-Square    Pr > ChiSq        Estimate 
 
     Intercept         1    -11.2985      1.9586       33.2772        <.0001 
     SUMGRA            1     -0.0242      0.0304        0.6364        0.4250         -0.0420 
     LOGAFQT06         1      0.2507      0.1062        5.5747        0.0182          0.1628 
     ED08              1      0.1189      0.0466        6.5151        0.0107          0.1439 
     LOGINCOME08       1     -0.1873      0.0988        3.5914        0.0581         -0.1042 
     SUMCGRA           1      0.0109      0.0492        0.0492        0.8244          0.0116 
     logCPPVTRAW86     1      0.0552      0.1445        0.1461        0.7023          0.0216 
     CED08             1      0.0143      0.0444        0.1038        0.7473          0.0176 
     LOGCINCOME08      1      0.6787      0.1390       23.8455        <.0001          0.3573 
 
 
                                      Odds Ratio Estimates 
 
                                            Point          95% Wald 
                        Effect           Estimate      Confidence Limits 
 
                        SUMGRA              0.976       0.920       1.036 
                        LOGAFQT06           1.285       1.044       1.582 
                        ED08                1.126       1.028       1.234 
                        LOGINCOME08         0.829       0.683       1.006 
                        SUMCGRA             1.011       0.918       1.113 
                        logCPPVTRAW86       1.057       0.796       1.403 
                        CED08               1.014       0.930       1.107 
                        LOGCINCOME08        1.971       1.501       2.588 
 
 
                   Association of Predicted Probabilities and Observed Responses 
 
                        % Concordant      68.5    Somers' D    0.377 
                        % Discordant      30.7    Gamma        0.380 
                        % Tied             0.8    Tau-a        0.067 
                        Pairs                 160776    c            0.689 
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                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                              HOW FREQ R & PTR ARGUE ABT MONEY 2008 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                  CMONEY08    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                         1         145       15.76           145        15.76 
                         2         262       28.48           407        44.24 
                         3         302       32.83           709        77.07 
                         4         211       22.93           920       100.00 
 
 
                                                        Cumulative    Cumulative 
                 CMONEY08bi    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                 ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                          0         513       55.76           513        55.76 
                          1         407       44.24           920       100.00 
 
 
                                                       Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   SUMCGRA    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        11           1        0.11             1         0.11 
                        12           1        0.11             2         0.22 
                        13           1        0.11             3         0.33 
                        15          12        1.30            15         1.63 
                        16          12        1.30            27         2.93 
                        17          32        3.48            59         6.41 
                        18          61        6.63           120        13.04 
                        19         143       15.54           263        28.59 
                        20         244       26.52           507        55.11 
                        21         230       25.00           737        80.11 
                        22         107       11.63           844        91.74 
                        23          53        5.76           897        97.50 
                        24          18        1.96           915        99.46 
                        25           4        0.43           919        99.89 
                        26           1        0.11           920       100.00 
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                                        The FREQ Procedure 
 
                                                      Cumulative    Cumulative 
                   SUMCFB    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                   ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                        3          60        6.52            60         6.52 
                        4         135       14.67           195        21.20 
                        5         143       15.54           338        36.74 
                        6         159       17.28           497        54.02 
                        7         100       10.87           597        64.89 
                        8          99       10.76           696        75.65 
                        9          73        7.93           769        83.59 
                       10          72        7.83           841        91.41 
                       11          28        3.04           869        94.46 
                       12          28        3.04           897        97.50 
                       13          11        1.20           908        98.70 
                       14          12        1.30           920       100.00 
 
 
                                                    Cumulative    Cumulative 
                     BO    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                     ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                      0         485       52.72           485        52.72 
                      1         435       47.28           920       100.00 
 
 
                                           SEX OF CHILD 
 
                                                     Cumulative    Cumulative 
                    CSEX    Frequency     %     Frequency      % 
                    ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
                       0         435       47.28           435        47.28 
                       1         485       52.72           920       100.00 
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                                       The MEANS Procedure 
 
Variable               Label                                       N           Mean        Std Dev 
ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
CMONEY08               HOW FREQ R & PTR ARGUE ABT MONEY 2008     920      2.6293478      1.0041305 
SUMCFB                                                           920      6.7532609      2.5596242 
LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS                                             920      3.9655060      0.6242552 
CAGE08                 AGE OF YA IN YEARS AT DATE OF INTV 2008   920     27.2065217      3.0053925 
CED08                  HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED AS OF 2008 2008   920     12.8565217      2.2965795 
CINCOME08                                                        851       28362.12       22468.78 
BO                                                               920      0.4728261      0.4995326 
CSEX                   SEX OF CHILD                              920      0.5271739      0.4995326 
ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
 
  Variable               Label                                          Minimum         Maximum 
  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
  CMONEY08               HOW FREQ R & PTR ARGUE ABT MONEY 2008        1.0000000       4.0000000 
  SUMCFB                                                              3.0000000      14.0000000 
  LOGCPPVTRAW86_NOMISS                                                1.6094379       4.9487599 
  CAGE08                 AGE OF YA IN YEARS AT DATE OF INTV 2008     18.0000000      35.0000000 
  CED08                  HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED AS OF 2008 2008      7.0000000      20.0000000 
  CINCOME08                                                                   0       125000.00 
  BO                                                                          0       1.0000000 
  CSEX                   SEX OF CHILD                                         0       1.0000000 
  ƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒ 
 
 
                                        The CORR Procedure 
 
  11  Variables:    HICFB1        HICFB2        HICFB3        SUMGRA        LOGAFQT06     ED08 
                    LOGINCOME08   SUMCGRA       logCPPVTRAW86 CED08         LOGCINCOME08 
 
 
                                        Simple Statistics 
 
 Variable                N          Mean       Std Dev           Sum       Minimum       Maximum 
 
 HICFB1               1350       0.39481       0.48899     533.00000             0       1.00000 
 HICFB2               1350       0.34667       0.47608     468.00000             0       1.00000 
 HICFB3               1350       0.09778       0.29712     132.00000             0       1.00000 
 SUMGRA               1350      24.12889       3.14554         32574      13.00000      32.00000 
 LOGAFQT06            1350       9.84181       1.17809         13286       5.14749      11.49928 
 ED08                 1350      12.70222       2.19614         17148       3.00000      20.00000 
 LOGINCOME08          1350       9.88531       1.00878         13345       4.60517      12.63728 
 SUMCGRA              1350      20.12667       1.93277         27171      10.00000      25.00000 
 logCPPVTRAW86        1350       3.85983       0.70857          5211             0       4.94876 
 CED08                1350      12.97926       2.22284         17522       7.00000      20.00000 
 LOGCINCOME08         1350       9.84504       0.95499         13291       3.80666      11.76847 
 
                                        Simple Statistics 
 
                     Variable         Label 
 
                     HICFB1 
                     HICFB2 
                     HICFB3 
                     SUMGRA 
                     LOGAFQT06 
                     ED08             HIGHEST GRADE COMPLTD (REV) 2008 
                     LOGINCOME08 
                     SUMCGRA 
                     logCPPVTRAW86 
                     CED08            HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED AS OF 2008 2008 
                     LOGCINCOME08 
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                                        The CORR Procedure 
 
 
                           Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 1350 
                                    Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
 
                                                HICFB1        HICFB2        HICFB3        SUMGRA 
 
  HICFB1                                       1.00000       0.41149       0.19839      -0.05094 
                                                              <.0001        <.0001        0.0613 
 
  HICFB2                                       0.41149       1.00000       0.33140      -0.09322 
                                                <.0001                      <.0001        0.0006 
 
  HICFB3                                       0.19839       0.33140       1.00000      -0.01270 
                                                <.0001        <.0001                      0.6410 
 
  SUMGRA                                      -0.05094      -0.09322      -0.01270       1.00000 
                                                0.0613        0.0006        0.6410 
 
  LOGAFQT06                                    0.17995       0.07349       0.11439       0.19678 
                                                <.0001        0.0069        <.0001        <.0001 
 
  ED08                                         0.15098       0.09101       0.11054       0.12757 
  HIGHEST GRADE COMPLTD (REV) 2008              <.0001        0.0008        <.0001        <.0001 
 
  LOGINCOME08                                  0.05847      -0.00200       0.03153       0.12359 
                                                0.0317        0.9414        0.2471        <.0001 
 
  SUMCGRA                                     -0.01687      -0.06629      -0.00093       0.08230 
                                                0.5356        0.0149        0.9728        0.0025 
 
  logCPPVTRAW86                                0.00002      -0.01216       0.04852       0.07518 
                                                0.9993        0.6554        0.0747        0.0057 
 
  CED08                                        0.12689       0.08735       0.09062       0.05721 
  HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED AS OF 2008 2008       <.0001        0.0013        0.0009        0.0356 
 
  LOGCINCOME08                                 0.12753       0.14809       0.15362      -0.00267 
                                                <.0001        <.0001        <.0001        0.9219 
 
 
                           Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 1350 
                                   Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
 
                                             LOGAFQT06         ED08     LOGINCOME08      SUMCGRA 
 
 HICFB1                                        0.17995      0.15098         0.05847     -0.01687 
                                                <.0001       <.0001          0.0317       0.5356 
 
 HICFB2                                        0.07349      0.09101        -0.00200     -0.06629 
                                                0.0069       0.0008          0.9414       0.0149 
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                                        The CORR Procedure 
 
 
                           Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 1350 
                                   Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
 
                                             LOGAFQT06         ED08     LOGINCOME08      SUMCGRA 
 
 HICFB3                                        0.11439      0.11054         0.03153     -0.00093 
                                                <.0001       <.0001          0.2471       0.9728 
 
 SUMGRA                                        0.19678      0.12757         0.12359      0.08230 
                                                <.0001       <.0001          <.0001       0.0025 
 
 LOGAFQT06                                     1.00000      0.40657         0.30138      0.00787 
                                                             <.0001          <.0001       0.7728 
 
 ED08                                          0.40657      1.00000         0.24488      0.02286 
 HIGHEST GRADE COMPLTD (REV) 2008               <.0001                       <.0001       0.4012 
 
 LOGINCOME08                                   0.30138      0.24488         1.00000      0.04671 
                                                <.0001       <.0001                       0.0862 
 
 SUMCGRA                                       0.00787      0.02286         0.04671      1.00000 
                                                0.7728       0.4012          0.0862 
 
 logCPPVTRAW86                                 0.12307      0.04801         0.11688      0.03637 
                                                <.0001       0.0778          <.0001       0.1817 
 
 CED08                                         0.26169      0.29166         0.17687      0.06135 
 HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED AS OF 2008 2008        <.0001       <.0001          <.0001       0.0242 
 
 LOGCINCOME08                                  0.16158      0.09190         0.26429     -0.02463 
                                                <.0001       0.0007          <.0001       0.3659 
 
                           Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 1350 
                                    Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
 
                                                         log 
                                                  CPPVTRAW86         CED08      LOGCINCOME08 
 
      HICFB1                                         0.00002       0.12689           0.12753 
                                                      0.9993        <.0001            <.0001 
 
      HICFB2                                        -0.01216       0.08735           0.14809 
                                                      0.6554        0.0013            <.0001 
 
      HICFB3                                         0.04852       0.09062           0.15362 
                                                      0.0747        0.0009            <.0001 
 
      SUMGRA                                         0.07518       0.05721          -0.00267 
                                                      0.0057        0.0356            0.9219 
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                                        The CORR Procedure 
 
                           Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 1350 
                                    Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0 
 
                                                         log 
                                                  CPPVTRAW86         CED08      LOGCINCOME08 
 
      LOGAFQT06                                      0.12307       0.26169           0.16158 
                                                      <.0001        <.0001            <.0001 
 
      ED08                                           0.04801       0.29166           0.09190 
      HIGHEST GRADE COMPLTD (REV) 2008                0.0778        <.0001            0.0007 
 
      LOGINCOME08                                    0.11688       0.17687           0.26429 
                                                      <.0001        <.0001            <.0001 
 
      SUMCGRA                                        0.03637       0.06135          -0.02463 
                                                      0.1817        0.0242            0.3659 
 
      logCPPVTRAW86                                  1.00000       0.13209           0.16129 
                                                                    <.0001            <.0001 
 
      CED08                                          0.13209       1.00000           0.30946 
      HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED AS OF 2008 2008         <.0001                          <.0001 
 
      LOGCINCOME08                                   0.16129       0.30946           1.00000 
                                                      <.0001        <.0001 
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